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ABSTRACT 
 




 Once described as a “diligent apprentice,” China has emerged in the early 21st 
century as an active and sometimes contentious participant in the UN Security Council. 
For the U.S., China has complicated decision-making on a range of issues, including 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe and Libya. China’s material interests 
in several of these “pariah states” has raised problems for attempts to target such regimes 
through the Council and its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   
 Yet China’s positions on these cases have been mixed. It has sometimes aligned 
with the U.S. (as it did on Libya), and has, at other times, stood in opposition (as on 
Burma). This study seeks to explain the variance. Drawing on an array of sources, it 
weighs five hypotheses against the empirical record. These explanations are centered on 
two sets of factors. First are the strategic risks of cooperation, i.e. the chance that 
coercion will harm China’s interests. Second are the political ramifications, i.e. the 
potential costs to China’s relations with the U.S., regional stakeholders and others 
associated with particular positions.  
 Prefaced by a historical narrative of China’s changing role in the Council from 
1971 through 2011, the analysis covers eight cases, spanning China’s diplomacy on 
North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. Five are positive cases, insofar as 
Beijing supported U.S.-backed resolutions. These include the issues of North Korea and 
Iran. Three are negative cases, in which China maintained opposition. These include 
proposed sanctions on Sudan in 2007, and draft resolutions on Burma and Zimbabwe.  
   
 The primary conclusion is that both strategic and political explanations can 
provide insight into the development of China’s positions. Specifically, China’s 
bargaining power is at its greatest when credible outside options exist and when there is a 
division in attitudes towards the legitimacy of the preferences of the U.S. and its allies, 
and weakest under the opposite conditions. From a policy point of view, the U.S. will 
have to craft nimble diplomatic strategies and carefully assess when to proceed versus 
when to yield. However, Washington can assume that China will remain a status-quo 
oriented, and relatively predictable, participant within the UNSC.   
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“The well-bred, throbbing sound that goes on behind the Bauhaus 
façade of the United Nations is not the air conditioning. It is the 
pulse of politics.”1 




 Two recent episodes illustrate the constraints on U.S. influence in the UN 
Security Council (UNSC). First, the U.S. was unable to secure a Council statement 
condemning the November 22, 2010, North Korean artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong 
Island, a Yellow Sea territory controlled by South Korea, which resulted in the deaths of 
two civilians and two military personnel. Following a month of consultations, in which 
members diverged over North Korea’s culpability and the possibility that a statement 
could incite further tensions, the Council abandoned attempts to issue a formal response. 
According to U.S. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, “I think it’s safe to predict that the gaps 
that remain are unlikely to be bridged.”2 Washington had been unable to gather sufficient 
support to criticize, let alone substantively respond to, a military attack against one of its 
own allies.  
 Second, on March 17, 2011, the U.S., along with allies Britain and France, was 
barely able to muster 10 votes in favor of a no-fly zone on Libya. The resolution was 
intended to prevent the killing of civilians, following an uprising against the rule of 
Muammar el-Qaddafi based in the eastern city of Benghazi. Qaddafi had previously 
pledged to show “no mercy” as his forces were poised to kill the rebels and their 
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 Quoted in Ernst B. Haas, “Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts,” 
American Political Science Review 49 (1955), 40.  
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sympathizers.3 Five states—the so-called BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China, 
as well as Germany—abstained. According to David Bosco, the probable reasons that 
China and Russia did not simply veto the resolution were that they didn’t care enough 
about the issue, and that they may have even “liked the idea of the West spending time 
and resources in Libya.”4 The tenuousness of the vote underscored the limits on U.S. 
diplomatic power in the Council.       
 However, these vignettes are not meant to suggest that U.S. influence had waned 
a decade into the 21st century, or even that its leverage was on a downward trajectory. 
The U.S. had been able to secure sweeping sanctions against Libya, including an 
International Criminal Court indictment of Qaddafi, in February 2011. It had obtained 
sanctions against North Korea in 2006 and 2009, Iran four times between 2006 and 2010, 
Eritrea in 2009, and Côte D’Ivoire in 2010, among others. Rather, the point is that U.S. 
influence in the Council is constrained. Though preponderant in overall indices of 
military and economic power, the U.S. may not desire or be able to use those resources to 
its advantage in particular settings.5 Opponents, with goals and capabilities of their own, 
may be able to impede the U.S. in the UNSC or any other international institution.     
 This study examines the contours of U.S. influence in the Security Council 
through an investigation of the positions of one of its principal interlocutors—China. As a 
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 “Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army Is Coming Tonight,” Al-Arabiya, March 17, 2011.  
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 This is consistent with a “relational” view of power in the international system, in which a state’s relative 
influence is situation-dependent. For a discussion, see: Bruce D. Jones, “Largest Minority Shareholder in 
Global Order LLC: The Changing Balance of Influence and U.S. Strategy,” Brookings Policy Paper No. 25, 
March 2011, 4-6; Brian C. Schmidt, “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power,” Millennium 33 (2005), 
523-549; David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Beth Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 177-191. For the alternative view, that 
military power is fungible, see: Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in The Use of Force, ed. Robert J. 
Art and Kenneth N. Waltz  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 3-22.  
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veto-holding member of the UNSC with increasing economic and political stakes in 
many of the regimes that the U.S. has targeted through the Council, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has the prerogative, and potentially the resolve, to prevent the 
U.S. from achieving its objectives.  Yet China’s cooperativeness vis-à-vis the U.S. has 
varied. In some cases (such as Iran), it has agreed to punish its own partner; in others 
(such as Burma), it has not. Identifying the reasons for that variance is necessary to 
explain why China sometimes endorses the U.S. position, and why it sometimes says 
“no.”   
 The argument developed in this study is that China’s cooperativeness depends on 
both strategic and political factors. Strategically, China is more likely to agree with U.S. 
calls for coercion when other options, such as mediation, have failed, and when 
concessions have been made that protect China’s material interests. Politically, it is more 
likely to support the U.S. when the costs of opposition are high. This is so when the issue 
is of major importance to the U.S., when Russia has favored the U.S. position, and when 
key regional stakeholders have offered their support as well. Conversely, China tends to 
oppose the U.S. when these conditions are not present. The larger point is that Council 
negotiations do not turn purely on the issue at hand, but are also embedded in broader 
political relationships. It is necessary to refer to both sets of factors in order to understand 
why states adopt the positions they do.  
 The introduction proceeds in three sections. The first establishes the significance 
of the Security Council as a venue for international cooperation on a range of issues, and 
its relevance for the U.S. The second defends the selection of China as the sole object of 
inquiry, explaining why policymakers and observers of Council politics in general should 
  
4 
devote more attention to China’s positions therein. The third section provides an outline 
for the following chapters and previews the conclusions.  
 
The Security Council in World Politics  
 
 The Security Council has emerged as a central forum for the adjudication of 
threats to international peace and security in the two decades since the end of the Cold 
War. Moreover, it has become a site in which the very definition of what constitutes a 
“threat” has evolved, such that the Council has become engaged in a wider range of 
problems than in prior years. For the U.S., working within this institution involves a 
combination of political and strategic benefits, which are likely to increase as the U.S. 
places more emphasis on multilateralism.   
 The Security Council, like the Council of the League of Nations which preceded it, 
is a “collective security” decision-making organization. As a concept, collective security 
rests on the principle of universality, or “all against one.”6 As Inis Claude explains,  
The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security for all states, 
by the action of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by 
the arbitrary unleashing of their power… Ideal collective security… offer[s] the 
certainty, backed by legal obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with 
collective sanctions.7 
Collective security contrasts both the idea of self-help, in which states individually 
respond, or prepare to respond, to aggression, and with the concept of alliances, in which 
blocs of states are formed to balance potentially aggressive outsiders.   
                                                 
6
 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe,” 
International Security 16 (1991), 118.  
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 During the Cold War, the UNSC played only an auxiliary role in world politics. 
The Council held an average of 67.5 public meetings per year between 1946 and 1989. 
Through 1989, only eight resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,8 
while sanctions against just two states (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) were 
imposed.9 The Council approved 18 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in its first 45 years. 
These followed a “traditional” model, in which the goal was to provide a buffer between 
belligerents, but not to address the fundamental causes of conflict.10 An example is the 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has patrolled the Israeli-Lebanon border 
since 1978.11  
 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the institution has taken a more prominent role in 
collective security. Between 1990 and 2008, the Council met, on average, 166.1 times per 
year. It passed 423 resolutions under Chapter VII (i.e., 34.9% of 1213 resolutions in 
                                                 
8
 The Security Council itself is constituted under Chapter V of the UN Charter, which confers on the 
Council the “primary responsibility of international peace and security.” Chapter VII provides the Council 
the authority to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression,” and permits it to authorize tools, including sanctions and the use of force, to “maintain or 




 Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were imposed by Resolution 253 (1968) and terminated by 
Resolution 460 (1979), while those against South Africa were imposed by Resolution 421 (1977) and 
terminated by Resolution 919 (1994). 
 
10
 According to Fravel, the “traditional model of peacekeeping emphasizes consent and impartiality, which 
in turn require the nonuse of force and establishment following the conclusion of a ceasefire.” M. Taylor 




 The mandate authorizing UNIFIL specified three functions: (1) confirming Israeli withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon; (2) the restoration of international peace; and (3) aiding the Lebanese government in re-
establishing authority in the area that had been occupied by Israel during its brief incursion in March, 1978. 





total).12 It imposed sanctions on more than 20 states, including Iraq, the former 
Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, North Korea, Iran and 
Afghanistan. During the same period, it authorized 45 PKOs, in states such as Rwanda, 
Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sudan. These missions have evolved from a traditional 
model to a set of practices described as the “new interventionism.”13 Centered on 
preventive action and peace-building, these operations trained police forces, supervised 
elections, demobilized combatants, strengthened the rule of law, and protected human 
rights, among other functions.14 Table 1 illustrates the growth of the UNSC’s role in post-
Cold War era politics.  
 
Table 1: The UNSC Before and After the Cold War  
 
 1946-1989 1990-2008 
UNSC official meetings/year 67.5 (N=2903) 166.1 (N=3156) 
Vetoes/Year 5.3 (N=207, 1946-1985) 2.4 (N=56, 1986-2009) 
Vetoes/All Votes 26.3% 4.2% 
Resolutions/Year 15 (N=646) 63.8 (N=1213) 
Chapter VII Resolutions/Year .19 (N=8) 22.3 (N=423) 
New Sanctions Committees 2 21 
New PKOS/year .42 (N=18)  2.4 (N=45) 
Total Peacekeeping Personnel 17,900 (1989) 91,300 (2009) 
Sources: UN Security Council website (http://www.un.org/sc); UN Official Document System 
(http://documents.un.org); UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website: 
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/).  
 
 The Council’s expanded role can be attributed to three factors. First was the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. This meant that superpower rivalry was no longer 
channeled into Council politics, resulting in heavy veto use. Indeed, the rate of vetoes 
                                                 
12
 These data were compiled through a reading of every resolution since 1990, utilizing the UN’s Official 
Document System, online at: http://documents.un.org.  
 
13
 John N. Clarke, “Revisiting the New Interventionism,” Peace Review 14 (2002), 93-100. 
 
14
 Stefan Stähle, “China’s Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” China 




declined from 26.3% of votes between 1946 and 1985 (N=207) to 2.4% between 1986 
and 2009 (N=56).15 Decisions were more likely to be made through private consultations 
among the five permanent members (the “P5,” i.e. the U.S., Russia, China, France and 
Britain), with input from the ten non-permanent members (the “E10,” each elected for 
two-year terms through the UN General Assembly), and other interested parties.16 
Although the P5 faced internal disagreements, the institution was able to operate with less 
open friction with the end of the Cold War.  
 Second was the spread of armed conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. While the 
incidence of international war declined, the number and intensity of intrastate conflicts 
increased, beginning in the early 1980s, peaking at more than 50 conflicts in 1993, and 
then declining somewhat to about 30 per year in the 2000s.17 As Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
wrote in his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, the persistence of armed conflicts 
required the UN’s “urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an 
end.”18 Though hampered by budget constraints and the perceived apathy of its members, 
the Council authorized PKOs with increasing numbers of troops (rising from 17,900 in 
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 See: Courtney B. Smith, Politics and Processes at the United Nations: The Global Dance (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2006), 239-40; Virgil Hawkins, The Silence of the UN Security Council: Conflict and 
Peace Enforcement in the 1990s (Firenze: European Press Academic Pub., 2004), 25-6; Jochen Prantl, The 
UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 29-30. 
 
17
 Data derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2009, available online, at: 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/. 
Armed conflicts are defined here as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results 
in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” See: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009, 
Section 2.1, online at the website cited above.  
 
18
 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, General Assembly Document A/47/277 (June 17, 1992). 




1989 to over 90,000 in 2009), and approved military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq 
and elsewhere.19 
 Third was an evolving interpretation of “threats” as applicable under the UN 
Charter.   Boutros-Ghali noted a “changing context,” in which factors such as poverty, 
disease, oppression, and proliferation were creating new insecurities.20 In 2004, a panel 
commissioned by his successor, Kofi Annan, pointed to similar sources of disorder, 
arguing that Chapter VII measures, including the use of force, should be used to respond 
to both external and internal threats.21 In 2005, representatives of 191 UN member states 
signed the World Summit Outcome Document, which enshrined the “Responsibility to 
Protect” doctrine. This doctrine held that the Council may use coercive measures to 
protect civilians in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity.22 This implied a broader role for the UNSC, though, as reported in this study, 
the limits of the Council’s jurisdiction have been debated in cases such as Burma and 
Zimbabwe.  
                                                 
19
 Regarding financial limitations, the UN peacekeeping budget in 2008 stood at $7.1 billion, which was 
approximately 15% of New York City’s annual budget. For arguments about UNSC apathy, see: Christine 
Gray, “A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?” International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 56 (2007), 157 and Smith, Politics and Processes, 169. 
 
20
 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. Available online, at: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.  
 
21
 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), passim. Kofi Annan echoed the 
High-Level Panel’s conclusion in a report to the General Assembly:  
The threats to peace and security in the 21st century include not just international peace and 
conflict, but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They 
also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can 
have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life 
chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international 
system. 
Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, General Assembly Document A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005), pp. 24-5.  
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 For the U.S., working within the Security Council has offered several benefits. 
First is that UNSC authorization for U.S. decisions, especially with respect to the use of 
force, is useful in terms of “collective legitimization.”23 Given the legal basis provided by 
a Council mandate, foreign governments may be more inclined to support U.S. policy and 
contribute to political or military coalitions.24 The lack of a clear mandate may not 
prevent the U.S. from acting, as in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but it likely does 
increase the costs of doing so. That the U.S., driven by officials such as Colin Powell, 
sought a resolution in that instance demonstrates that even a relatively unilateralist 
administration sees authorization as a desired good.25 In cases such as the no-fly zone on 
Libya in March 2011, Council approval may be a sine qua non of U.S. intervention.   
 Second is that the Council can assist the U.S. in placing pressure on regimes that 
defy international human rights norms or pose external security challenges. The U.S. can, 
and does, impose unilateral sanctions on a number of regimes, including North Korea, 
Iran, Burma, Sudan, Belarus and others.26 However, seeking further, multilateral 
sanctions may be useful in two ways. First is in providing a legal basis for actors, such as 
the EU, to increase their own financial and other restrictions. Second is in involving all 
                                                 
23
 Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International 
Organization 20 (1966), 367-369. 
 
24
 A second benefit, as explained by Alexander Thompson, is that seeking UN authorization provides a 
signal to the international community that U.S. goals are limited, which also serves a purpose in coalition 
building. See: Alexander Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of 
Information Transmission,” International Organization 60 (2006), 1-34, and Alexander Thompson, 




 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 190-193; Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 4-5. 
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UN member states, including those, like China, which may be in a relatively stronger 
position to exert effective pressure. Though systematic research on the efficacy of 
contemporary UN sanctions is lacking, there is some evidence that measures can be 
effective in some situations.27 Moreover, seeking sanctions in itself addresses the 
perception of apathy on the part of the major powers.28 
 Third, the Council offers the possibility of distributing the burdens of managing 
conflicts to a wider range of actors. While the U.S. contributes significantly to the UN 
budget (22% in 2010, compared to 3.2% for China), it subsidizes PKOs, which reduce the 
need for deployments of U.S. troops in conflict zones, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.29 
Propelled by financial, training and other motives, states such as Pakistan, Nigeria and 
Jordan provide the large share of troops, in contrast to marginal contributions by 
developed countries.30 Burden sharing is especially useful for a U.S. military that is 
already stretched thin in Afghanistan and Iraq, and facing severe budgetary constraints in 
the wake of the 2008 global recession.  
                                                 
27
 Much of the current debate about sanctions revolves around the utility of ‘smart,’ or targeted sanctions, 
as opposed to comprehensive economic sanctions. Drezner finds that the former are “more humane” but 
“less effective” than the latter, but acknowledges that further research is required (as much of the current 
evidence is based on the single case of Iraq). Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted 
Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13 (2011), 96-108. Moreover, as Meghan 
L. O’Sullivan points out, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on their goals, and different goals require 
different sanctions regimes. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Iran and the Great Sanctions Debate,” The 
Washington Quarterly 33 (2010), 7-21.  
 
28
 Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart,” 104.  
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 For instance, in January 2011, the largest troop contributors for UN missions were: Pakistan (10,672 
troops), Bangladesh (10,380), India (8,680), and Nigeria (5,873). States such as these are often located near 
to conflict zones and receive generous UN funding, in addition to training and other benefits. The U.S. was 





 Finally, the trend in U.S. policy appears to be towards a greater embrace of the 
UN as a valued collective security institution. Despite few references to the UN in either 
his 2002 or 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, George W. Bush pursued 
Security Council decisions on a range of issues, from North Korea to Iran to Darfur.31 For 
his part, Barack Obama underscored his commitment to the UNSC in his May 2010 NSS:  
We need a UN capable of fulfilling its founding purpose—maintaining international 
peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and enhancing human rights. To this 
end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside 
the UN Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to 
address threats to peace and security.32  
Obama put a fine point on this preference by upgrading the status of the U.S. ambassador 
to the UN to a Cabinet-level post, and has channeled U.S. diplomacy through the 
institution on issues ranging from North Korea and Iran, to Côte D’Ivoire, to Libya. 
Though multilateralism in a post-Obama world is uncertain, the costs of unilateral action 
suggest that the U.S. will likely continue to prefer to work through the UNSC to address 
shared challenges.  
 
Why China?  
 
                                                 
31
 The 2002 NSS made only one reference to the United Nations and none to the Security Council. George 
W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White House, 
2002). It can be found online, at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-
020920.pdf. The 2006 document made two general references to the UN and one to the Security Council. 
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White 
House, 2006). It can be found at: http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf. One scholar even argues 
that Bush reversed a trend in Clinton administration, especially in the wake of the intervention in Somalia, 
away from multilateral cooperation. Lise Morjé Howard, “Sources of Change in United States-United 
Nations Relations,” Global Governance 16 (2010), 485-504. 
 
32
 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington: The White House, 2010), 46. This document 





 A constraint on pursuing policy goals through the Security Council is that the 
U.S., on occasion, faces resistance from other participants. According to UNSC voting 
rules, resolutions require the support of at least nine of the 15 members. A negative vote 
by any of the permanent members is sufficient to block approval of a resolution.33 If the 
preference is for a unanimous outcome, affirmative votes by all 15 members are 
necessary. Presidential Statements, which are sometimes used in lieu of a resolution, but 
are usually not regarded to carry the same legal weight, require the consent of all 15 
members.34 In order to determine whether its objectives are feasible, and to develop ways 
to diminish potential opposition, the U.S. needs to understand the positions of its 
interlocutors in the Council.  
 Assessing the prospects for cooperation in the UNSC should focus on the P5, 
given veto power, the transient composition of the E10, and the reality that proposals are 
generally initiated and deliberated by the P5 prior to the involvement of other actors.35 
Within the P5, the U.S. can often count on the support of Britain and France, due to 
consonant strategic and ideological interests.36 From the vantage point of cooperation, 
                                                 
33
 The rules governing the membership, agenda, leadership and voting of the Council are contained in the 




 The exact legal status of Presidential Statements is subject to interpretation. As we will see in Chapter 3, 
there was disagreement about whether or not the April 2009 statement responding to a North Korean 
‘satellite launch’ was legally binding. In general, though, Presidential Statements are considered a less 
authoritative response by the Council. An even weaker form is a ‘Press Statement.’  
 
35
 Mohammad Ayoob refers to this type of consensus-driven decision-making among a small group of key 
states as “unipolarized multipolarity,” borrowing the phrase from Barry Buzan. His contention is that a 
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then, attention has centered on the two non-Western permanent members. For instance, 
T.V. Paul suggests that China and Russia took a common position against Washington on 
Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 in an attempt to “soft balance” against U.S. power.37 
Indeed, the present study observes that the two countries have taken similar positions on 
a range of issues.38 
 However, China and Russia do not constitute a voting bloc in the UNSC. Moscow 
did not support China’s two 1990s-era vetoes,39 while China did not back Russia’s 2009 
veto of a motion to extend the UN mission in Georgia. Moreover, China is only slightly 
more likely to vote with Russia than it is with the U.S., as detailed in Chapter 1. A more 
salient point is that the two countries play different roles on different issues. For instance, 
it was China, not Russia, which impeded a Council response to North Korean’s 
November 2010 attack of Yeonpyeong Island.40 As discussed in Chapter 6, Russia’s last-
minute objections, rather than Chinese resistance, was a decisive reason for the Council’s 
failure to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe in July 2008.41 Even if they do sometimes 
coincide, the preferences of China and Russia can, and should, be assessed separately.     
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 In this context, a case can be made for a primary focus on China. The argument is 
based on five factors. First, though only a rough guide to influence in specific institutions, 
the PRC holds several advantages over Russia in aggregate indicators of power. In 2010, 
China’s GDP was valued at $9.87 trillion, having grown at 10.3% from the previous year, 
ranking third in the world. Russia had a $2.23 trillion economy, a 3.8% growth rate, 
ranked seventh.42 China’s military budget was estimated by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at $98.8 billion in 2009, a 15% increase from 2008, 
while Russia’s military budget was $61 billion, an increase of less than 5%.43 China had 
the largest military in the world, with 2.3 million troops in 2007, while Russia counted 
just over 1 million personnel.44 China’s population in 2009 was about 1.35 billion, nearly 
ten times greater than Russia’s 141 million.45  
 Second, within the Security Council, China poses a particular challenge given its 
interests in the types of states targeted by the U.S. As a measure, Figure 1 compares the 
aggregate trade between China and Russia with the nine states that earned the lowest 
score (a “7”) in the 2010 Freedom House survey of political and civil rights: Burma, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.46 As of 2011, the U.S. had placed unilateral financial sanctions on five of 
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these countries,47 and the UNSC had imposed sanctions on five as well.48 China had total 
trade valued at more than $1 billion with six of these countries,49 while Russia topped the 
$1 billion mark with only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. China’s trade surpassed 
Russia’s in all cases except for the two former Soviet republics. Based on material 
interests, China has stronger reasons than Russia to object to U.S.-backed plans to punish 
states with poor human rights records.   
 































































 Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)  
 
 The third reason concerns arms. The most compelling reason to examine closely 
Russia’s role in the Council is its status as an arms supplier. According to SIPRI, Russian 
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arms sales in 2010 amounted to about $9.8 billion, while Chinese sales stood at about 
$2.3 billion.50 However, two factors mitigate the significance of these figures. First, 
Russian sales rose by 17.6% between 2005 and 2010, while Chinese sales increased by 
370% during the same period.51 Proposed arms embargoes may meet stiffer Chinese 
resistance in future debates. Second, the U.S. government had expressed concern about 
PRC assistance in missile technology, which is typically a proscribed item in UN 
sanctions, especially towards proliferators such as North Korea, Iran, Libya and Pakistan. 
Similar concerns were not noted with regard to Russia.52  
 Fourth, a focus on China does not preclude discussion of the role of Russia or any 
other influential participant in Security Council negotiations. On the contrary, an 
assessment of the behavior of one state necessarily invites discussion of the positions of 
others. One of the explanations for China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. developed in 
Chapter 2 and considered in later chapters is that China’s support for U.S. goals is 
influenced by Russia’s preferences. The involvement of the P3, non-permanent members, 
and other interested parties are likewise included, because they can, and, in some cases, 
do, affect China’s positions. In a sense, a focused examination of a particular actor serves 
as a fixed vantage point from which the processes of cooperation in the Council writ 
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large can be observed. This contributes to the modest, but growing, literature on decision-
making in the UNSC.53  
 Fifth, analysis of PRC behavior is important because it relates to the broader issue 
of the impact of China’s rise on the international order. As John Ikenberry argues, “As 
China goes, so goes the international system. The future of a one-world system that is 
open and loosely rule-based hinges on China.”54 The relationship between rising powers 
and existing institutions does not take place at an abstract level, but occurs in the context 
of how specific countries operate within specific institutions, each with their own 
memberships, rules and purposes. China’s behavior in the Security Council is a part of 
the larger narrative, but has largely been left unexamined.55 For the U.S., understanding 
China’s role in that institution is important not only in terms of defining the limits of 
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American power in the UNSC, but in the larger sense of filling substance into the outlines 
of what the international order will look like in the middle decades of the 21st century.  
 
Chapter Outline  
 
 The study begins with a profile of China’s role in the Security Council between 
1971 and 2011. The argument in Chapter 1 is that China has maintained “strategic 
restraint” in the organization, in which positive relations with the superpowers, and the 
U.S. since the end of the Cold War, were prioritized over ideological misgivings. China 
rarely exercised its veto power, and did so only when it perceived that major interests 
were at stake. In the 2000s, though, the PRC began to take a more active role in Council 
affairs. In one sense, this meant fostering goodwill through greater participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions. In another, it meant a growing inclination to use its influence to 
affect the course of debates on a series of “pariah” states, such as North Korea, Iran, and 
Sudan.56  The reason was that China’s growing material interests in these states clashed 
with the strategic and normative goals of the U.S. and its partners.  
 Chapter 2 defines the empirical puzzle and develops the explanatory framework 
used in subsequent chapters. The puzzle is that China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. on 
pariah states has been uneven. In some cases, Beijing has acquiesced to sanctions or other 
types of pressure, while in others it has opposed Council interference. The chapter 
generates five hypotheses, grounded in the general literature on negotiations, as well as 
the specific literatures on the UN and Chinese foreign policy. The hypotheses are that 
China will be more likely to cooperate with the U.S. when: (1) alternative dispute 
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resolution mechanisms, such as UN mediation, have failed; (2) the U.S. has made 
concessions or side-payments that limit the risks of agreement for China; (3) Washington 
has applied high-level diplomatic pressure on Beijing; (4) Russia’s position has shifted 
towards the U.S.; and (5) regional stakeholders have endorsed the U.S. position.   
 The following four chapters apply these hypotheses to eight cases, five of which 
involved an agreement between the U.S. and China, and three of which were left 
unresolved. Each chapter starts with a description of China’s “dilemma” in the case, 
provides a historical background, weighs the hypotheses against the empirical record, and 
states the conclusions. Chapter 3 presents four mini-case studies of negotiations on North 
Korea between 2006 and 2009, in each of which China was able to reach a consensus 
with the U.S. Chapter 4 considers the Iranian nuclear issue, asking why Beijing 
acquiesced to a fourth round of sanctions in 2010 after months of resistance. Chapter 5 
covers the Darfur issue through the lens of China’s objections to sanctions as a way to 
prod Khartoum to accept UN peacekeepers in the spring of 2007. Chapter 6 is a paired 
comparison of China’s two most recent vetoes, on Myanmar in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 
2008, and asks why China departed from its normal practice of veto avoidance.  
 The analysis finds broad, but not unequivocal, support for the five hypotheses. 
The availability of mediation is associated with Chinese resistance to sanctions, though 
the PRC seems to put stock in dubious mediation efforts on cases where it does not 
perceive the need for an urgent response, such as Burma. Concessions do help to assuage 
China’s concerns, but there are cases, such as Darfur, in which the U.S. prefers not to 
enter into substantive talks with the PRC in the first place. U.S. diplomatic pressure does 
have an impact, though works best when there is an external shock, such as a provocative 
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missile test by North Korea. Russia’s positions do matter, although, on cases like Iran, 
Beijing has maintained opposition to the U.S. even when Moscow has warmed to 
Washington’s viewpoint. Regional stakeholders are also influential, as South Africa’s 
role on Zimbabwe makes clear, though the question of which states possess influence in 
which cases remains.  
 The conclusion makes three points. First, with some exceptions, the five 
explanations can each provide insight into China’s positions relative to the U.S. The 
implication is that, in reaching decisions, states are concerned not only with the issue at 
hand, but also with the consequences for their relationships with the other major actors in 
the negotiations. An implication of this finding, which merits further research, is that 
bargaining power among veto holders is contingent on both the availability of outside 
options and on the distribution of attitudes towards the legitimacy of specific proposals.  
Second, from a policy angle, the U.S. must develop strategies aimed at both the strategic 
and political bases of its interlocutors’ positions. Third, despite its growing use of power 
within the Council, the analysis is that China will likely continue to act as a status-quo 


















 In the first decade of the 21st century, China became entangled in a series of 
diplomatic disputes with the U.S. in the Security Council. Between 2006 and 2010, 
Beijing used its influence to weaken resolutions addressing North Korea’s missile and 
nuclear tests, and “diluted” sanctions targeted at Iran’s nuclear program.57 In 2004 and 
2005, China sparred with the West58 on the issue of Darfur, threatening to veto sanctions 
on Sudan’s oil industry, and acquiesced only to an arms embargo on non-governmental 
entities.59 In 2007, the PRC vetoed a non-binding statement of concern about political 
repression in Burma driven by the Bush administration.60 The following year, China 
vetoed proposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in the wake of electoral violence in that 
country.61 
 China’s contentious positions in the UNSC elicited pointed remarks from some 
Western observers. In 2006, James Traub wrote in the New York Times Magazine that 
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China used power to “protect abusive regimes with which it is on friendly terms,” and 
that “China is prepared to play the role of ‘spoiler’” on issues such as Sudan and Iran.62 In 
addition, some commentators have connected China’s behavior in the UNSC with a 
broader trend towards “assertiveness” vis-à-vis the West on topics ranging from climate 
change, to human rights, trade and currency policy.63 Andrew Small has opined that 
China’s counterparts have been surprised by “the brashness with which Beijing now 
asserts its interests—and its willingness to prevail, even at the expense of appearing the 
villain.”64 John Pomfret contends that “China’s increasingly anti-Western tone” casts 
doubt on the “long-held assumption…that a more powerful and prosperous China would 
be more positively inclined toward Western values and systems.”65  
 Chinese assertiveness in the UNSC is not unprecedented. On a few occasions 
during the Cold War and in the 1990s, China cast “no” votes or blocked the approval of 
particular resolutions until its requests were fulfilled. For example, in 1981 China 
defeated Western attempts to grant Kurt Waldheim a third term as UN Secretary General, 
using its veto power 16 times to support a candidate from the developing world. In the 
1990s, China threatened to, or actually did, veto the extension of a handful of UN 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) that became entangled with the issue of Taiwan, 
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watered down a resolution during the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis and withheld 
support for UN authorization of the first Gulf War until certain demands were met.  
 However, diplomatic confrontation between China and the U.S. has been 
uncommon. When it disagreed with the positions of the U.S. or others, China typically 
opted to disassociate itself through abstentions and polemics. Although it did use its veto 
power sporadically, this was more the exception than the rule. Indeed, China’s co-
negotiators took it for granted that Beijing would not actively resist proposals. As David 
Bosco notes,  
U.S. diplomats often counted on Beijing’s willingness to abstain, even on resolutions it 
disliked, rather than appear isolated or stand in the way of agreement among the other 
permanent members.66  
Broadly speaking, China’s participation in the Council until the 21st century was 
restrained, measured and largely acquiescent.  
 This chapter underlines the anomalous nature of China’s contentiousness in 21st 
century debates on pariah states, and explains the general trajectory in China’s UNSC 
diplomacy from passive to active.  
China’s restraint through the end of the 20th century can be explained as a 
strategic conclusion that intransigence was not in China’s national interest. The reasons 
were several: inexperience in the early 1970s and the need to watch and learn how the 
institution operated; the emphasis on modernization that resulted from China’s reform 
program starting in the late 1970s, which necessitated maintaining positive ties with the 
U.S. and others; the imperative not to be obstructive in the 1990s as a means to resurrect 
China’s image after the Tiananmen Square crisis; and, throughout, the lack of significant 
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economic or political stakes in the issues brought to the Security Council. By contrast, 
China emerged from the wings in the 21st century as both an ardent supporter of causes, 
such as UN peacekeeping, and as a defender of increasingly broad and complex national 
interests in pariah states, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Myanmar.   
 
Objecting from the Sidelines: The Cold War Years, 1971-1989 
 
 On October 29, 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which 
transferred representation of the seat granted to the “Republic of China” under Article 23 
of the UN Charter to the PRC. This meant that control of the “China seat” shifted from 
Taipei to Beijing. Two weeks later, a delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao 
Guanhua arrived in New York to assume what it regarded as its “rightful seat” (hefa 
xiwei) in the UN. For most of the following 18 years, China’s role in the UN, including 
the Security Council, was centered on promoting the “revolutionary” principles of anti-
hegemonism and self-determination, often in opposition to the positions of both 
superpowers. However, China rarely directly confronted either the U.S. or the USSR, 
instead making its point by refusing to participate in votes and through rhetoric. As 
Samuel Kim argues, China’s opposition was “more verbal than real.”67 By the 1980s, 
though, China had abandoned the practice of non-participation and cut down the 
frequency of its speeches on controversial topics.  
 
 The Road to New York: 1949-1971 
 
 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had sought UN membership from the 
moment it prevailed in the Chinese civil war and established the PRC in 1949. On 
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October 1, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared that accession to the UN “[is symbolic] 
as a badge of sovereignty and legitimizes the government and its status as a great 
power,”68 and sent a series of cables to the UN Secretariat arguing that the new 
government in Beijing should be represented.69 The Soviet Union declared its support, 
and the U.S. stated that it would not veto Beijing’s request if it were put to a vote.70 
However, having intervened in the Korean War in October 1950, the PRC found itself at 
odds both with the U.S. and with the UN itself, under whose auspices the U.S.-led 
counter-offensive against North Korea was waged.71 As Bosco observes, “Had China 
abstained from the Korean War, it likely would have joined the UN much earlier.”72 
 During the following two decades, the PRC was excluded from the UN primarily 
through the diplomatic maneuvering of the United States. U.S. strategy in this respect 
followed three tracks: first, ensuring that its allies would vote against proposals to admit 
China in the General Assembly; second, from 1961, sponsoring resolutions that the issue 
of China’s membership be considered as an “important question” and thus require a two-
thirds supermajority in the GA, lowering its chance of success; and, third, in the late 
1960s, advocating a plan whereby both Taiwan and China would be represented, which, 
as a violation of the “one China” principle, Beijing would never accept.73  
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A second reason for China’s delayed admission was the effects of the Cultural 
Revolution. The radicalization of domestic politics in 1966 led China to announce a 
number of “prerequisites,” such as the “expulsion of all imperialist countries” from the 
UN and a resolution denouncing the U.S. as an “aggressor” in the Korean War.74 Making 
such demands rendered China’s bid for membership politically infeasible.  
 However, by the late 1960s, several changes laid the basis for China’s entry. First 
was that decolonization, particularly in Africa, led to a number of newly independent 
states. This changed the composition of the UN such that, by 1965, about 76% of its 
members hailed from the developing world, which tended to support China’s cause.75 
Second, recognizing the PRC’s size, status as a nuclear power, and growing weight in 
world affairs, U.S. allies such as Italy, Austria, and Canada switched their recognition 
from Taipei to Beijing, and began to support the latter’s bid for UN representation.76 
Third, mounting tensions between China and the Soviet Union, heightened by the latter’s 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, prompted Beijing to abandon its “prerequisites” and 
conclude that a UN seat might be useful in checking Soviet “hegemonism.”77 Fourth, 
perhaps most decisively, the U.S., led by Henry Kissinger, had entered into secret 
negotiations with China in July 1971, which undermined U.S. efforts in the UN to 
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preserve the “China seat” for the ROC on Taiwan.78 Thus, by 1971, the U.S. could no 
longer muster sufficient opposition, and the GA was able to pass Resolution 2758 by a 
vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, and 17 abstentions.79    
 Upon receiving this news, the Chinese leadership assembled a delegation led by 
Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. At the suggestion of Zhou Enlai, then-ambassador 
to Canada Huang Hua was selected to represent the PRC in the Security Council.80 In his 
memoires, Qiao Guanhua relates that, en route to New York, a journalist asked him how 
the Chinese delegation would launch its work in the UN. Qiao responded,  
To tell the truth, we’re quite unfamiliar with this institution. We need to honestly study 
and become familiar as soon as possible, so that China can carry out its duties as a 
permanent member of the Security Council.81  
This echoed what Chairman Mao had told the delegation privately a few days earlier: 
China needed to adopt the attitude of a “student,” avoid “rushing into battle unprepared,” 
and “meticulously” consider the complex issues with which it would soon be faced 
before making decisions.82 Such pragmatism would guide China’s behavior in the 
Security Council for years afterwards.  
                                                 
78
 Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 43.  
 
79
 Following the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the U.S. also began to change its attitude about 
containment towards China. In a 1967 Foreign Affairs article, candidate Nixon argued against immediate 
UN admission for China, but stated that “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to forever leave 
China outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its 
neighbors.” Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 46 (1967), 121.  
 
80




 Ibid, 41.  
 
82
 Ibid, 36. Indeed, as Zhou Enlai remarked in 1971: “We do not have too much knowledge about the 
United Nations and are not too conversant with the situation which has arisen within the United Nations. 




 Leaning toward the Third World: 1971-1979 
   
 Three characteristics defined China’s participation in the UNSC in the years 
between 1971 and 1979. First was its tactic of not participating in votes on resolutions 
toward which it professed ideological misgivings, generally on the establishment or 
extension of PKOs. These included missions to monitor ceasefires between Israel and 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon (respectively, the second UN Emergency Force [UNEF II], the 
UN Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
[UNIFIL]), and between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (the UN Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus [UNFICYP]). China either abstained or refrained from casting any vote, by using 
what it labeled the “fifth voting style” (diwu toupiao fangshi), on 63 occasions (or 32.3% 
of all votes) during this period. For reference, non-participation functioned as a form of 
abstention, allowing China to register its presence and to give justificatory speeches. 
However, China dropped non-participation in favor of the more conventional device of 
formally abstaining in the 1980s. 83  Table 2 offers a summary of China’s voting behavior 
compared to the other permanent members. 
 
Table 2: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1971-1979 
 
Votes N=195 United 
States 
Soviet Union China  France United 
Kingdom 
Affirmative 149 166 130 172 163 
Rate 76.4% 85.1% 66.7% 88.2% 83.6% 
Abstentions or 
Non-Participation 
28 22 63 16 20 
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Rate 14.4% 11.3% 32.3% 8.2% 10% 
Vetoes  18 7 2 7 12 
Rate 9.2% 3.6% 1% 3.6% 6.1% 
NB: Data begin with China’s first vote, on Nov. 21, 1971 and proceed through the end of 1979. Sources: 
Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System 
(UNBISnet).  
 
 Abstention and non-participation was a way for China to disassociate itself from 
UN peacekeeping in particular. Most such votes concerned the four operations listed 
above. The PRC’s grievances in the 1970s flowed from the perception that PKOs might 
be used as an instrument through which the superpowers could exercise political 
influence in areas such as Africa and the Middle East. Wang Yizhou, a scholar at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attributes China’s negative attitude toward 
peacekeeping during the 1970s to its experience on the receiving end of United Nations 
forces during the Korean War. Wang also notes that China viewed UN intervention in the 
Congo in the 1960s, and Cyprus from 1964 onwards, as a pretext for U.S. geopolitical 
ambitions.84  
 Along with voting, China’s representatives criticized PKOs in numerous public 
sessions of the UNSC. For instance, on October 25, 1973, Ambassador Huang Hua made 
the following remarks in light of the Council’s decision to establish UNEF II, which was 
meant to monitor the ceasefire declared between Israel and Egypt following the Yom 
Kippur War:  
The dispatch of a United Nations Emergency Force will be of no avail. Instead, it will 
leave infinite evil consequences in its wake, turning sovereign Arab states in the Middle 
East into an area of international control… Is not South Korea a living example? China 
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has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called ‘peacekeeping forces.’ We 
maintain the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. Such 
a practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with 
the superpowers as the behind-the-scenes boss.85    
Similar themes of anti-hegemonism and self-determination were echoed throughout 
China’s rhetoric on PKOS in the 1970s.86 
 A second characteristic of China’s behavior during this decade was its support for 
proposals by Non-Aligned Movement87 (NAM) states to condemn, and promote political 
change in, both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These proposals were generally 
critical of the Western powers for their support of the two “racist” and “illegal” regimes. 
The U.S. and the U.K. vetoed a number of draft resolutions and abstained on several 
others. The result was that China’s voting affinity with the West on these issues was quite 
low. Between 1971 and 1979, for example, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. on 
resolutions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was only 29.2% (7 out of 
24). In comparison, China’s overall voting affinity with the U.S. during these years was 
46% (91 out of 195).88  
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 Rhetorically supporting the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia and 
opposing apartheid in South Africa was another means through which China could 
express solidarity with the NAM countries. For example, on September 29, 1972, the 
Council considered a proposal by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan, which called on the U.K. 
to release political prisoners, call a constitutional convention, and take other steps to 
promote liberation.89 Following a veto by the U.K., Huang Hua said the following:  
…the British Government has once again shown that it stands completely on the side of 
the white racist regime of [Ian] Smith and that it deliberately supports the latter in 
perpetuating its brutal colonialist rule over 5 million Zimbabwe people...The people of 
Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa will surely draw the necessary lesson there-from and 
will further unite themselves to carry out the necessary struggles and to put an end, with 
their own hands, to the brutal rule of the Smith racist regime.90 
Like its polemics on peacekeeping, China used its position as a permanent member to 
pledge its support for the NAM and distinguish itself from what it saw as the unjustifiable 
positions of the Western powers.   
 A third key feature of China’s diplomatic behavior in the UNSC in the 1970s was 
its infrequent veto use. As Table 2 demonstrates, China voted against only two proposals 
between 1971 and 1979, compared to seven for France, seven for the Soviet Union, 12 
for the U.K., and 18 for the U.S.  
Both of China’s vetoes occurred in 1972. In August, the Council considered a 
request by Bangladesh for UN membership. China rejected this application on account of 
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voted in favor of each of these draft resolutions.  
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a request by its ally, Pakistan, to use Bangladesh as a bargaining chip in Islamabad’s 
attempts to gain the return of 90,000 prisoners of war held in India.91 Huang Hua, in his 
speech, also noted that Indian troops, supported by the Soviet Union, remained in 
Bangladesh, and thus admitting the latter to the UN while under the occupation by 
foreign forces was “untenable from a legal point of view.”92 In 1974, a three-way 
agreement between Pakistan, Bangladesh and India was signed, and China expressed no 
objections when the issue of Bangladesh’s membership was raised later that year.  
 In September 1972, China, along with the Soviet Union, vetoed a proposal 
submitted by Belgium, France, Italy and the U.K. to modify the language of a draft 
written by three NAM states to condemn the Israeli use of force in the Middle East.93 
Huang Hua’s rationale for the veto was that the amendment “fails to condemn Israeli 
Zionism for its aggressive acts” against Syria and Lebanon.94 This veto is unusual in that 
China did not have any obvious interests at stake in the vote, aside from lending support 
to the NAM. It is possible that China decided to use its veto because it was insulated by 
the concurrent negative vote of the Soviet Union, as well as by support from every NAM 
non-permanent member on the Council.95 Even then, however, China may have realized 
that it had gone too far. On ten votes on the Middle East over the following five years, 
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China opted not to participate and state its position rhetorically rather than use its veto 
power.96  
 There are two viable explanations for China’s general restraint in exercising its 
veto power during the 1970s. First is that China was operating in a new organizational 
environment in which it was not familiar with the actors, rules, constraints, and main 
issues. Under these conditions, it was pragmatic for China to act as a “diligent apprentice, 
mastering her new trade and adjusting her crude ideological preconceptions to the 
institutional milieu.”97 This conforms to Qiao Guanhua’s perspective, as discussed above. 
Nevertheless, this argument is weakened by the fact that, as the decade wore on and the 
PRC acquired experience, China did not become more assertive in the sense of wielding 
its veto substantively to affect agenda items; it did not use its veto after 1972 and instead 
preferred to make its opinions known polemically.98  
 The second explanation is that, in most of the topics covered by the Council at the 
time, China’s national interests, if any, were peripheral. Aside from the issue of 
Bangladesh, the PRC, which was then an autarkic country wary of formal alliances, had 
no major political or economic stakes in the issues at hand, from Lebanon to Cyprus to 
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southern Africa. A Chinese diplomat said that his country was “a bit indifferent;” at the 
time, it was a “poor, closed country, and didn’t care [about the outcome].”99 Regarding 
PKOs, one scholar writes that the “lack of political or economic interests” helps to 
explain China’s “inactive policy.”100 Wang Yizhou argues that China’s goals were rather 
to use its rhetorical power to support the NAM, which it did many times, and to use the 
UN as a conduit through which to forge formal diplomatic ties with states.101 Indeed, 
from 1971 to 1979, some 57 countries switched their recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing.102 
 
 The Silent Power: 1980-1989 
 
 In its second decade on the Council, China scaled back its rhetorical opposition to 
the West and preferred largely to sit in the wings. This is evident in three respects. First, 
beginning with its vote in favor of an extension of UNFICYP’s mandate in December 
1981, China abandoned its practice of not participating in votes on peacekeeping 
operations, and voted in favor of every draft related to PKOs considered in the 1980s.103 
As a result, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. climbed from 46% in the 1970s to 73% 
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in the 1980s (153 of 209 votes).104 China’s rate of non-participation and abstentions 
dropped from 32.3% in the 1970s to 6.2% in the 1980s; only France had a lower share of 
abstentions, at 2%. In addition, from September 1983 until the end of the decade China 
cast only affirmative votes.105 Table 3 presents the combined voting data for the P5 in the 
1980s.  
 
Table 3: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1980-1989 
 




China France United 
Kingdom 
Affirmative  162 192 196 200 189 




27 15 13 5 14 
Rate 12.9% 7.2% 6.2% 2% 6.7% 
Vetoes 20 2 0 4 6 
Rate  9.6% .5% 0% 1.9% 2.9% 
NB: Data are inclusive from the beginning of 1980 through the end of 1989. Sources: Official Document 
System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet). 
 
 Second, China significantly reduced its use of the Council as a platform for 
rhetorical opposition to superpower hegemony. For instance, in January 1980, China 
chose not to cast a vote on a U.S. proposal to impose sanctions on Iran in light of the 
ongoing hostage crisis. While using the opportunity to remark on the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, China’s delegate, Chen Chu, had no negative words for the U.S., stating 
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only that sanctions “may not necessarily lead to the relaxation of tensions and the release 
of hostages.”106 Moreover, of the 14 votes on the issue of South Africa conducted 
between 1981 and 1988, China’s delegate offered remarks on only one occasion. On July 
26, 1985, Qian Yongnian,107 urged the Council to “adopt various measures of sanctions 
against South Africa and to support the heroic struggle of the South African people 
against apartheid.”108 No specific criticism was leveled against the U.S. or the U.K. for 
their role in the matter.109 In 13 other cases, China made no comment whatsoever.  
 Third, China did not cast any negative votes in the 1980s.110 China was alone 
among the P5 in this respect, having contributed not one of the 32 vetoes made by the 
permanent members combined. Indeed, China did not use its veto in any instance 
between 1972 and 1997.  
 The major reason for China’s relative silence in the 1980s was that it subordinated 
its ideological misgivings to the more pressing need to maintain positive ties with the U.S. 
and with the UN system, both of which it viewed as indispensible to the goals of 
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modernizing its domestic economy, acquiring advanced technology, and opening, in a 
limited fashion, its market to foreign trade and investment.111 Thus, China adopted a 
“differentiated and flexible policy” (qubie duidaide linghuo lichang) in the United 
Nations, whereby it would abandon its opposition to peacekeeping; contribute to the PKO 
budget; participate in subsidiary bodies, such as the Disarmament Commission and the 
Human Rights Commission; and refrain from rhetorical attacks against the 
superpowers.112 This was part of Deng Xiaoping’s broader “independent foreign policy of 
peace” (duli zizhude heping waijiao zhengce), announced in September 1982, through 
which amicable relations with major states and institutions, such as the UN and the IMF, 
would be prioritized over ideological struggle.113  
 However, China did assert itself on one issue during this decade. In late 1981, the 
PRC blocked the appointment of Kurt Waldheim to a third term as Secretary General of 
the UN, favoring Tanzanian candidate Salim A. Salim.114 The result was a prolonged 
clash with the U.S., which favored Waldheim and used its own influence to block 
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 China had also voted against Waldheim in early balloting in 1971 and 1976, but shifted course once its 
show of support for the NAM had been made. Bernard D. Nossiter, “China Suggests Compromise on UN 




Salim.115 Bosco attributes China’s position to its general support for the Third World 
during the period.116 However, as we have seen, China tended not to confront the U.S. 
when it did not have major interests at stake, relying primarily on abstentions and oratory. 
A more plausible explanation is that China used this situation to express its grievances 
with Ronald Reagan’s decision to consider selling advanced weapons to Taiwan and to 
pursue what the PRC believed was a “two China policy.”117 The intrusion of the Taiwan 
issue would pose increasing difficulties for the PRC in its Council diplomacy in the 
1990s.  
   
 
Principled Flexibility: The Post-Cold War Era, 1990-1999 
 
 In the post-Cold War era, China’s commitment to the principles of sovereignty 
and the non-use of force in world politics were tested by an increasingly interventionist 
UN. In most instances, China demurred to the West, recording its objections but not 
maneuvering to obstruct proposals even when its favored norms were jeopardized. The 
reasons were that the PRC sought to rehabilitate its reputation in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square crisis and preserve positive ties with the sole remaining superpower. 
Samuel Kim writes that China’s “code of conduct was to be firm in principle but flexible 
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in application” when its political and ideological objectives clashed.118 However, in a 
limited number of cases, when its national interests were involved, China did utilize its 
veto power and risk facing the opprobrium of the very states with which it wished to 
ingratiate itself. 
 China’s overall voting pattern in the 1990s different little from the 1980s. As 
illustrated in Table 4, its rate of assent was about the same (93.1% in the 1990s versus 
93.8% in the 1980s), while its rate of abstentions was slightly higher (6.5% versus 6.2%). 
Notably, its voting affinity with the U.S. jumped from 73% in the 1980s to 92.1% (591 of 
642 votes). In part, this reflected the tendency of the P5 to close ranks, usually bringing 
texts to a vote only when consensus among the five had been reached.119 Scholars have 
also noted a degree of normative convergence among the major powers on questions 
related to sovereignty versus non-intervention. As Allen Carlson argues, China’s position 
on sovereignty did become more nuanced and flexible in the 1990s.120  Nevertheless, in 
relation to the other permanent members, China was more likely to express a dissenting 
opinion through abstentions, doing so 42 times over the decade. This was more than 
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Table 4: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1990-1999 
 
Votes N=642 United States USSR/Russia  China France United 
Kingdom 
Affirmative  635 619 598 640 642 
Rate 98.9% 96.4% 93.1% 99.7% 100% 
Abstentions 2 20 42 2 0 
Rate .3% 3.1% 6.5% .3% 0% 
Vetoes 5 3 2 0 0 
Rate .8% .5% .3% 0% 0% 
NB: Data are inclusive from the beginning of 1990 through the end of 1999. Sources: Official Document 
System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet). 
  
More specifically, China’s tendency to prioritize political relations with the U.S., 
except in instances in which major interests were at stake, was evident in its behavior on 




 Although China had come to support PKOs in principle in the early 1980s, 
changes in the nature of peacekeeping during the following decade created new concerns. 
In his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, 121  Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
wrote that the goal of UN intervention after the Cold War would not simply be to patrol 
borders, but to “address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice 
and political oppression” via “preventive deployment”, “post-conflict peace-building,” 
and more heavily-armed units that would “respond to outright aggression, imminent or 
actual.” 122 Though tempered somewhat by the ambivalence of the major powers in cases 
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 Ibid, passim. In terms of scope and size, peacekeeping surpassed its previous boundaries as well.  In the 
45 years prior to 1990, the UN authorized 18 missions; between 1990 and 1999 alone, it approved 35. At its 
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such as Rwanda and Bosnia, UN missions in the 1990s were broader, more frequent, and 
more complex than at any point during the Cold War. As Courtney Smith argues, the 
Council “redefined what can count as a threat to international peace and security and a 
proper subject of international intervention.”123 
 China was wary about the expanding size and mandate of PKOs in the 1990s, but 
mainly expressed its reservations through rhetoric. For instance, in June 1995, a number 
of Western states proposed creating a “rapid reaction force” of some 12,500 troops within 
the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operating in the former Yugoslavia. Concerned 
about the precedent that might be set by such a decision, China’s representative, Qin 
Huasun, abstained from the vote and said that:  
A United Nations peace-keeping operation, as the name indicates, is for the purpose of 
keeping peace rather than fighting…The establishment of this [rapid reaction] force is 
for the purpose of enforcement actions and brings about a de facto change to the peace-
keeping status of UNPROFOR. Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to 
become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peace-
keeping force.124 
Similar concerns included the lack of consent of all parties prior to implementation of 
PKOs,125 the intertwining of PKOs with human rights,126 and fear that certain operations 
might infringe on the territorial integrity of states.127  
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Beyond rhetoric, however, the PRC did little to actively challenge the West on 
these matters. The main reason for this restraint appears to have been reputational. In 
particular, Chinese leaders in the 1990s were aware that their nation’s image needed to be 
restored in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis, the fallout of which included 
sanctions on the PRC imposed by the U.S. and the European Community, as well as a 
degree of concern by neighboring states. 128 As Allen Carlson writes,  
…an interest in playing the role of ‘good citizen’ on the international stage has led the 
Chinese to acquiesce to a series of interventions about which many in Beijing have real 
reservations.129  
Moreover, in a few cases, the PRC did not simply refrain from opposing the West, but 
actively contributed personnel. This is reflected in its dispatch, from 1992 to 1993, of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Li Daoyu, abstained and explained that his vote was based in part on the lack of “express consent of the 
parties concerned” for the operation. See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3114 (September 14, 1992), 12. Similarly, in 
June 1994, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Chen Jian, noted that a French proposal to augment 
the ongoing operation in Rwanda did not guarantee consent of the belligerents, and abstained from voting 
on what would become SCR 929. See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3392 (June 22, 1994), 4.  
 
126
 See, e.g., the speech of China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Wang Xuexian, explaining China’s 
abstention on a proposal to add a Human Rights Office to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. SC, 
Verbatim, S/PV.3707 (October 22, 1996), 2.   
 
127
 For instance, in March 1997 the UNSC authorized the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to deploy a multinational force to Albania; Qin Huasun arged that the problem is mainly an 
“internal affair” and “for the Security Council to authorize action in a country because of strife resulting 
from the internal affairs of that country is inconsistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.” 
SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3758 (March 28, 1997), 2-3.  
 
128
 As Ann Kent notes, in the context of human rights, the PRC’s drive to improve its image “does not 
mean that China has internalized international norms, but that it is prepared to be more pragmatic about its 
interests than its statements of principles would suggest, and to make tactical adaptations.” Ann Kent, 
China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 358; Su Changhe, a professor at the Shanghai Foreign Studies University, also 
notes that breaking out of its post-1989 isolation was a main driver of China’s strategy in the 1990s 
(interview, September 2009).  
 
129
 Allen Carlson, “Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign 
Relations in the 1990s,” National Committee on United States-China Relations, China Policy Series No. 18, 




several hundred engineers and observers to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC).130 
 Nevertheless, China did exercise its veto power on a handful of peacekeeping-
related issues in the 1990s. In each case, the issue was not peacekeeping itself but rather 
the brewing diplomatic hostilities between China and Taiwan. First, in February 1995, 
China introduced a proposal to drastically scale down the size of the UN Mission in Haiti 
(UNMIH) from about 6,000 to 1,000 personnel and threatened to veto any other plan. 
This was a result of the invitation from Port-a-Prince for Taiwan’s vice president to 
attend the inauguration ceremony for Haiti’s new president, René Préval.131 Owing to the 
opposition of the other 14 members of the Council, and especially to the opinion among 
Latin American members of the NAM that the PRC was acting unreasonably, China 
eventually agreed to a Canada-sponsored compromise to only modestly reduce the 
strength of UNMIH.132 
Second, in January 1997, China vetoed a resolution to deploy military observers to 
monitor a ceasefire that had recently been declared in Guatemala’s long-running civil war. 
The problem for the PRC was that Guatemala recognized Taiwan, had supported efforts 
to have the question of possible Taiwanese membership in UN placed on the General 
Assembly’s agenda since 1993, and had most recently invited Taiwan’s foreign minister 
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to attend the signing of the peace agreement in Guatemala City.133 Explaining his veto, 
Qin Huasun was candid about his government’s position:  
The Guatemalan authorities cannot expect to have the cooperation of China in the 
Security Council while taking actions to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. No country’s peace process should be at the expense of another 
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.134 
However, following ten days of negotiations, China and Guatemala reached an agreement, 
whereby the latter promised to drop its support for Taiwan’s annual UN application.135 
On January 20, the military observer mission was approved unanimously. 
 Third, in February 1999, China vetoed an extension of the UN Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, which had been created in 1995 as part 
of the larger program of peace restoration in the Balkans. In his remarks, Qin Huasun did 
not mention that Macedonia had recently switched its diplomatic recognition from 
Beijing to Taipei, nor did he mention the Taiwan issue at all. Rather, he claimed that, 
because the situation in Macedonia “has apparently stabilized in the past few years,” 
UNPREDEP was no longer necessary, and its resources should be spent on other 
operations.136 However, observers attributed China’s decision to Taiwan.137 For instance, 
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the Canadian representative, Robert Fowler, said that China’s action appeared to be 
“compelled by bilateral concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP.”138 As Zhao Lei, a scholar at 
the Central Party School in Beijing, writes, “the purpose behind China’s two vetoes was 
to protect national sovereignty and dignity.”139 
 The issues of Haiti, Guatemala and Macedonia, in themselves, were each 
peripheral to China’s national interests. China’s assertive posture can instead be 
understood in the context of deteriorating cross-Strait relations in the mid-1990s, in 
which Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, adopted what Beijing saw as a “splittist” 
approach in comparison to his conciliatory posture in the 1980s and early 1990s.140 This 
was evidenced by Lee’s promulgating a “two states theory” (liangguo lun) of cross-
Straits relations, making pro-independence remarks on a trip to the U.S., and seeking a 
more visible profile in international politics, including the UN.141 China’s behavior in the 
UN made sense as a way to display a willingness to pay a public cost—going so far as to 
cast solo vetoes on otherwise uncontroversial subjects in the Security Council—to punish 
states that welcomed Lee’s overtures for closer official ties.142 
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The Use of Force  
 
 In several cases during the 1990s, China expressed concerns about UNSC 
authorization for the use of force. China adopted the position that military action, 
especially by the U.S. and its allies in situations in which no external threat existed, might 
erode the norm of sovereignty. Pragmatic and historical factors lay beneath this 
opposition. First, the PRC worried that a weakening of sovereignty might ultimately 
create a pretext for external influence in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and other parts of 
China’s own restive territory.143 Second, as Wu Xinbo explains, China’s emphasis on 
sovereignty was based in its own experience of exploitation by foreign imperialists in the 
19th and 20th centuries. There was a conviction that stronger states, especially the U.S., 
might use intervention to encircle or weaken China.144 Nonetheless, due to its desire to 
rehabilitate relations with the U.S., and the international community writ large, in the 
wake of Tiananmen, the PRC was reluctant to use its veto power to actually prevent 
intervention. 
China’s rhetoric betrays its anxiety about the use of force. In December 1992, the 
PRC voted in favor of Resolution 794, which approved the U.S.-led Unified Task Force 
in Somalia, but its representative, Li Daoyu, said that the measure “may adversely affect 
the collective role” of the UN, and voted affirmatively only due to the “unique situation” 
prevailing in Somalia.145 18 months later, China abstained on a French-sponsored request 
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to authorize Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, noting that the consent of all parties had not 
been received, and that the “experience and lessons” of Somalia cautioned against 
military action.146 A month later, China abstained on Resolution 940, which laid the basis 
for Operation Uphold Democracy, in Haiti, executed by the U.S. military. China’s 
ambassador, Li Zhaoxing, said that this would set a “dangerous precedent” and would 
“not contribute to a fundamental solution” to the problem.147  
 In 1999, the U.S. and its NATO allies sought, but did not receive, the UN’s 
blessing for Operation Allied Force, the air war in Serbia. One might expect that China, 
leery about the excessive use of force by the U.S., would have taken concrete actions to 
prevent UN approval for this request. However, Colin Keating, New Zealand’s UN 
representative in the 1990s, notes that China took a “backseat role” to Russia during the 
negotiations. Warren Hoge, then a New York Times correspondent at the UN, recalls that 
China did not want to “make waves” on the issue.148 Indeed, it was mainly Russian 
opposition that prevented a resolution, which makes sense given Moscow’s more obvious 
strategic interests in preventing Western military occupation in the Balkans.149 
Remarkably, even after a NATO warplane destroyed China’s embassy in Belgrade during 
the war, China did not use its veto power to forestall U.S.-led efforts to authorize KFOR, 
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the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo relying, instead, on rhetoric to air its 
grievances.150 
 China’s restraint in these cases is attributable to three factors. First, as with PKOs, 
China sought to improve its standing with the international community, and would have 
been hard pressed to do this while simultaneously obstructing humanitarian missions of 
the type executed in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.151 Second, Chinese leaders recognized 
that the PRC lacked the strength to resist U.S. “hegemonism” in the 1990s, and that its 
primary purpose, modernization, would be better served by maintaining positive ties with 
the U.S. and its allies. Deng Xiaoping himself reportedly told Central Committee 
members in December 1990:  
A few Third World countries would like China to raise its profile [in the UN], but 
China must not do so; this is a basic national policy. Our strength is insufficient to take 
on such a role…China always stands on the side of the Third World and resists 
hegemonism, but must not take the lead.152 
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Third, China had no major strategic interests at stake in any of the states mentioned above, 
in terms of geography, trade or alliance relations. As Zhao Lei writes, when national 
interests are not at stake, China tends to explicate its principles but adopt a “detached 
attitude” (chaotuode taidu) in terms of actively pursuing an alternative agenda.153   
 The one instance in which China did adopt an assertive position was during the 
run-up to the Gulf War in 1990. In order to secure approval of a UN mandate for its 
offensive in Iraq, the U.S. went to great lengths to acquire the support, or at least 
acquiescence, of the other 14 members of the UNSC. The PRC was ambivalent about the 
U.S. proposal, opposed to the use of force in principle, but also against Iraq’s breach of 
Kuwait’s sovereignty.154 Beijing initially resisted U.S. overtures, not because it saw 
military action as a threat to its interests, but because it saw a chance to extract important 
concessions from the U.S. To gain China’s consent,155 the U.S. agreed to resume high-
level exchanges with Beijing, which had been suspended in 1989; four days after the vote, 
the World Bank, presumably influenced by the U.S., released a $114.3 million loan to 
support rural industries in the PRC. Both decisions helped China to ease its way out of 
the international isolation created a year earlier by the Tiananmen crackdown.156 
 
Sanctions  
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 During the 1990s, the Security Council made heavier use of sanctions against 
states and, in some cases, non-state actors. Whereas the Council had enacted only two 
sanctions regimes during the entire Cold War (on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia), 
it established 11 between 1990 and 1999.157 It also considered, but did not impose, 
sanctions on other parties, including North Korea and one side in the civil war in 
Cambodia. As with PKOs, China voiced concerns about the use of sanctions, but rarely 
used its veto power to alter the substance of proposals. During the decade, China 
abstained on 16 relevant votes. These are listed in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5: Chinese Abstentions on Sanctions-Related Votes in the 1990s158 
 
Date Topic Purpose Res.  Vote Speaker  
3/31/1992 Libya Imposes aviation, arms embargo due 
to concerns about Libyan-sponsored 
terrorism 
748 10,0,5 PR Li Daoyu 
5/30/1992 Bosnia Imposes economic, aviation, arms, 
cultural embargoes on Serbia and 
Montenegro (the FRY)  
757 13,0,2 PR Li Daoyu 
10/9/1992 Bosnia Bans military flights in FRY airspace 781 14,0,1 DPR Jin 
Yongjian 
11/16/1992 Bosnia Demands end to external interference 
(from the FRY) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
787 13,0,2 PR Li Daoyu 
11/30/1992 Cambodia Threatens measures against Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea for failure to 
meet obligations under Paris Treaty  
792 14,0,1 PR Li Daoyu 
3/31/1993 Bosnia Extends ban on military flights 816 14,0,1 DPR Chen 
Jian 
4/17/1993 Bosnia Threatens sanctions on Bosnian Serbs 
for continued violence 
820 13,0,2 DPR Chen 
Jian  
5/11/1993 N. Korea  Calls on DPRK to rejoin Non-
Proliferation Treaty 
825 13,0,2 PR Li 
Zhaoxing 
11/11/1993 Libya Imposes economic and financial 
sanctions on Libya for failure to 
comply with previous resolutions 
883 11,0,4 PR Li 
Zhaoxing  
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 The Appendix provides a full account of Chinese abstentions from 1971 to 2009, including a summary 
of the principles cited in the justificatory speeches.  
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12/2/1994 Bosnia Affirms that economic measures 





4/21/1995 Bosnia Extends partial suspension of 
particular measures against the FRY 




Imposes sanctions on Sudan in 
relation to failure to extradite suspects  




Imposes aviation sanctions on Sudan 
for non-compliance with SCR 1054 
1070 13,0,2 PR Qin 
Huasun 
10/20/1997 Iraq Threatens travel ban on Iraq for failure 
to cooperate with UNSCOM 
1134 10,0,5 Counselor 
Liu Jieyi 
3/31/1998 Kosovo Imposes arms embargo on FRY due to 
situation in Kosovo  
1160 14,0,1 DPR Shen 
Guofang  
10/14/1998 Kosovo Demands FRY comply with OSCE 
and NATO missions in Kosovo  
1203 13,0,2 PR Qin 
Huasun 
 NB: Purpose describes only the aspects of the proposal relevant to sanctions; some are omnibus proposals 
that also deal with other subjects, such as peacekeeping. Voting is written as “yes, no, abstain.” 
PR=permanent representative; DPR=deputy permanent representative. Sources: Official Document System 
(ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet). 
 
 Rhetorically, almost without exception, China opposed the threat or use of 
sanctions on the grounds that coercion tends to be counterproductive. For instance, in 
March 1992 the UN authorized sanctions on Libya in relation to the latter’s intransigence 
over international legal proceedings following the Lockerbie bombings. Justifying his 
abstention, China’s delegate, Li Daoyu, said that:  
In principle we do not support the Security Council imposing sanctions against Libya, 
because sanctions will not settle the question but will rather complicate the issue further, 
aggravate regional tensions and have serious economic consequences for the countries 
concerned in the region.159  
Similarly, in April 1993, the Council threatened to impose an array of sanctions on 
Bosnian Serbs for their reluctance to participate in a peace settlement. Ambassador Chen 
Jian objected on the basis that,  
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The actions authorized by the resolution will not only bring suffering to the people in 
the country…but also be gravely detrimental to the economies of the third countries 
implementing such sanctions provisions.”160  
In May 1994, China endorsed sanctions on Haiti, which were meant to help restore 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, but did so only under the “highly unique 
circumstances now prevailing [there],” and stated that its vote “does not presuppose any 
change in our position” on sanctions.161 
 In disassociating itself from sanctions resolutions, China was sometimes able to 
rely on sympathetic speeches and votes from other states on the Security Council. The 
PRC cast sole abstentions on less than one-third of votes (5 of 16). More broadly, China 
stood alone on only 15 of its 42 abstentions in the 1990s. On several occasions, China 
was joined by non-permanent members, such as Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan, 
which held various similar reservations regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness 
of sanctions.  
A notable trend that developed in this respect was a normative alignment between 
China and Russia, both of which were wary in general about the excessive application of 
coercion (both the use of force and sanctions) by the U.S. and its allies.162  On sanctions 
votes, Russia abstained with China five times in the 1990s, on issues including Bosnia, 
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Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo.163 However, despite its concerns, China did not use its veto 
power to block the approval of these resolutions.  
 China’s restraint on sanctions was likely a product of two interrelated factors. 
First was that, as with PKOs and the use of force, it was reluctant to actively challenge 
the West at a time when it sought to rehabilitate its reputation and positive relations with 
the U.S. and other developed countries. Acquiescing on sanctions on “pariahs,” such as 
Libya, Haiti and Serbia was a way to maintain its image as a positive actor on the world 
stage. Second, the price paid by China to do so was not high. With the exception of 
Afghanistan,164 none of the targeted states were geographically contiguous with the PRC, 
and so China did not need to worry excessively about negative spillover effects.165 
China’s economic relations with these states were also somewhat low; the only case in 
which China’s bilateral trade exceeded $100 million at the time sanctions were imposed 
was Libya.166 In addition, there is little evidence of the PRC carrying out military sales to 
any state subjected to UN measures in the 1990s.167 
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 The notable exception was China’s attitude towards pressure against North Korea 
in 1993 and 1994. In March 1993, the DPRK announced that it would withdraw from the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refuse inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). In response, the U.S. circulated a draft stating that North Korea 
should not withdraw from the NPT and ought to allow the IAEA to continue inspections. 
Concerned about a destabilizing North Korean response, China refused to countenance a 
pivotal clause calling for “further Security Council action” if the DPRK continued to 
waver on the NPT and reject cooperation with the IAEA.168 China, with Pakistan, 
subsequently abstained on the weaker final text of what would become Resolution 825. In 
his remarks, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing stated that the issue should be dealt with by the 
IAEA, as Council involvement might “lead to the intensification and escalation” of 
tensions on the Korean peninsula.169 
 A year later, following a suspension of its announcement that it would withdraw 
from the NPT and some progress on inspections, North Korea again denied the IAEA 
access to several nuclear sites. The U.S. once more tried to gather support for a resolution 
prodding the DPRK with the threat of “further action.” However, this time China was not 
willing to acquiesce to any resolution, but only to a less authoritative Presidential 
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Statement, which asked the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA and to resume peaceful 
dialogue .170 During this episode, Washington’s top China diplomat, Winston Lord, said 
that “China is acting on Korea in its own self-interest” and that the main reason why the 
U.S. didn’t pursue a stronger response was the concern that China might try to “obstruct 
the international consensus.”171 The 1993-4 North Korean crisis presaged China’s more 
assertive role in the 2000s on debates connected to a series of pariah states.  
 In sum, China continued to practice strategic restraint in the UNSC in the 1990s. 
Though it occasionally exercised power when its interests on matters such as Taiwan or 
North Korea were threatened, it generally prioritized positive relations with the U.S. This 
made sense in light of China’s desire to rebuild its reputation after Tiananmen and further 
integrate itself into the international community. China’s diplomatic rhetoric did note 
objections on the grounds of protecting sovereignty and opposing potentially ineffective 
sanctions, though these concerns did not translate into substantive efforts to resist 
intervention.  
 
Into the Fray: The Dawn of the 21st Century, 2000-2011  
 
In the early 21st century, China moved beyond a restrained posture and toward a 
more active role in the Council. This manifested itself in two distinct ways. First, the 
PRC made notable contributions in terms of support for UN peacekeeping operations. 
China’s motivation in doing so was to improve its image as a responsible power, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, China took a more active and, on occasion, 
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contentious role in negotiations on how to address the challenges created by a series of 
pariah states, including North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. As it had done 
on occasion since the 1970s, China used influence in negotiations when it perceived that 




 In the aggregate, China’s voting behavior in the UNSC at the outset of the 21st 
century was virtually indistinguishable from its peers. Of the 636 votes that took place 
between 2000 and 2009, China voted affirmatively 97.8% of the time, abstained on only 
12 ballots and used its veto twice. Its abstention rate was slightly higher than the U.S. 
(1.9% versus 1.3%), while its veto rate was somewhat lower (.3% versus 1.4%). As it had 
begun to do in the 1990s, the P5 closed ranks even further in the 2000s, such that 
unanimous voting outcomes were the norm. Overall, 94% of votes (598 of 636) received 
support from all five of the permanent members. Table 6 illustrates the voting behavior of 
the P5 over the course of these ten years.  
 
 
Table 6: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 2000-2009 
  
Votes N=636 United States Russia China France United 
Kingdom 
Affirmative 619 622 622 632 628 
Rate 97.3% 97.8% 97.8% 99.4% 98.7% 
Abstentions 8 10 12 4 8 
Rate 1.3% 1.57% 1.9% .63% 1.26% 
Vetoes 9 4 2 0 0 
Rate 1.4% .63% .3% 0% 0% 
NB: Data are inclusive from the beginning of 2000 through the end of 2009. Sources: Official Document 
System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet). 
 
 Moreover, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. continued to increase. The two 
countries agreed on 95.3% (606 of 636) of votes in the 2000s, up from 92.1% (591 of 642) 
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in the previous decade. This was slightly lower than China’s affinity with Russia, which 
reached 98.4% in the 2000s (626 of 636), continuing the trend of comparative Sino-
Russian agreement. Figure 2, below, shows the convergence of China’s voting positions 
with those of the U.S. and Russia in the four decades since the PRC was admitted to the 
Council.  
 
Figure 2: China’s Voting Affinity with the U.S. and Russia, 1971-2009 
 
 
Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System 
(UNBISnet).  
 
 At the same time, China’s rhetorical objections largely disappeared. To illustrate, 
in the 1990s, China’s representative had made comments in 43 of 52 (82.7%) sanctions-
related votes, stressing civilian costs, sovereignty and other principles. By contrast, in the 
2000s, remarks were issued in only 21 of 99 votes on sanctions (21.2%). Additionally, 
not all of the speeches were meant to disassociate China from the decision. In November 
2004, for instance, the UNSC authorized an arms embargo and other measures against the 
government of Côte D’Ivoire, which had staged an attack on French peacekeepers in the 
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country. China’s ambassador, Wang Guangya, said that the PRC “favors further Council 
action” due to the “current serious situation” in the country, noting that this was also the 
position of the African Union.172 
There are four mutually-compatible ways of explaining this convergence between 
China and the West. First is that China’s attitudes on interventionism, to a degree, 
became more similar to those of the U.S. and others.173 Zhang Guihong, director of the 
UN studies program at Fudan University, recalls that China, in 2005, supported the 
World Summit Outcome Document, which condoned collective action to halt genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In doing so, China abandoned 
any pretense of supporting an absolutist notion of sovereignty.174 It would be misleading, 
however, to argue that the PRC has come to support the West on uninvited intervention 
when the issue does not fall into one of the above-cited categories, such as the more 
routine political violence that occurred in Myanmar and Zimbabwe.175 One Chinese 
diplomat states that sovereignty remains the “most important rule of international 
relations.”176 
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Second, some of the disagreement about the scope of peacekeeping that existed in 
the 1990s was rendered irrelevant as PKOs were scaled back in the 2000s. Numerically, 
whereas the Council approved 35 missions in the 1990s, it authorized only 10 in the 
2000s.177 In a qualitative sense, the missions that were established in the 2000s largely fit 
the model of “peace support operations,” in which the UN would only intervene after a 
“pivotal state,” such as the U.S., or a regional organization, such as NATO or the African 
Union, had secured the environment from a military point of view. The result of this 
transformation was that China’s concern about PKOs becoming mired in ongoing 
violence was diminished, and it could thus lend its approval to operations of the type 
conducted in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Côte D’Ivoire and elsewhere.178  
Third is that China’s positions have tended not to be influenced by the issue of 
Taiwan, as they were in earlier periods. One exception is that, in September 2003, the 
PRC held up an operation in Liberia until that state switched its diplomatic recognition 
from Taipei to Beijing.179 In general, however, the Taiwan issue was of decreasing 
relevance simply because, aside from Haiti, the UN did not have any PKOs in the 
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dwindling number of states that recognized Taiwan in the 2000s. China even overlooked 
Haiti’s ties with Taiwan, as Beijing “appeared to recognize the benefits of a less punitive 
and more incentive-based strategy.”180 Moreover, with the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou 
as Taiwan’s President, the two sides declared a “diplomatic truce” whereby the PRC 
would refrain from prying away Taipei’s few remaining partners.181 
A fourth plausible reason for convergence arises from the political dynamics of 
the UN itself. Specifically, the P5 have faced a growing lobby from states such as India, 
Germany and Japan to permit changes in the membership of the Council that would better 
reflect the changing distribution of global power.182 Each of the current permanent 
members has an incentive to forestall reform, which would either mean a weakening of 
their veto rights; a larger, more unwieldy, and less effective institution; or both. To 
preserve its stake in what Barry Buzan terms a system of “unipolarized multipolarity,” 
then, China might opt to subjugate its ideological objections to the imperative of P5 unity 
both in terms of voting and in refraining from making dissenting speeches.183 Although 
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internal divisions among the reformers have reduced pressures on the P5, it is still 
arguably in the interests of the five to present a façade of unity to the world.184 
 
Responsible Stakeholder: China and Peacekeeping in the 2000s  
 
 A second noticeable feature of China’s UN diplomacy in the early 21st century 
has been its contributions to PKOs. As we have seen, China came to support 
peacekeeping in principle in the 1980s and offered a small number of personnel to 
missions in the 1990s. However, in the 2000s, China significantly expanded the overall 
size of its peacekeeping contingent, rising from 98 at the end of 2000 to 2,136 at the end 
of 2009. By the end of 2009, China had personnel deployed in ten of the UN’s 19 
ongoing operations, stretching from Haiti to Lebanon to Sudan. Among all contributing 
states, China’s rank was 15. In comparison to the other P5 states, China ranked first and, 
among G20 nations, it ranked fourth (behind Italy, India and South Africa).185 Overall, 
China sent more than 10,000 “blue helmets” to 22 missions in the years between 1989 
and 2009, with the large majority participating since 2003.186 Figure 3 shows the annual 
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Figure 3: Chinese Personnel Contributions to PKOs, 2000-2009 
 
 
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping, online at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/ 
  
China’s financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget grew accordingly 
in the 2000s. From a level of about .9% in the 1990s, China’s share of the overall PKO 
budget rose to above 3% in 2008, which is notable since the budget itself grew from $2.5 
billion in 2000 to over $8 billion in 2008.187 This marked the highest rate of Chinese 
appropriations since the mid-1970s, when the PRC, in an effort to establish itself as a 
leader of developing states in the UN, subsidized about 5% of the institution’s budget.188 
It should be mentioned, though, that China still lagged well behind the U.S., Britain and 
France both in absolute terms and accounting for GDP.189 Among the P5, China in the 
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early 2000s surpassed Russia, whose contributions declined sharply from early 1990s 
levels of nearly 10%. 190 
 Tactically, China’s evolution from acquiescence to active participation in PKOs 
can be attributed to the operational experience gained by the military, police and other 
forces it sends into the field. As Drew Thompson points out, overseas missions allow the 
Chinese armed forces to “learn from other nation’s systems,” including in the medical, 
logistical, and engineering areas. China is reportedly especially interested in participating 
in missions in which it is able to work directly with units seconded from advanced 
militaries, such as France or the U.S.191 Knowing how new technologies and practices 
can be applied to a complex and dangerous environment can also enhance China’s ability 
to respond to domestic crises, such as the Sichuan earthquake or the Tibetan riots, both of 
which occurred in 2008.192 
 At a strategic level, China’s transition from restraint to action is related to a larger 
effort to enhance its image as a “responsible” power. This motive can be divided into two 
components. First, within host countries, China has sought to make a positive impression 
on the citizens and elites with which its personnel are in direct contact, countering images 
of China as exploitative and harmful and facilitating China’s economic objectives, such 
as securing natural resources, in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. 
PKOs, then, fit into larger diplomatic “charm offensives” which also include elements 
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ranging from debt forgiveness, to high-level exchanges, government scholarships, and 
infrastructure development aid.193  
 Second, participation in PKOs buttresses China’s self-characterization as a 
“responsible great power” (fuzerende daguo) that assumes public obligations 
commensurate with its growing size and resources.194 By doing so, Beijing can address 
not only concerns that China’s rise poses a threat to the international system, but also 
demands that it contribute to efforts to resolve global challenges such as poverty, famine, 
environmental damage, and so on.195 Chinese leaders have thus trumpeted their country’s 
more active role in the UN. In April 2008, for instance, Hu Jintao told Asian delegates to 
the annual Boao Forum on Hainan Island that “China is now a key participant in the 
international system,” is “actively involved in international and regional affairs,” and [has] 
earnestly fulfilled its international responsibilities.” As evidence, he cited the fact that 
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China was ranked as “the largest troop-contributing country among the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council.”196 
 Broader still, some mainland Chinese scholars have suggested that China’s 
growing role in peacekeeping is not merely instrumental, but also a result of a change in 
the country’s identity. The argument is that, through decades of increasingly close 
interaction with other states and with bodies such as the UN, China has come to be 
moved not only by its own interests but also by the interests of the larger world. It acts 
responsibly not simply because it might accrue a reputational benefit, but because it is 
ethical to do so.197 This interpretation takes advantage of the theoretical notion that a 
state’s identity and resulting sense of interests can change on account of socializing 
experiences with other actors.198 However, since the PRC has distinct utilitarian reasons 
to adopt a more active approach toward PKOs, which are to assuage fears and earn 
diplomatic capital, it is difficult to separate out whatever normative motives might inform 
this trend in China’s UN behavior.199 
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Assertion: Diplomatic Discord and the Pariah States 
 
 As discussed earlier, China became engaged in protracted contests with the U.S. 
and its allies over the disposition of problems caused by several pariah states in the mid-
to-late 2000s. These included North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Libya. 
In relation to previous decades, China’s willingness to resist parts or, in some cases, the 
entirety, of the U.S. platform was frequent and tenacious. The details of these cases will 
be described in subsequent chapters, but the short version is that China pushed for a less 
expansive response to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear problems than the West 
preferred; limited the scope of sanctions on Sudan and equivocated about a PKO in 
Darfur without Khartoum’s consent; and rejected out of hand efforts to place pressure 
Zimbabwe and Burma, arguing instead that continued peaceful mediation would be a 
more effective strategy.200   
 It is important to note that China’s contentiousness did not extend to every state 
that was targeted by the UN in the 2000s. In several instances, there was no evidence that 
the PRC opposed the use of sanctions against regimes. These included Eritrea and 
Ethiopia from 2000 to 2001, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 2003, Côte 
D’Ivoire since 2004, and Eritrea since 2009. The PRC did abstain on the imposition of 
sanctions against Eritrea in 2009, but there is no indication that it used influence behind 
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the scenes to affect the type of measures vis-à-vis that government.201 More discretely, 
China voted for sanctions against Congo, but has failed to supply details regarding PRC 
arms sales to the DRC to the UNSC Committee charged with monitoring implementation, 
leading observers to question China’s commitment to sanctions in that country.202 
 Table 7 provides an overview of China’s strategic relations with the nine 
countries subjected to sanctions in between 2000 and 2011. The table illustrates that 
China’s interests in these states varied. In instances in which the PRC had very little at 
stake, it usually did not adopt a contentious posture either during negotiations or in the 
voting stage.203 China had formal diplomatic relations with all nine countries. It 
conducted large-scale arms transfers to Sudan, Iran and Myanmar; lesser transfers to the 
DRC and Zimbabwe; and no recorded transfers to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Côte D’Ivoire or 
North Korea during the decade. Its total trade with targets at the time punitive action was 
first considered ranged from about $40 million (Eritrea in 2009) to about $14.5 billion 
(Iran in 2006). China’s trade level with Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Libya and 
the DRC all topped $1 billion at some point in the 2000s, while its trade with Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Côte D’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe fell far short of that mark.  
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Table 7: PRC Economic and Military Relations with Targeted States, 2000-2009 
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Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System 
(UNBISnet); UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database; SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. NB: Most recent 
data for Libya was 2009.  
 
 There are three reasons why China used power to shape the outcome of UN action 
on the DPRK, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe, but not the others. First is 
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geography.204 Two of the nine states (North Korea and Burma) are geographically 
contiguous with the PRC. With respect to the former, China feared that overly aggressive 
measures against Pyongyang might result in regime collapse, which could in turn lead to 
a massive influx of refugees into China’s Northeast.205 North Korea also serves as a 
strategic buffer between China and South Korea, a U.S. ally and host to some 25,000 U.S. 
troops, and so Beijing has an incentive not to distance itself too far from the DPRK.206 
Burma, for its part, is a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a partner in China’s strategy to 
improve its relative naval capabilities in the region. In addition, China has also been 
concerned about the possibility of refugees flowing into its Southwest as a result of 
outside pressure on that state. The PRC thus has an incentive to prevent Western 
meddling, including via UNSC pressure against the military junta.207 
 Second is China’s dependency on energy imports, which are increasingly critical 
to the growth of China’s domestic economy.208 China is cautious of aggressive UN action 
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since this might cause domestic or regional instability which might threaten its supplies, 
and might strain its political relations with key partners. As John Bolton writes, China’s  
Large and growing demand for energy has been and will increasingly be a driver of its 
foreign policy, leading it to seek assured sources of supply around the world. China’s 
solicitude for undesirable and threatening governments like those of Iran, Sudan and 
Burma can be explained in large measure by its desire to support governments that can 
help China achieve its broader objective of energy security.209  
This point applies particularly to Iran and Sudan, which were the 3rd and 6th largest 
suppliers of China’s petroleum imports in the first half of 2009, and which the PRC holds 
large equity stakes in national petroleum corporations.210 Moreover, Iran serves the 
additional strategic role of major supplier of liquid natural gas.211  
 Third is China’s diplomatic partnership with Russia in Council negotiations. As 
we have seen, the two non-Western permanent members supported each other on a 
number of sanctions-related votes in the 1990s. Some scholars have described a tendency 
of China and Russia to oppose U.S. intervention in the UNSC as “soft balancing.”212 
Regarding pariah states, UN diplomats refer to a condominium among the two powers to 
support each other when their respective national interests are at stake. Specifically, 
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 See, e.g., Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” Paul (62-4) focuses especially on Sino-
Russian disagreement with NATO on the issue of Kosovo in the 1990s. He also portrays China as a 
member, albeit a tangential one, of the coalition of states that opposed a resolution in 2002 to authorize the 




Russia followed China’s lead on the DPRK and vice-versa on Iran.213 Similarly, Russia 
supported China’s resistance to U.S. plans to punish Myanmar in 2007, while Beijing 
appeared to return the favor by voting with Moscow against a Western-sponsored draft 
on Zimbabwe the following year.214 Such behavior, though perhaps confined to a few 
highly significant issues, runs contrary to the image of normative convergence among the 
P5 states.215 
 In sum, in contrast to its prior restraint, China emerged as an active participant in 
UNSC affairs at the dawn of the 21st century. On one hand, it took a prominent role as a 
contributor to PKOs. Aimed in part at burnishing China’s credentials as a responsible 
actor, this has generally been welcomed by the international community. On the other 
hand, China was enmeshed in contentious negotiations on how to respond to a number of 
pariah states, especially those in which it held strategic or economic interests. The 
impression of China as a “diligent apprentice” had given way to that of a complex actor: 




 A diplomat in China’s UN mission recently remarked that his “personal view” is 
that the U.S. is still the “leader of the world,” that “no country can challenge it,” and that 
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 This will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. However, to preview, China did not 
express particularly strong reservations to sanctions against Zimbabwe; rather, the PRC declared its 
intention to use its veto only after Russia did so. In the eyes of Western diplomats, Russia was attempting 
to reassert itself as a key player in P5 negotiations and used Zimbabwe as an excuse to do so.  
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this will remain true for at least the next twenty years.216 This opinion contains elements 
of both fact and fiction. It is true that the PRC was reluctant to confront the U.S. in the 
Security Council in the forty years between 1971 and 2011. China acquiesced to 
proposals on topics ranging from peacekeeping, to sanctions, to the use of force by the 
U.S. At times, it disassociated itself from the West by means of abstentions and polemics 
in public debates, but did not use its veto power unless it had clear material interests in 
the outcome.  
 China’s restraint can be attributed to a simple pragmatism. In its formative years, 
it adopted an attitude of watching and learning, rather than “going into battle 
unprepared.” It did not choose to clash with the U.S. or the USSR when it did not have 
obvious economic or political stakes in the outcome of negotiations. Moreover, the PRC 
has placed a premium on positive relations with other major powers. As Ambassador 
Charles Freeman writes, the PRC often makes “tactical sacrifices in order to avoid giving 
offense in the interest of achieving longer-term strategic gains in relations with other 
member states.”217 This was as true in the 1980s, when China prioritized positive 
relations with the developed world over ideological struggle, as it was in the 1990s, when 
it tempered its concerns about sovereignty and intervention with the aim of resurrecting 
its status as an integral member of the international community after the Tiananmen crisis.   
 Moreover, in a sense, China’s need to exercise restraint dissipated as its tolerance 
for intervention grew. This is especially relevant to PKOs, in which China’s position 
evolved from principled resistance in the 1970s, to begrudging acceptance in the 1980s, 
                                                 
216
 Interview, Permanent Mission of China to the UN, January 2010.  
 
217
 Chas Freeman, “Chinese Negotiating Behavior Revisited,” in Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing 
Interests Through ‘Old Friends’ , by Richard Solomon (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 
1999), 190-1.  
  
73 
to limited participation in the 1990s, to active contributions in the early 21st century. It is 
debatable, and perhaps not resolvable from an analytical point of view, whether this 
evolution can be explained by a utilitarian desire for recognition, by a process of 
socialization, or both. The point is that disassociation, including by way of abstentions, 
became a much less prominent part of China’s behavior in the UN than it once was.   
 The fiction of the Chinese diplomat’s comment is that, historically, Beijing has 
not been hesitant to confront the U.S. in cases in which national interests were at stake. 
As Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University, suggests, China is “principled on 
security.” His meaning is that the PRC can overlook purely normative concerns, but does 
not refrain from using the tools at its disposal to achieve goals that significantly impact 
the country’s survival and prosperity.218 In the Council, China used its veto power on 
matters that became entangled with its alliance with Pakistan, its struggle with Taiwan, 
and the stability of the Korean Peninsula. It has challenged the West on a series of pariah 
states, including the DPRK, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe, absorbing unvarnished 
criticism from Western observers and fuelling a narrative of China as an increasingly 
“assertive” power in the 21st century. In short, it did what it had to do.  
 
# # # 
 
 It is one thing to point out that the PRC has been willing to challenge the U.S. or 
others when its national interests have been affected. This much is clear from the 
historical record. It is more difficult to explain why China’s positions in Security Council 
debates on subjects such as North Korea, Sudan and Iran evolved from initial resistance 
to eventual agreement with the U.S. Similarly, the reasons why China was not willing to 
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move towards a consensus on Myanmar and Zimbabwe are also opaque. To explain the 
nuances within China’s contentiousness, we have to understand the mechanics that 
influence the extent to which states become prone to compromise. The next chapter 
identifies the PRC’s mixed record of cooperativeness on pariah states as a puzzle, and 





The Pariah Puzzle:  




Despite its gradual acceptance of peacekeeping, intervention with host country 
approval, and punitive measures against non-state actors, such as terrorists, China has 
become relatively confrontational in UNSC debates on how to respond to pariah states. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. and its partners have been increasingly 
willing to use the coercive authority available to the Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to pressure a series of pariah states to reform their behavior. These states 
have included North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Libya. In some cases, 
such as military provocation by the DPRK or Iranian nuclear development, the offense 
was a traditional, external security threat. In others, such as political repression in Burma 
or threats against civilians in Libya, the West appeared to be propelled by a desire to 
prevent humanitarian disasters, which were perceived to be actionable under the 
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.219  
Motivated by a variety of political and economic interests in these regimes, China 
has not unreservedly accepted Western plans to use coercion through the Council. As a 
result, the PRC has used its influence as a veto-holding member to weaken some 
proposals and reject others out of hand. Yet, the PRC has ultimately granted its 
imprimatur to some proposals. These have ranged from non-binding Presidential 
Statements (PRSTs) on states such as Burma and Zimbabwe to sanctions, including those 
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against Iran in 2010 and Libya in 2011. China’s contentiousness has been bounded, not 
absolute.  
A number of empirical questions flow from China’s mixed record of support vis-
à-vis the U.S. First, what factors can help explain its willingness either to consent to 
UNSC decisions against targeted regimes, or to block such initiatives? In other words, 
under what conditions is China amenable to compromise, and when is it not? Second, 
why, during the course of specific negotiations, does China’s stance sometimes change 
from opposition to support? Third, based on this analysis what policy options are 
available to the U.S. or others to influence China’s positions?  
This chapter develops five hypotheses intended to explain the puzzle of China’s 
mixed cooperation on pariah states. Two center on aspects of the issue under negotiation 
itself. These are that China is more likely to endorse U.S. calls for pressure when (1) 
alternate dispute resolution methods, including dialogue and bilateral pressure, have been 
tried and failed; and (2) the U.S. and its partners have been willing to make concessions 
that address key Chinese concerns, such as about the scope of sanctions. Three 
hypotheses center on the broader political dynamics in which UNSC deliberators are 
enmeshed. These are that (1) China is more likely to cooperate on issues of central 
concern to the U.S. than on peripheral ones, such as those driven purely by ideological 
concerns; (2) China should become more amenable to compromise if Russia’s position 
has shifted towards the West, as the PRC desires not to be isolated among the P5; and (3) 
Beijing is likely to follow the major regional stakeholders, who may be most likely to 
reward China for its support, and to punish it for not following suit.  
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The chapter proceeds in the following three sections. The first defines and 
explains the dependent variable, which is China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. on 
negotiations related to pariah states. It identifies the puzzle that, despite interests in each 
of these regimes, the PRC has had a mixed record of support for punitive measures 
against them. The second section develops the hypotheses, as outlined above. This 
section draws from the conceptual building blocks provided by the general literature on 
negotiations, as well as the more specific literatures on Council politics and Chinese 
foreign policy. The third section comments on the research design and potential 
limitations to the approach.  
  
Beyond Votes: Outcomes in the Security Council 
 
In essence, the positions of states towards some initiative within the Security 
Council can be described as “cooperative” or “not cooperative.” This terminology is not 
meant to ascribe normative values to either choice, but merely to capture the state’s 
relative position at a particular moment. It also does not imply a reactionary orientation; 
China, for instance, might resist a certain proposal while advancing its own. However, 
since plans to apply pressure on the pariah states were typically driven by the U.S. and its 
supporters (such as the U.K. and France), it makes sense to describe China’s positions in 
terms of cooperativeness. The distinction is meaningful because, with its veto, China’s 
cooperation is necessary for the Council to act; its opposition is sufficient to prevent the 
Council from acting.     
Analytically, cooperation in the Security Council can be defined in the negative, 
as the lack of opposition to a particular proposal. China cooperates when it does not block 
a PRST, or when it votes in favor of, or abstains on, a resolution. Punitive resolutions 
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range from warnings to highly invasive sanctions, covering arms, travel, financial or 
other elements.220 The UN Charter also provides the Council the right to authorize force, 
though this is not applicable to any of the cases described here.  
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the variances in China’s voting behavior on major 
decisions related to states identified in Chapter 1 as those in which the PRC has major 
interests. China cooperated with the West by endorsing PRSTs on North Korea, 
Myanmar, and Zimbabwe, by abstaining on a series of resolutions on Darfur, and by 
voting in favor of resolutions on North Korea and Iran.221 
 
Table 8: Selected Positive Cases  
 
Case Talks Start Talks End Result (*=sanctions) China’s Vote 
DPRK July 6, 2006222 July 15, 2006 1695 Yes 
DPRK Oct. 10, 2006223 Oct. 14, 2006 1718* Yes 
DPRK April 7, 2009224 April 13, 
2009 
PRST 2009/7 N/A 
DPRK May 25, 2009225 June 12, 2009 1874* Yes 
DPRK June 4, 2010226 July 9, 2010 PRST 2010/13 N/A 
Iran Sept. 22, 
2006227 
Dec. 23, 2006 1737* Yes 
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Iran Feb. 26, 2007228 Mar. 24, 2007 1747* Yes 
Iran Jan. 28, 2008229 Mar. 3, 2008 1803* Yes 
Iran March 4, 
2010230 
June 9, 2010 1835* Yes 
Sudan Sept. 9, 2004231 Sept. 18, 2004 1564* Abstain 
Sudan Feb. 17, 2005232 Mar. 19, 2005 1591* Abstain 
Sudan Aug. 17, 
2006233 
Aug. 31, 2006 1706 Abstain 
Myanmar Oct. 5, 2007234 Oct. 11, 2007 PRST 2007/37 N/A 
Zimbabwe June 23, 2008235 June 23, 2008 PRST 2008/23 N/A 
Libya236 Feb. 22, 2011237 Feb. 26, 2011 1970 Yes 




1973 Abstain  
 
Conversely, a non-cooperative position reflects opposition either to a PRST or to 
a draft resolution. Veto use represents the most apparent form of noncooperation, though, 
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as previously noted, China has rarely exercised this option. More common is resistance 
during the negotiating process, which, in turn, may lead to two outcomes.  
First is that a specific proposal is never brought to a vote. For instance, the U.S. 
chose not to pursue sanctions against Sudan in the spring of 2007 owing, in part, to 
resistance by China.239 Due to Chinese objections, the U.S. did not table resolutions on 
Burma’s recalcitrant position towards international aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 
2009,240 on violence towards civilians in the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009,241 or on North 
Korea’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.242 Table 9 provides a sample of 
“non-outcomes,” due either to veto use or withdrawn proposals.  
Table 9: Selected Negative Cases  
Case Date Proposal Contents Vote? 
DPRK Nov., 2010 Condemnation of DPRK attack on 
Yeonpyeong Island, calling it a violation of 
prior resolutions 
No 
Burma Jan. 12, 
2007 
Draft called on junta to release Aung San 
Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, engage in 
political reform.  
Yes (veto by 
China/Russia) 
Burma Sept., 2009  Discussion of a proposal to authorize 
shipments of humanitarian aid over the 
objections of the junta, following Cyclone 
No 
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Sri Lanka May, 2009  Limited discussion of possible sanctions or 
ICC involvement, following government 




Expansion of arms embargo, ban on 
“offensive military flights,” sanctions on 
individuals charged with human rights 
violations.  
No 
Zimbabwe July 11, 
2008 
Arms embargo, travel and financial 
restrictions on Mugabe and 13 other 
government officials.  
Yes (veto by 
China/Russia) 
 
Second is that proposals are modified by their sponsors so as to draw support. 
Positions, of course, can change during the course of negotiations. For instance, China 
initially rejected a Japanese draft resolution on North Korea’s nuclear test in June 2009, 
but eventually agreed to a compromise approach.244  
It should be emphasized that most contention occurs well before the voting stage. 
Council observers have described the informal interactions that precede public discussion 
of agenda items.245 Plans to punish pariah states typically originated with the U.S. and its 
partners, especially the U.K. and France. Proposals are then brought to the non-Western 
permanent members, China and Russia, and discussed informally, often at the missions of 
the relevant states or other places on the fringes of the UN. Disputation of the issue may 
then follow several courses, as described above. Only if, and when, the parties have 
agreed to the text of a PRST or resolution is it formally circulated, discussed and acted on. 
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This process is intentionally opaque, designed to shield the actors from political 
interference and maintain a façade of Council unity in public, which usually serves the 
interests of all five permanent members.246 
Since a state’s position relative to another can be described as cooperative or not 
cooperative at any particular point during the negotiating process, it is possible to identify 
countless “outcomes.” From a pragmatic angle, however, it is only necessary to describe 
cooperativeness at two points: at the beginning and end of negotiations. In each case 
studied here, China’s opening position was resistant vis-à-vis the initial proposal of the 
West. This is unremarkable for two reasons. First is that the U.S. tends to seek far more 
pressure against pariah states than what China is willing to tolerate in principle, if an 
agreement can be reached at all. Second, China has a variety of material interests in these 
states, which means that it will be conflicted about the use of punitive measures. What’s 
interesting is where the parties ended up. Were the sides able to compromise, or were 
they left with a non-outcome (i.e., a shelved proposal or a veto)? The puzzle, then, is 
explaining why China was sometimes able to reach an agreement with the U.S., and 
sometimes not.  
Analysis can be further divided into two forms. First is cross-case comparison. 
This type of assessment focuses on the reasons why an actor maintained opposition to a 
decision in one instance, but was able to agree in another. For example, why did China 
veto a U.S.-drafted resolution on Myanmar in January 2007, only to agree to a 
condemnatory PRST against the junta the following October? Why did it support an arms 
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embargo on Sudan in 2005 but oppose one against Zimbabwe in 2008? Second is within-
case analysis, which examines changes in position during the stages of a specific 
negotiation cycle. Why did China first oppose, and then come to support, a second round 
of sanctions on the DPRK in June 2009, or a fourth round on Iran in June 2010? Both 
types of analysis target the puzzle, which is explaining the variance in cooperation.   
In this context, a sensible analytical framework would provide some insight into 
the conditions that tend to be associated with variance in China’s positions. It would be 
useful both in explaining differences across cases, and shifts within single cases. In 
addition, it would be falsifiable, open to independent verification and refutation. Finally, 
it would be general enough as to be applicable to similar cases, but not so broad as to lose 
the ability to account for a large share of the variance in the cases that are examined.  The 
next section develops a framework based on these standards, and is followed by a 
discussion of methods and limitations.  
 
Five Explanations  
 
International relations theorists have demonstrated that cooperation between states 
is possible when each party perceives gains that exceed the potential costs. Robert Jervis 
observed in 1978 that “wars would be much more frequent…if they were less risky and 
costly, and if peaceful intercourse did not provide rich benefits.”247 Robert Keohane also 
argued that “attainment of the gains from pursuing complementary policies depends on 
cooperation,” and noted that institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction 
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costs, providing information, and offering “rules of thumb” to guide national 
bureaucracies.248 Abram and Antonia Chayes go even farther, and assert that institutions 
themselves may help to generate cooperation by modifying preferences and persuading 
parties to comply with the norms embedded within regimes.249 
If these accounts are correct, then the reasons for China’s cooperativeness with 
the U.S. in Security Council negotiations should be based on an expectation of acquiring 
some advantage, or at least avoiding some loss. The question, then, is what types of 
considerations can help to explain the decision. The following sections develop a series 
of hypotheses that are intended to account for the variance. They were assembled in two 
ways. First is through partial induction, in which a survey of the cases led to a number of 
“hunches” about the types of variables that appeared to be influencing China’s positions. 
Second was through a canvassing of a variety of relevant literatures, particularly in the 
areas of Chinese foreign policy, prior studies of United Nations decision-making, and 
broader research on negotiations that has appeared in the disciplines of organizational 
psychology, management, and others.  
Partial induction and reference to external research both pointed to a basic 
distinction in the types of interests that should have an effect on how the PRC developed 
its positions during the course of UNSC negotiations. First are interests in the issues 
themselves. In particular, we would expect China to question the efficacy of the proposal 
under consideration given the available alternatives, and to weigh the potential risks to 
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China’s interests in the regimes in question if a particular resolution was approved. 
Second are interests in maintaining positive political relations with others engaged in the 
deliberations. This includes not only the U.S. and its allies, but also Russia and the key 
regional stakeholders. The following sections generate five hypotheses based on this 
distinction.   
 
Weighing Alternatives  
 
A major axis of contention between China, Russia and the Western powers with 
respect to pariah states is how the challenges posed by these regimes can be most 
effectively addressed. The PRC has recognized that the instability generated by states like 
North Korea and Sudan can negatively affect its own interests, and has acquiesced to 
various forms of external intervention in response. The problem is that the West typically 
defaults on the application of multilateral pressure as a preferred strategy, while the PRC 
tends to place more emphasis on bilateral contacts and non-coercive mediation. Hence, 
cooperativeness should result from constraints on these alternate pathways, such that 
punitive action becomes a goal shared by the P5.  
 
(1) Sovereignty and Stability  
 
Chapter 1 noted that China often finessed the norm of sovereignty in the UNSC 
because it had little at stake and wished to enhance its credentials as a responsible power, 
especially after 1989. This flexibility is apparent even in instances in which China has 
powerful economic or political motives to shield the state in question. The reason is that 
these states have jeopardized stability which is, fundamentally, at the core of China’s 
post-Mao grand strategy. The essence of Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thought is that, 
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“stability is the highest priority for the interests of China…The essential condition for 
China to reach its goal of development is to have a stable, peaceful international 
environment.”250 
Given its basic strategic interests in sustained economic growth and a peaceful 
international environment, China pays close attention to how the behavior of states like 
North Korea, Sudan and Burma affects both internal and external political stability. 
Domestic instability and violence may threaten China’s economic interests, especially its 
access to oil, natural gas or other vital commodities; the ability of states to repay loans; or 
even the lives of a growing number Chinese citizens abroad engaged in diplomacy, 
construction, trade or other tasks.251 As Jonathan Holslag suggests, internal disorder 
might also precipitate Western-led military intervention, which would reduce China’s 
“clout” in sought-after markets.252  
Additionally, the PRC is aware that domestic disorder may mutate into regional 
threats. Instability in Myanmar, for instance, has led to refugee flows, drug smuggling, 
money laundering and other cross-border issues.253 The situation in Darfur is another case 
in point. Internecine violence there is problematic both because it threatens PRC 
investments and the lives of Chinese workers, and because it has the potential to spill 
over into Chad, another area where China is seeking to improve its access to energy 
resources. According to the International Crisis Group, “Beijing is learning to avoid the 
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perils of entrusting its energy security to unpopular and, in many cases, fragile, 
regimes.”254 A Chinese UN diplomat acknowledges the dilemmas posed by pariah states, 
noting that “in this context, sovereignty cannot be respected.”255 
China also has compelling reasons not to dismiss the external provocations of 
states such as North Korea. Concerns that the development of nuclear weapons 
technology, and its means of delivery, might spark regional conflict, invite a U.S. military 
response, and thereby threaten China’s commercial and strategic interests both in 
Northeast Asia and in the Middle East have been commonly cited as a reason for China’s 
unwillingness to inflexibly shield these two states from intervention.256 Similarly, the 
PRC seeks to preserve the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which strengthens 
China’s own power and prestige by minimizing the number of states permitted to possess 
nuclear weapons.257 As a Chinese diplomat observes:  
Traditionally, the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles has been 
the decision of a sovereign nation. China has developed its own nuclear weapons and 
missile capability according to this argument. Yet, Beijing now considers its 
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commitment to regional stability and international nonproliferation regimes to be high 
priorities. In a time of globalization, China’s economic and security interests have 
become intertwined with securing a stable peripheral environment and a peaceful world. 
Consequently, China has to adjust its traditionally held value of an abstract and absolute 
sovereignty.258  
In Krasnerian fashion, China’s attachment to sovereignty is attenuated even—and 
perhaps especially—with respect to states in which it has major interests.259  
 
(2) The Dilemma of Coercion    
 
 In the context of negotiations on pariah states, the issue is not necessarily 
disagreement about the existence of a problem, but rather divergent attitudes about the 
means through which problems should be addressed. The U.S. and its partners typically 
prefer to rely on sanctions to motivate recalcitrant regimes to change their behavior, 
whereas the PRC, Russia and others often prefer a less confrontational modality. For 
China, this means either bilateral pressure, peaceful dialogue (including efforts carried 
out by regional or ad-hoc groups), or both. China’s formal position on sanctions is that 
they be applied “with prudence on the precondition that all peaceful means have been 
exhausted,” although, once enacted, all states have a responsibility to implement them.260  
As noted in the previous chapter, the PRC has argued since the early 1990s that 
sanctions tend to be counterproductive. This claim can be disaggregated into several parts, 
each of which provides a reason for China to treat punitive action cautiously. First is the 
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belief that pressure will further destabilize already fragile regimes, leading to state 
collapse and ultimately harming China’s own strategic interests. For instance, on the 
DPRK some Chinese experts have argued that sanctions would cause the regime to 
implode, which in turn would generate a refugee crisis and perhaps lead U.S. troops to fill 
the void along China’s northeastern periphery.261 Colin Keating suggests that China drew 
a parallel between the collapse of the USSR under external pressure and the potential 
implosion of Sudan or the DPRK as a result of UNSC interference.262 
Second is the concern that states subjected to harsh penalties might react 
provocatively and ignite regional tensions, which may spiral out of control and, once 
again, ultimately harm China’s interests. For instance, the belief that sanctions might 
cause Pyongyang to become “more aggressive and unpredictable” was a reason for China 
to resist measures against North Korea in 2006.263  
A third, related factor is that the U.S. or others might seek to use resolutions as a 
justification for the use of force. Hua Liming, a retired Chinese ambassador to Iran, 
writes that sanctions against Tehran might be used as a pretext for U.S. or Israeli 
airstrikes.264 Fear about the possibility of unauthorized escalation was exacerbated by the 
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U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, leading to considerable debate about the precise legal 
phrasing of resolutions.265 
Fourth is the view that ineffectual decisions weaken the Security Council’s 
authority and only encourage wrongdoers by providing evidence that the international 
community is not prepared to act decisively. Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University 
in Shanghai, argues that the Council’s inability to mete out effective punishment on one 
state, such as North Korea, can become a signal to others, such as Iran, that they too can 
behave with indemnity.266  
 
(3) Shifting Alternatives     
 
In contrast to multilateral pressure, China tends to favor two alternate conflict 
resolution types. First is dialogue, in which parties try to reach a mediated settlement 
without the threat of punishment. This may include representatives of the UN (“good 
offices” missions of the Secretary-General), regional organizations (such as the African 
Union or ASEAN), or ad-hoc processes (e.g., the Six-Party Talks on the DPRK or the 
E3+3 on Iran).267 There are several reasons for this preference, including: a belief that 
only negotiations, and not pressure, can resolve the underlying causes of conflict;268 the 
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desire to preserve positive relations with the target state, or with regional or other actors 
which support mediation;269 avoidance of economic costs that would result from 
sanctions;270 and the opportunity for China to play an appreciated role as a mediator in 
cases such as the Six-Party Talks.271 
The second route is through bilateral pressure. Specifically, the PRC might make 
threats or warnings to encourage the target to reform its behavior. The benefits of this 
avenue would be avoiding the pitfalls of sanctions while adding needed “sticks” to 
negotiation efforts, as well as responding to international calls for China to use its unique 
influence on pariah states as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.272 
For example, Ian Holliday describes China as a “low-level interventionist power” on 
Myanmar, “nudging the junta in a reformist direction” through quiet diplomacy.273 Others 
have observed China’s efforts to use economic leverage to influence the behavior of the 
Zimbabwean government, “even in the absence of strong international pressure to do 
so.”274  
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However, for various reasons both alternatives may be untenable. States such as 
North Korea and Iran may engage in dialogue solely to delay coercion while work on 
nuclear programs continues unabated, or they may reject them entirely. In terms of 
domestic politics, the Burmese junta may accept brief visits by the Secretary General’s 
Special Representative without delivering progress on political reform objectives, or it 
may deny the envoy access to opposition leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi. The 
government in Khartoum may reject private appeals by the PRC to permit UN 
peacekeepers to deploy to Darfur, just as Robert Mugabe may resist bilateral efforts to 
discourage crackdowns on political opponents. In short, alternative processes can fail to 
achieve their intended goals. 
The degree to which China is willing to cooperate with the U.S. to punish 
recalcitrant states should depend on the prospects offered by these alternate mechanisms. 
In other words, Beijing should be more cooperative the fewer external options exist, and 
vice versa. This theorem is analogous to the proposition that states engaged in armed 
conflict are more likely to submit to negotiations the dimmer their perceptions of the 
gains of continued fighting. I. William Zartman writes that “parties must be convinced 
that bilateral efforts are better than unilateral efforts.”275 A “ripe moment” for 
cooperation exists when parties believe that the remaining alternatives are inferior to 
negotiation with one another.276 Thus:  
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Hypothesis 1: China should be more willing to cooperate with efforts to 
punish pariah states the fewer opportunities exist for multilateral dialogue and 
bilateral intervention and, conversely, China should be less willing to 
cooperate the more such alternatives exist.  
 
Two cases illustrate how the changing structure of alternatives impacts the 
decision-making of states in Security Council negotiations. First is Britain’s decision to 
shift from opposition to support for pressure against Southern Rhodesia in 1965. In late 
1963, the UK, preferring to use bilateral channels, vetoed a resolution that would have 
“invited” it not to transfer sovereignty to its colony without a representative government 
in place, or sell arms to the regime.277 When, in November 1965, Ian Smith’s government 
declared independence without Britain’s consent, the UK changed its position and agreed 
to a Security Council resolution278 which requested states to terminate economic relations 
with Salisbury.279 The closing of the bilateral avenue made Security Council involvement 
a relatively appealing option.  
Second was the willingness of Colombia, then a non-permanent member of the 
Council, to support UNSC sanctions and the use of force against Iraq in 1990 and 1991. 
Colombia held reservations about coercion due to its experience with U.S. hegemonism 
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in the Western Hemisphere, and attempted to broker a deal whereby the issue of Iraq’s 
annexation of Kuwait would be mediated by the General Assembly, as opposed to the 
Security Council.280 However, this initiative failed, both because of provisions in the UN 
Charter which grant the Council precedence in handling crises, and because of sentiment 
within the General Assembly that such a move would damage the UN itself.281 As a result, 
Colombia opted to support the U.S.’s more punitive approach. 
 
 Responses to Flexibility  
 
 There are two ways in which the issue itself may enter into China’s decision-
making calculus. First is in terms of the structure of alternatives, as discussed above. The 
second is through the anticipated consequences of a specific proposal for China’s general 
interests in stability, in addition to more specific interests in economic relations with the 
state in question. The extent to which China perceives a strategic risk in cooperating with 
the U.S. is bound up in the flexibility Washington has demonstrated in assuaging China’s 
concerns. It is more likely that China will cooperate if the U.S. is willing to alter, or 
“weaken,” its plans in order to generate consensus.  
  
(1) Forms of Accommodation  
 
Sergey Lavrov, a former Russian ambassador to the UN, has written that mutual 
concessions and accommodation both within the P5 and in the Security Council at large 
is a necessary and common occurrence in the process of reaching deals. Russia’s “key 
task” is to protect its “national interests,” but, “those can only be advanced when they are 
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harmonized with the interests of others.” What is voted on is not a “maximalist position,” 
but rather  
…a more moderate one, adjusted for consideration by a body with many clashing points 
of view, and whose work is to search for compromise, concession, exchanges, and ways 
to untie a knot.282  
In general, there are two ways in which a Council member may be compensated 
for the risks it expects to incur as a result of a decision. First is by amending the text of a 
draft. For instance, to reduce concerns about the escalation of conflicts, the U.S. might 
delete references to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, replace decisive measures with 
discretionary ones,283 or change the form from a resolution to a PRST, which is usually 
considered a less forceful response that does not carry the weight of international law.284 
For instance, during deliberations prior to the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. agreed to a French 
proposal that violations of prior resolutions would lead to “serious consequences,” but 
that the use of force would have to be authorized by a second resolution.285 
In the context of sanctions resolutions, a sponsor might eliminate items that would 
harm the commercial or political interests of a reluctant state. This is particularly relevant 
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to China in the 2000s, given its expanding and deepening stakes in countries like Iran, 
Sudan and Burma. As a result, the U.S. can promote consensus by opting not to press for 
restrictions on entities that would cause major harm to the PRC. For example, in March 
2005, the U.S. omitted from a draft resolution reference to Sudan’s oil industry in a bid to 
reduce the burden on China, a move which likely averted a veto.286 A sponsor might also 
elect not to target high officials or others with whom China (or another Council member) 
would like to preserve a working relationship.287   
The second form of accommodation is tradeoffs in other areas. In theory, one of 
the reasons why states act through formal organizations is the ability to coordinate side-
payments, and to share information about whether parties have fulfilled their obligations 
under the terms of the agreement.288 For instance, to secure votes to authorize the use of 
force against Iraq in late 1990, the U.S. offered debt forgiveness and development aid to 
several ambivalent Security Council members, including China.289 Another example is 
Russia’s support for U.S. military intervention in Haiti in 1994, likely given in response 
for U.S. approval of a Russian-led peacekeeping force in Georgia.290 The U.S. or others 
                                                 
286
 Warren Hoge, “U.N. Council Approves Penalties in Darfur,” New York Times, March 30, 2005).  
 
287
 For instance, Resolution 1591 (March 2005) on Sudan did not mention any individuals; when the U.S. 
sought measures against four individuals in April, 2006, it encountered Chinese intransigence. However, 
the four included only one, relatively lowly-ranked government official (the others being militia 
commanders). China ultimately abstained. Warren Hoge, “U.S. Envoy to Expose 4 Sudanese in U.N. 
Debate About Darfur,” New York Times, April 18, 2006.  
 
288
 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kenneth Abbott 
and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 42 (1998), 3-32.  
 
289
 Martin Walker, “Baker’s Quest for Bloodless Victory,” The Guardian (London), December 9, 1990. 
 
290
 As Malone writes, however, the “extent of trading between the U.S. and Russia has been impossible to 




might also offer guarantees, such as by arranging alternative sources of oil should 
sanctions result in a loss of access to a particular state’s supplies.291 
 
(2) Reasons for Flexibility  
 
Three reasons might propel a sponsor to make concessions during the course of 
negotiations. First is the assessment that doing so may be sufficient to compensate the 
putative loser for the risk it is assuming by agreeing to a specific action. This is especially 
relevant to veto-wielding states. Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University, writes 
that, in the case of Iran, U.S. admonitions that China behave “responsibly” could not 
make up for potential losses. Chu poses several rhetorical questions to argue that Beijing 
would not agree to further sanctions on Tehran in the absence of compensation:   
The Chinese government can afford to give up some of its interests with Iran, but the 
big question is “why?” Why should China sacrifice and bare the cost of deteriorating 
relations with Iran? Why is it necessary? Is it a fact that Iran is a serious threat to the 
region or to the world that China must act with others against such a threat? What are 
China’s incentives when it sacrifices its relations with Iran?292 
In short, the purpose of offering concessions is to alter the strategic calculus by making 
the risks of pressure less severe.   
 Second is the conviction that negotiation strategies are reciprocal; that is, that the 
behavior of one actor, in itself, can elicit similar behavior in its opposite number. In the 
context of labor negotiations, the practice of management making a “first and final offer” 
can generate resentment on the part of a union, resulting in the latter dismissing the 
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notion that productive negotiations are feasible at all—even if bargaining space does 
actually exist.293  Conversely, adopting a conciliatory posture, in the form of dropping 
low-priority goals, expressing a willingness to modify demands, and maintaining ongoing 
dialogue, can communicate the message that the actor is willing to concede something of 
value, and, if successful, will prompt the other side to do likewise, and so on, until an 
agreement is struck.294   
 The third reason is that concessions provide leaders a face-saving way to reach a 
compromise. Organizational psychology research has demonstrated that negotiators are 
likely to become more competitive, and less willing to compromise, the more social 
capital they stand to lose in front of their peers.295 Compensation allows would-be 
compromisers to construe the result of negotiations as a victory, or at least as a draw, 
overcoming internal resistance. As Peter Hays Gries argues in the context of Chinese 
diplomacy, “face” (mianzi) is not simply about national dignity; it is also about enabling 
moderate actors to appease hardliners, such as those in the military. For leaders, 
reputation is crucial, since “their social credit at home depends on it.”296 In effect, there is 
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a mutually-reinforcing logic of concessions that works at both the international and 
domestic levels.  
  
(3) Constraints on Concessions 
 
 Despite the benefits of accommodation, there are costs as well. The first is simply 
that the required concessions are unacceptably high to the proposer. For instance, Beijing 
might be strongly opposed to a draft on political repression in a state of strategic 
importance. To bolster its position, it might publicly threaten a veto and line up allies, 
including Russia.297 Although the U.S. might be able to convince the PRC to abstain by 
weakening the draft, that option might be unattractive for one of two reasons. First is that 
the outcome would be so weak as to have no effect on the target state’s behavior. Second, 
it might be considered a diplomatic failure domestically. The typical strategy would be to 
refrain from substantive negotiations in the first place.298    
 Second is that there may be incentives to suggest or push drafts without the hope 
or expectation of approval. For instance, the U.S. apparently sought UN approval for the 
use of force against Iraq in late 2002 not because it thought such an outcome likely, but 
because doing so was a condition for Britain’s participation in the coalition. Forcing a 
vote that the U.S. knows will fail, as it did on Burma and Zimbabwe, might be driven by 
the desire to shame intransigent members of the Council and to make a public statement 
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of values.299 Alternately, the U.S. might bluff; that is, suggesting that it intends to seek a 
resolution in order to compel a state to cease some behavior, without the actual intention 
of paying the costs associated with following through.300 Hence, inflexibility might be the 
result of an actor valuing symbolism over substance.   
 Third, flexibility without limits can have negative reputational effects. Although 
offering to make concessions can elicit a conciliatory response, doing so can also lead the 
opposite party to raise its demands, seeking more and more in return for less and less. A 
related problem is that the actor may desire to cultivate a long-term reputation of firmness 
to enhance its credibility in future negotiations.301 For these reasons, deliberators have 
developed several tactics, such as making concessions contingent on reciprocal acts, 
alternating between yielding and firmness, and issuing “first and final” offers.302 Parties 
that are concerned more with their reputation than with the substance of the issue at hand 
are especially unlikely to offer sufficient concessions to reach agreement.  
 The point is that China’s cooperativeness is contingent on the willingness of the 
U.S. to engage substantively and to demonstrate a willingness to compensate the PRC for 
the economic, political or other costs that it expects to incur as a result of agreement. 
When the U.S. adopts a more rigid posture, we would expect China to resist cooperation. 
Thus:  
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Hypothesis 2: China is more likely to cooperate the more flexible the U.S. 
is in terms of the content of negotiations; it is less likely to cooperate the 
more rigid and inflexible the position of the U.S.  
 
Political Interests  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, one reason for China’s strategic restraint in the 
Security Council in the 1990s was a desire to maintain positive relations with the U.S. 
and other developed countries. Doing so was unproblematic in most cases, since the PRC 
had very little to lose materially by acquiescing to Western goals on sanctions, 
peacekeeping and the use of force. In the early 21st century, the PRC also pays attention 
to the political costs and benefits of its choices in Council deliberations. However, given 
its broadening political and economic interests, it has to take into account the positions of 
a wider range of actors when determining its own stance.  
Parties to any type of negotiation, from labor talks to interstate diplomacy, not 
only have to be concerned with the issue at hand, but also how their positions might 
impact the quality of their relations with their counterparts.303 In general, positive 
relations enhance mutual trust, communications, and reciprocity in other domains, while 
negative relations generate suspicions, debilitate communications, and stall 
cooperation.304 An actor might also desire to preserve positive ties with co-negotiators 
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simply because he or she values the esteem of acceptance in a particular reference group, 
or, more instrumentally, due to the belief that maintaining one’s good standing vis-à-vis 
another is an advantageous and strategically sound policy.305 Social and utilitarian 
motives may operate in tandem.  
However, the argument here is not that China weighs the balance of opinions in 
the Council per se, but rather the positions of states and regional bodies with strong 
interests in the case at hand.306 The two are not the same, as some Council members (e.g., 
non-permanent ones) may have very little at stake, and thus not be particularly interested 
in whether the PRC cooperates or not, while some actors outside the Council (such as 
regional powers) may have much to lose depending on how the Council acts and, as a 
result, hold China accountable for the outcome.307 Moreover, Iain Johnston’s argument 
that China is apt to be affected by social rewards within an institution is only intended to 
work when the PRC is a newcomer; we would not expect China to be overly sensitive to 
its status within the Council some 40 years after its admission.308 
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 In this context, we would expect that China’s positions on pariah states would be 
affected by three sets of actors: the U.S., Russia, and regional stakeholders. The reasons 
for each are given in the following sections.  
 
(1) Relations with the United States  
 
Chapter 1 observed that China generally prioritized positive relations with the U.S. 
in the Security Council over its ideological divergences with the positions taken by the 
U.S. on matters such as peacekeeping and sanctions. The reason was that the U.S. was a 
key element in China’s grand strategy, first in balancing the Soviet Union and, then, in 
the reform era, as an economic partner. The importance of the U.S. in China’s decision-
making did not wane in the early 21st century. As Yong Deng and Thomas Moore have 
argued,  
At the outset of the new millennium, China’s international behavior is increasingly 
motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo by seeking stable relations with the 
United States as the world’s sole current superpower and by promoting China’s gradual 
rise in the international system.309 
Similarly, Jia Qingguo, a professor at Beijing University, writes that “China’s current 
leaders attach great importance to the relationship and believe that it is in China’s best 
interests to develop a constructive strategic partnership with the United States.”310  
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 More specifically, there are several reasons why the U.S. should prominently 
factor into China’s political calculations. First, Chinese experts note that, despite 
narrowing, the balance of power still favors the U.S. and that it is in China’s interests not 
to disrupt relations while the latter is in a relatively weak position.311 Second, the U.S. is 
a pivotal military actor in East Asia, due to its own presence and alliances with Japan, 
South Korea, and others, and exercises influence over issues such as maritime security 
and the status of Taiwan. Third, the PRC continues to depend on the U.S. a major export 
market, source of investment capital, and access to advanced technology and higher 
education.312 Fourth, the U.S. is a partner on a swath of transnational issues, from piracy, 
to terrorism, non-proliferation, and clean energy.313 Yang Jiemian, president of the 
Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, writes that “common interests and common 
responsibilities” lies at the heart of the bilateral relationship.314 These reasons do not 
mean that China has not taken steps to hedge against the U.S.; it only implies that U.S. 
views on matters taken up in the Security Council are likely taken very seriously in 
Beijing.315 
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 Nevertheless, the magnitude of U.S. interests in topics considered in the UNSC is 
variable. Matters such as North Korean military aggression affect U.S. security interests 
in a more direct way than, for instance, political repression in Burma. Beijing is aware 
that the costs of opposing the U.S. are likely to be much higher on issues considered to be 
priorities in Washington than those that are driven purely by ideological goals, and 
should adjust its own positions accordingly. For instance, John Garver notes that China 
suspended nuclear cooperation with Iran in the 1990s due to the threat posed by Iran’s 
nuclear program to a U.S. ally, Israel. China did not disengage from cooperation with 
Pakistan’s nuclear program, since that issue did not pose as central a threat to U.S. 
interests.316 
 The expectation is that U.S. pressure is likely to be more effective on issues of 
major importance to the U.S. An observable implication of this is that the U.S. will use 
high-level diplomacy, including intervention at the presidential level, on key priorities. 
China should be more likely to cooperate when the U.S. has signaled its interests in this 
way than on those issues that the U.S. has not prioritized in the bilateral relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 3: China is likely to cooperate when it is subject to high-level U.S. 
pressure. By contrast, U.S. pressure will be less effective when it has not 
made the issue a central element of the bilateral relationship.  
 
(2) Relations with Russia  
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 In addition to the U.S., Russia should also factor into China’s political calculus. 
This is based on a number of interests. First, since the early 1990s, Russia has acted as a 
major arms supplier to the PRC, although by the late 2000s the vitality of that interaction 
had waned, owing to a stronger defense base in China and concerns in Russia about the 
strategic implications of supply the most advanced weaponry to its neighbor.317 Second is 
that Russia serves as a critical source of oil and natural gas, and this will only increase 
with the construction of an oil pipeline through Eastern Siberia to China that was 
completed in September, 2010.318 Third, Moscow is a potential strategic counterweight to 
U.S. presence in Central Asia, as well as an ally on issues such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, and 
human rights.319 In general, China is susceptible to Russian influence in the UNSC since 
it wishes not to upset this “axis of convenience.”320 
 Beyond the bilateral relationship, Russia should play a particularly important role 
in China’s decision-making as the only other non-Western permanent member. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Moscow and Beijing tend to grant sympathetic votes 
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to each other when one or the other’s interests are threatened. China has tried not to be 
isolated within the P5 and should be more likely to cooperate with the U.S. and others 
when Russia, for its own reasons, has either supported the U.S. position or has indicated 
that it may be moving in that direction. Indeed, U.S. officials appear to have subscribed 
to the notion that China wishes not to be in a position where it would have to cast a lone 
veto. One senior State Department official reports that U.S. practice is generally to “cut 
Russia out first and leave China isolated.”321 Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4: China is more likely to cooperate when it is isolated among the 
permanent members of the Security Council, and especially when Russia has 
chosen to cooperate.  
 
(3) Relations with Regional Stakeholders  
 
 Beyond the U.S. and Russia, China is subject to political pressure from a variety 
of other states. The exact mix of states that might influence China’s positions varies 
depending on the issue. In general, it is the neighbors of the target state, other regional 
powers, and additional external actors heavily engaged in negotiations that are likely to 
weigh in China’s political calculus. On the DPRK, China likely considers the attitudes of 
the other members of the Six-Party Talks: South Korea and Japan, as well as the U.S. and 
Russia. On Iran, we would expect it to take into account the positions of the other 
members of the “E3+3:” France, Germany and Britain (in addition to Russia and the 
U.S.), and regional actors, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.  
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 As regards Sudan and Zimbabwe, the PRC likely assesses political relations with 
major states, such as South Africa, and with the African Union, which aggregates the 
views of dozens of African states and serves as a political actor in its own right.322 Colin 
Keating suggests that, in deliberating African cases, China has paid closer attention to 
regional opinion than to the sentiments of the great powers.323 While the West was driven 
largely by human rights concerns, local actors had to be wary about the direct 
consequences of UN action or inaction as well, such as refugee flows or dangers to AU 
peacekeepers. This translated into resolve, which is a major contributor to any form of 
international pressure.324 African views would also have been important to China based 
on the latter’s interests in the continent, such as preserving access to vital resources, 
expanding markets, and maintaining diplomatic support in human rights, trade, and other 
multilateral bodies where votes matter.325 
 On Myanmar, the key regional stakeholder is ASEAN. Like the AU, ASEAN 
represents frontline states to the conflict, such as Thailand, which naturally hold major 
interests in how the resolve is settled. In addition, China likely believes that “regional 
institutions have the primary right to speak on the issues that directly concern them,” a 
normative tenet buttressed by the realpolitik calculation that supporting bodies like 
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ASEAN diminishes perceptions of China as a threat and increases the likelihood that 
these states will lean towards Beijing instead of Washington in the competition for 
influence in Southeast Asia.326 ASEAN might also be sympathetic to China’s preference 
for dialogue and quiet diplomacy, and provide useful cover in the face of Western 
pressure.327 
 As a rule, we would expect that the chance of Chinese cooperativeness in the 
UNSC would increase the greater the support among regional stakeholders for U.S. 
proposals, while dissent would reduce this probability both by complicating the political 
stakes of cooperation and by offering public support for decisions to resist made on other 
grounds.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the support among the regional stakeholders for the 
U.S. position on pariah states, the more likely it is that China will cooperate; 






 The preceding discussion outlined two general factors likely to influence the 
extent to which the PRC cooperates with the U.S. and its partners in UNSC deliberations. 
First is the issue itself. Two hypotheses were developed to test the idea that China’s 
positions are based on aspects of the issues. The first concerns the structure of 
alternatives, noting that the PRC typically prefers options that do not involve multilateral 
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pressure on its partners. The second is based on the straightforward observation that 
states are more receptive to proposals that mitigate risks than those which do not. A 
second set of interests involves political relations with other major actors. For China, this 
includes the U.S., Russia and regional stakeholders. The point is that China’s position 
should not be based only on the issues, but should also take into account how cooperation 
will affect its relations with these actors. Table 10 lists the five hypotheses.  




H Expectation  
1 China should be more willing to cooperate with efforts to 
punish pariah states the fewer opportunities exist for 
multilateral dialogue and bilateral intervention and, 
conversely, China should be less willing to cooperate the 
more such alternatives exist. 
Strategic stakes in 
pariah states as 





in the UNSC. 
 
2 China is more likely to cooperate the more flexible the U.S. is 
in terms of the content of negotiations; it is less likely to 
cooperate the more rigid and inflexible the position of the 
U.S. 
3 China is likely to cooperate when it is subject to U.S. 
pressure, as indicated by high-level diplomatic intervention. 
China is less likely to cooperate when the issue has not been 
prioritized in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.  
4 China is more likely to cooperate when it is isolated among 
the permanent members of the Security Council, and 
especially when Russia has chosen to cooperate. 
Political stakes in 
maintaining 
positive ties with 





within the UNSC.  
5 The greater the support among the regional stakeholders for 
multilateral pressure, the more likely it is that China will 
cooperate; the more division, the higher the chance that China 
will not cooperate.  
 
 
Methods and Limitations  
 
 The analytical objective is to weigh the hypotheses developed above against the 
historical record. A small-N, case study approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, the 
universe of cases is small. As argued in the previous chapter, China is rarely assertive in 
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Security Council negotiations, confronting the U.S. and its allies only when major 
interests are at stake. The puzzle raised in this chapter is even narrower: what can explain 
variance in China’s approach to North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe? The 
theoretical reason for focusing on these cases is that it allows us to bracket domestic-level 
factors that have changed over time, including the composition of the leadership and the 
nature of the decision-making process, and instead look at the role of external 
conditions.328 The policy reason is that these cases are recent and, in general, important to 
the U.S. and other states on strategic and humanitarian grounds.   
 The following chapters disaggregate these cases into distinct decisions. Chapter 3 
studies China’s behavior on four UNSC decisions related to the DPRK (i.e., responses to 
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009); Chapter 4 centers on the 
diplomatic encounters on Iran that occurred over the course of several months and 
culminated in fourth round of sanctions in June, 2010; Chapter 5 addresses why the 
Council did not pass sanctions as a means to pressure the Sudanese government to accept 
UN peacekeepers in Darfur in the spring of 2007; and Chapter 6 deals with China’s 
vetoes on Burma (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008). In short, these cases represent an even 
smaller slice than the list of major decisions reported in Tables 8 and 9 above.  
 The methodological justification for considering these particular cases is that they 
facilitate both intra-case and cross-case comparison. In five of these eight decisions, 
China resisted but ultimately was able to forge consensus with the U.S. This allows us to 
ask which external factors changed in the interlude. Did preferred alternatives close? Did 
the U.S. use high-level diplomacy? Did Russia’s position change first? And so on. In 
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three cases (the Sudanese non-outcome, and the vetoes on Burma and Zimbabwe), China 
was unable to reach agreement. Were the factors which seemed to explain change in the 
positive cases absent in the negative ones? Comparison across cases thus offers a second 
form of evidence. The latter analysis will be taken up in the concluding chapter.  
 The second reason to use a small-N approach is that the explanatory framework 
calls for close scrutiny across a broad and complex range of strategic, political and 
diplomatic factors. Some of these, including alternative processes, bilateral exchanges 
with the U.S., and the positions of regional stakeholders, require attention to 
developments far outside the bounds of the Council, while others, including the nature of 
Russian and U.S. diplomacy, demand close analysis of interactions within it. Examining 
how, and the extent to which, any of these changed between the beginning and end of 
negotiations calls for thorough process-tracing, which is an investigation of the steps 
leading from initial conditions to outcomes. It allows us to gauge causal arguments, 
identify interactions between the independent variables, and identify factors that were not 
part of the original expectations.329   
 In testing the hypotheses, reference to a wide variety of sources is useful. First, 
the secondary literature on the political context of the eight decisions is informative. 
Second, publications from the Chinese scholarly community are useful in assessing PRC 
perceptions of the issues, as are interviews with Chinese scholars. Newspapers and 
newswires, accessible through Lexis-Nexis Academic and the World News Connection, 
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contain a wealth of applicable data on the negotiations themselves, as well as on the 
political relations assessed. UN documents, such as transcripts of public meetings and the 
texts of resolutions, are helpful in describing the outcomes, and are also available online. 
Interviews with diplomats, particularly from the U.S. and Chinese delegations, offer a 
window into the process. The analysis borrows liberally from each of these sources.330    
 As a final note, there are two main limitations to the analytical framework 
developed in this chapter. First is that it is not possible to entirely dismiss the role of 
domestic politics, especially at the elite level. Despite the absence of a general 
ideological or leadership transition in the period covered, significant personnel changes 
did occur at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, affecting the composition of the 
Politburo Standing Committee, the top-level Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and 
other relevant actors.331 The influence of specific state-owned enterprises, bureaucratic 
agencies, individual policymakers, and so on, is left out, as is the role of nationalism and 
public sentiment in general.  
The response is fourfold. First are limits on sources. Given the opacity of China’s 
foreign policy process, it would not be feasible to obtain accurate data about the role of 
elite politics or other domestic factors. Second, even if it were, adding these dimensions 
would lead to a cluttered analysis, reducing the parsimony of the framework. Third, from 
a policy perspective, tracing the effects of external factors is probably more valuable. 
International variables, such as the mix of pressure and flexibility in U.S. strategy, are 
manipulable while domestic ones, as a rule, are not.  
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Fourth, there is little reason to believe that domestic turbulence had much of a 
role in how these issues were handled in contrast to policy during the Cultural Revolution, 
for instance.332 Moreover, it is dubious that major political changes between 2006 and 
2010 that could account for changes in China’s positions in the UNSC. There was no top 
leadership transition within China, with Hu Jintao having been installed in key posts by 
September 2004. There did not seem to be any infighting associated with the 17th Party 
Congress in 2007 that may have impacted foreign policy.333  The PRC was represented at 
the UN by a series of ambassadors during this period, but it is doubtful that individual 
differences affected China’s positions. Key rulings would have been up to Hu and others 
in Beijing.334 
 The second limitation is that the external validity of the argument is narrow. The 
hypotheses are meant to illuminate Chinese behavior on a specific set of issues in a given 
institution at a particular moment in time. The expectations may also apply to the broader, 
but still limited, universe of cases in which the eight decisions are situated (such as 
China’s decision-making on the first three rounds of sanctions of Iran), but start to lose 
their value with changes in the protagonist (e.g. replacing China with Russia), setting 
(trading the Security Council for the G20, for instance), or time period (such as 
                                                 
332
 See, e.g., Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly 53 (1973), 34-
66. A more recent foreign policy case in which scholars have considered the role of domestic politics as 
independent from external factors was the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits crisis. See: You Ji, “Making Sense of War 
Games in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China 6 (1997), 287-305.  
 
333
 Alice L. Miller, “China’s New Party Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, 23 (2008). Available 
online, at: http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM23AM.pdf.  
 
334
 Wang Guangya served from August 2003 to October 2008; Zhang Yesui from October 2008 to March 
2010; and Li Baodong from June 2010. Decisions on critical issues such as Iran and North Korea would 
likely have been made collectively within the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), chaired by 
Hu Jintao.  
  
115 
substituting the Mao era for the early 21st century). The argument would be almost 
completely irrelevant with changes across more than one of these categories.  
 This problem is mitigated in two ways. First is that the framework is designed to 
explain a small set of cases that happen to be politically and analytically interesting; its 
intended value lies precisely in its accounting of a large share of the variance in a limited 
number of cases, not in an attempt to explain a fraction of the variance in a vast 
population of cases. Second is that, from a theoretical perspective, the argument applies 
conceptual building blocks from the broad negotiation literature (including the structure 
of alternatives, concession tolerance, and relational interests), which have rarely been 
utilized in diplomatic studies. This set of concepts can be used to help untangle other 




 This chapter began with the observation that China tends to act assertively in the 
Security Council when it has major interests at stake, and posed the question: why does 
the PRC cooperate at times with the U.S. even in cases in which it does have material 
interests, such as the five pariah states examined in this study? What can explain the 
variance? Posing the question does not imply the view that China should cooperate with 
the U.S., or refuse to cooperate for that matter. Rather, the object is constructed in this 
way simply because it has been the U.S., and its allies, that have pushed for punitive 
action against the DPRK, Sudan, and so on, and it is reasonable to examine the reasons 
why others might cooperate with these efforts when those parties have reasons not to.  
 The explanations posited in this chapter are based on a disaggregation of interests 
in negotiations into two types: interests in the issues themselves, and those in states’ 
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political relations with the main participants. From this framework, five hypotheses were 
developed. The first two concern the substantive issues, and predict that China will 
cooperate with the U.S. when preferred alternatives to pressure have failed and when key 
risks have been mitigated. The second three concern political interests, expecting that 
China will be more likely to cooperate when the U.S. has major interests at stake, when 
Russia has shifted towards the West, leaving China isolated among the P5, and when 
regional stakeholders have offered their support for the U.S. position.  
 The final section proposed a small-N research design, focused on a close 
examination of eight cases, five in which China was willing to cooperate, and three in 
which it refused to do so. The discussion noted that a variety of sources are helpful in 
carrying out the analysis. It also addressed two potential limitations to the framework, 
namely that it does not account for domestic-level sources of change, and that it is not 
easily generalizable beyond the subject of China’s diplomacy in the UNSC.  
 The following chapters address China’s positions on the problems of North Korea, 
Iran, Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe respectively. The five hypotheses developed in this 
chapter are applied to each of these cases, leveraged against the empirical record. The 
analytical objective is to demonstrate the extent to which the hypotheses developed in 
this chapter are a useful way to account for China’s varied positions, and to discern the 
relative importance of two conceptually interesting variables—issues and relations—in 





Pressuring Pyongyang:  




On December 5, 2010, Hu Jintao and Barack Obama held a phone conversation 
on the subject of North Korea’s recent artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, a Yellow 
Sea territory controlled by South Korea. Hu reportedly told the U.S. president: “The 
Korean Peninsula has a very fragile security situation. If not dealt with properly, tensions 
could well rise…or spin out of control.”335  
Hu’s comment reflects the basic dilemma that has confronted China in 
international negotiations on North Korea. On the one hand, China recognizes that 
Pyongyang’s behavior threatens PRC interests. Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Central 
Party School in Beijing, writes that a nuclear North Korea would harm China in three 
ways: first, by undermining the NPT, which preserves stability by keeping the number of 
nuclear weapons-holding states to a minimum; second, by generating an arms race in East 
Asia, which may even include Taiwan; third, in the sense that an accident may cause 
direct damage to China’s northeast. 336 Zhao Lei, another scholar at the Central Party 
School, submits that, despite China’s historical alliance with the DPRK, its “main interest 
is in non-proliferation.”337 Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, adds 
that DPRK provocations may complicate the power balance in Northeast Asia by driving 
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South Korea and Japan closer to the U.S., which itself may seek to play a more prominent 
military role in the region.338  
On the other hand, China is concerned that U.S. proposals to punish the DPRK 
may be counterproductive. One reason that the PRC was unwilling to heed the 
suggestions of the Bush administration and use strong bilateral pressure on North Korea 
was the fear that this might precipitate a regime collapse, which in turn would involve a 
destabilizing refugee flow into northeastern China.339 Moreover, Beijing is worried about 
the possibility that sanctions, or other types of pressure, may cause Pyongyang to act 
even more provocatively, leading to the very outcome that coercion was meant to 
prevent.340 An additional source of skepticism is that pressure might cause the PRC to 
lose whatever limited influence it already had on the DPRK, causing an already fragile 
situation to become even more perilous.341  
Thus, when the issue of North Korea has been raised in the Security Council, 
China has treaded cautiously. It has been hesitant to support the full range of measures 
sought by the U.S. and Japan, including a general arms embargo and mandatory cargo 
inspections, fearing that such provisions might either contribute to the regime’s internal 
demise, or begin an escalatory chain of events ending with U.S. military strikes. However, 
the PRC has not entirely dismissed a role for the UNSC. In a series of decisions 
beginning in the summer of 2006, the Council agreed to condemn Pyongyang, and to 
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“incentivize” it to return to the negotiating table through an arms embargo, financial 
restrictions, proscription of nuclear and ballistic missile tests, voluntary cargo inspections, 
and other means.  
This chapter applies the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 to the North Korean 
case. It asks why China was able to compromise with the U.S. The argument is fourfold. 
First, alternative routes, in particular the Six-Party Talks and bilateral pressure, had failed, 
making UNSC action a preferred option. Second, the U.S. was able to accommodate the 
PRC’s major concerns regarding both the form and substance of the decisions. Third, the 
U.S. leveraged the shock of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests to encourage Beijing 
to agree to proposals drafted by Washington and its allies. Fourth, two major regional 
powers, Japan and South Korea, generally supported the U.S. position, adding political 
pressure for China to cooperate. The discussion also suggests that Russia played a 
marginal role, and likely was not a primary factor in China’s political calculus.   
The chapter develops this argument in five sections. The first provides a 
background of the DPRK nuclear issue, and sketches the outcomes to be explained. The 
second covers the Council’s response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in July, 2006. 
The third addresses the North’s October 2006 nuclear test, and the UNSC response, 
Resolution 1718. The fourth discusses the PRST that was issued after a “satellite launch,” 
suspected to be a disguised long-range missile test, in April, 2009. The fifth assesses the 
negotiations leading to Resolution 1874, passed after the DPRK’s second nuclear test in 
May, 2009. The conclusion summarizes the findings, and states the implications for 






 The evolution of North Korea’s nuclear program, and the international 
community’s response to it, has taken place primarily outside of the Security Council. 
The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985 and, following the finalization of a Safeguards 
Agreement in 1992, the IAEA conducted inspections of DPRK nuclear sites for two 
years.342 In October 1994, Washington and Pyongyang negotiated an Agreed Framework 
which would have required the latter to abandon its nuclear programs in return for 
international energy assistance.343 In the mid-1990s, the DPRK carried out talks with the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which had been created 
by the U.S., South Korea and others to facilitate the Agreed Framework’s objectives.344 
After it admitted the existence of a secret nuclear weapons program in October 2002, 
North Korea entered into multilateral discussions on disarmament with the U.S., China, 
Russia, South Korea and Japan. Six rounds of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) took place 
between August 2003 and their eventual collapse in April 2009.345 
 Prior to 2006, the Security Council was involved in the issue only twice. In May 
1993, it passed Resolution 825 in response to the DPRK’s announcement that it would 
withdraw from the NPT and eject IAEA inspectors, requesting that Pyongyang 
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“reconsider,” and asking states to “encourage” it to “respond positively.”346 In September 
1998, the body issued a Press Statement (a device considered even less authoritative than 
a PRST) that voiced “concern” about the North’s August 31 missile launch over the Sea 
of Japan, urging “restraint” by all countries concerned.347 China, seeking to avoid the 
prospect of sanctions, diluted both the 1993 and 1998 decisions, and, with Russia, 
prevented any response to Pyongyang’s 2002 revelation and its subsequent decision to 
withdraw from the NPT. Instead, the PRC used its influence to prompt North Korea to 
join the 6PT, which Beijing offered to host.348     
  The Council’s reticence ended in July 2006. On the 5th, the DPRK launched 
seven ballistic missiles that landed in Japanese territorial waters. Six of these were short-
range missiles and one was believed to be a long-range Taepodong-2 rocket, which might 
have been capable of hitting parts of the U.S.349 On the 15th, the Security Council 
unanimously passed Resolution 1695, which condemned the launches, demanded the 
suspension of all ballistic missile-related programs, called on states to “exercise 
vigilance” in terms of arms transfers to and from North Korea, and urged the latter to 
return to the 6PT.350 After the vote, Wang Guangya said that China was “gravely 
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concerned about the newly emerged complicating factor on the Korean peninsula,” and 
“opposed to any further tension” there.351 
 On October 3, 2006, North Korea announced that it would soon carry out a 
nuclear test,352 which it did six days later.353 The blast was so small that scientists debated 
whether the test was successful, though the DPRK media celebrated an “historical event 
that has brought our military and our people great joy.”354 On the 14th, the UNSC 
unanimously passed Resolution 1718, which imposed an embargo on a range of arms, 
including artillery, tanks, and WMD-related items, as well as on luxury goods.355 In 
addition, it called for voluntary cargo inspections, but ruled out the use of force. The 
resolution also authorized restrictions on North Korean firms and individuals associated 
with WMD programs, but left the designation of these to a UNSC committee (the “1718 
Committee”) that would establish guidelines and monitor enforcement.356 After the vote, 
Wang stated that the test was “not conducive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” 
and that the PRC supported a “firm and appropriate” response. However, he also noted 
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 KCNA, the official North Korean news agency, reported that the “U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war 
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reservations about cargo inspections and urged states to “adopt a prudent and responsible 
attitude in this regard.”357 
 Following an additional two-and-a-half years of inconclusive multilateral 
dialogue, North Korea launched what it purported to be a communications satellite on 
April 5, 2009. Since the launch employed ballistic missile technology, the U.S. and its 
allies argued that this constituted a breach of Resolution 1718.358 On the 13th, the Security 
Council issued a PRST which said that the launch was in “contravention” of the previous 
resolution and ordered the 1718 Committee to designate “entities and goods” that would 
be subject to restrictions.359 In a press conference afterwards, China’s UN ambassador, 
Zhang Yesui, said that the response should be “cautious and proportionate,” and made 
clear that the PRC did not favor another resolution or the imposition of further 
sanctions.360  
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 On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and fired several 
short-range ballistic missiles.361 There was agreement among experts that the explosion 
was larger than in 2006, but some doubted that it yielded the force of a “Hiroshima-style” 
blast.362 On June 12, the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 1874, which 
condemned the incident, called on states to carry out inspections of vessels suspected of 
transporting proscribed items, and widened existing arms and economic measures.363 
Zhang emphasized China’s “firm opposition” to the test, but reiterated Beijing’s concerns 
about cargo inspections. In particular, he urged states to “act prudently” and “refrain from 
any word or deed that could exacerbate the conflict. Under no circumstances should force 
be used.”364 
Table 11: Key Dates in UNSC Negotiations on North Korea 
 
Date Event 
May 11, 1993 UNSC passes Resolution 825 13-2 (China and Pakistan abstain), 
urging DPRK not to withdraw from the NPT. 
Sept. 15, 1998 UNSC issues PRST in response to DPRK missile tests of Aug. 31.  
July 5, 2006 NK tests seven ballistic missiles over the Sea of Japan. Japan calls 
for emergency Security Council session. 
July 15, 2006 UNSC passes Resolution 1695 15-0, demanding suspension of 
ballistic missile programs.  
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 SC Document S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009). Paragraphs 11-17 outline the procedures through which 
states are to conduct inspections, but does not authorize the use of force if the vessel in question refuses. 
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October 3, 2006 DPRK announces imminent nuclear test. 
October 6, 2006 UNSC issues PRST warning DPRK not to conduct nuclear test.  
October 9, 2006 DPRK carries out first nuclear test; UNSC holds emergency session. 
October 14, 2006 UNSC passes Resolution 1718 15-0, imposing arms embargo and 
creating sanctions committee to list violators.  
February 14, 2009 DPRK announces intention to launch satellite using Taepodong-2 
rocket.  
April 5, 2009 DPRK conducts satellite launch; UNSC holds emergency session.  
April 13, 2009 UNSC issues PRST condemning launch and instructing 1718 
Committee to designate individuals and firms.  
May 25, 2009 DPRK conducts second nuclear test; UNSC holds emergency 
session.  
June 12, 2009 UNSC passes Resolution 1874 15-0, widening arms embargo and 
laying out procedures for conducting cargo inspections.  
 
  China’s willingness to agree to two rounds of sanctions, in addition to other 
decisions on North Korea, is surprising in light of three factors. First is the risk that 
pressure might frustrate the chances for productive dialogue with Pyongyang. Indeed, the 
April 2009 PRST was used as a pretext for the DPRK’s withdrawal from the 6PT.365 
China had preferred the 6PT as a peaceful and effective route to nuclear non-proliferation, 
a way to demonstrate its leadership in regional security affairs, and as a means to avoid 
an escalation of tensions by the U.S. and Japan.366 Second, siding with the U.S. might 
have harmed Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang, reducing the former’s ability to coax 
the latter into good-faith engagement in the 6PT.367 Third, alienating North Korea might 
have led to a spiral of conflict between the DPRK and its neighbors, and perhaps even to 
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China’s worst case scenario: regime collapse, an influx of refugees, and military 
conflict.368 
 The following sections test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 against China’s 
record of cooperation on four decisions related to North Korea: the adoption of 
Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and the April, 2009, PRST. In short, 
the expectations are that the PRC should have moved towards cooperation with the U.S. 
as preferred options failed, as the U.S. made concessions that addressed China’s major 
political and economic concerns, and as the political stakes mediated in favor of 
cooperation (through U.S. diplomatic pressure; changes in Russia’s position; and the 
attitudes of the other regional stakeholders, notably Japan and the ROK).   
  
Call for Restraint: Resolution 1695 
 
 China’s initial reaction to North Korea’s test firing of seven ballistic missiles on 
July 5, 2006, was muted. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Liu Jianchao 
urged “all parties” to “remain calm and exercise restraint,” and said that China would 
play a “constructive role” in the matter.369 Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, in a call to 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the same day, likewise emphasized “restraint” and 
asked for “more meetings,” which prompted Rice to report to the U.S. ambassador in 
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New York, John Bolton, that “We’ve got a China problem.”370 On the 6th, Hu Jintao, 
speaking with George W. Bush, said that China was “deeply concerned” about the 
situation and noted the PRC’s commitment to the 6PT, but refrained from committing to 
efforts to punish the DPRK.371  
 Indeed, China’s opening position in the UN was to seek a PRST along the lines of 
the statement issued after the 1998 missile tests. This position was seconded by Russia.372 
Meanwhile, Japan, supported by the U.S., circulated a draft resolution that would have 
urged the North to return to the 6PT and imposed sanctions on the North’s missile 
industry.373 The outcome, ten days later, was a compromise resolution that did not 
explicitly cite Chapter VII or require sanctions, but did reference the Council’s “special 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”374 condemned the 
tests and called on states to exercise “vigilance” in their arms transactions with the DPRK. 
Given its hesitance, why did the PRC move towards the U.S. position that a resolution 
was required?  
 
 Narrowing Alternatives  
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 Hypothesis 1 is that multilateral dialogue and bilateral pressure had proven 
ineffective, opening the way for a punitive response. In this case, we need to assess both 
the status of the 6PT and China’s bilateral interactions with Pyongyang. First, the 6PT 
had been stalled for six months prior to the July crisis. In September 2005, the six parties 
had agreed to a Joint Statement, under which the North promised to abandon its nuclear 
program in return for a U.S. guarantee not to attack the DPRK. International energy 
assistance would be discussed at a later date.375 The parties met again in November, with 
Pyongyang rejecting U.S. calls to close its principal nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.376  
Additionally, in late 2005 the U.S. Treasury Department had begun to target 
banks with ties to North Korea. In September, it publicized a link between a Macau bank, 
Banco Delta Asia, and a DPRK money laundering operation, resulting in the bank’s 
collapse and the freezing of accounts in other institutions. This complicated the 6PT as 
North Korea demanded the removal of constraints on its overseas accounts as a 
precondition for fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Statement.377 In March 2006, 
North Korean officials met with their U.S. counterparts at the UN and reiterated this 
position. While the U.S. argued that there was no connection between the 6PT and the 
financial investigations, this did not appease the North. Following the March talks, a U.S. 
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congressman reported that “the six-party process is beginning to appear moribund.”378 In 
fact, the 6PT would not resume until December, 2006. 
In late June, likely in a gambit to coerce the U.S. into bilateral talks, Pyongyang 
declared a right to conduct intercontinental ballistic missile tests, and intelligence reports 
showed that the DPRK was preparing to launch a Taepodong-2 rocket. The U.S. and 
Japan both averred that a test would lead to a response by the UNSC.379 On the 22nd, an 
MFA spokesperson said, “We are very concerned about the current situation. We hope all 
parties can do more in the interest of regional peace and stability.”380 Six days later, in a 
joint press conference with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Wen Jiabao stated 
that he hoped that “the various parties will proceed from the greater interest of 
maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and refrain from taking measures that will 
worsen the situation.”381 It is unclear whether China sent private messages as well, but 
the DPRK went ahead with the test a week after Wen’s remarks.  
Afterwards, China attempted to pressure North Korea to return to the 6PT. Hu 
Jintao and other leaders signaled displeasure by not mentioning the 45th anniversary of 
the PRC-DPRK defense treaty on July 11, and China failed to offer any assistance for 
flooding that occurred in North Korea in early July.382 More directly, Vice Foreign 
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Minister Wu Dawei, China’s 6PT representative, was dispatched to Pyongyang on the 8th 
for consultations with his counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, intending to secure a moratorium 
on further missile tests, which would have reduced the need for the UNSC to intervene. 
Wu returned on July 14 with no agreements, leading Japan’s UN ambassador, Kenzo 
Oshima, to comment that China seemed “desperate” and that the trip had been an 
“embarrassment.”383 More charitably, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill 
said that Beijing “sent a good delegation up to Pyongyang, showed a real interest in 
trying to work with the DPRK, but it does not appear to have been reciprocated.384 With 
the 6PT stalled and bilateral pressure ineffective, China was primed to move closer to the 
U.S. position.  
 
Concessions and Risk-Reduction  
 
 A second explanation is that concessions during the negotiating process should 
enhance the prospects of Chinese cooperativeness. Since North Korea’s October 2002 
admission of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, the Bush Administration had 
advocated multilateral dialogue. It viewed the matter as a “neighborhood problem” and 
sought the aid of China in particular, which the U.S. believed held considerable leverage 
over Pyongyang.385 This was apparent in the July crisis. On the 6th, Bush said that, 
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 Diplomacy takes a while, particularly when you’re dealing with a variety of partners. 
And so, we’re spending time diplomatically making sure that voice is unified. These 
problems won’t be solved overnight.386  
The next day, Bush observed that “If you want to solve a problem diplomatically, you 
need partners to do so,” and acknowledged China’s significance in this endeavor, saying: 
“They’ve got some influence in that neighborhood.”387  
 As mentioned, the U.S. did not seek to force a vote on Tokyo’s July 5 draft, but 
allowed the PRC to attempt to pressure the DPRK bilaterally. In New York, Bolton 
offered only qualified support for the Japanese draft, saying that, “I don’t doubt there will 
be some changes” as the talks progress.388  The U.S. accommodated China’s concerns in 
two respects during talks between the 13th and 15th. Specifically, the U.S. and Japan 
dropped their bids for a Chapter VII reference and deleted references to mandatory 
sanctions, instead agreeing merely to call upon states to exercise restraint in their arms 
sales with the DPRK.389 Washington sought to avoid a veto, as Wang Guangya had 
warned that both Chapter VII and sanctions were “red lines” that Beijing would not 
cross.390 Rice agreed to drop those demands, primarily in order to have a deal reached 
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before the opening of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg on the 15th.391 Afterwards, she said 
that, “It’s a remarkable resolution, and with an affirmative Chinese vote,” and that “We 
really, now, have a coalition.”392  
 
Political Pressure  
 
 Politically, three hypotheses expect that China’s decision is tied to the positions of 
other actors. Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to cooperate when Washington 
uses high-level diplomatic pressure. The initial U.S. posture was not to push China on a 
Security Council resolution, but rather to wait for the result of its bilateral effort.393 The 
key conversation appears to have been between Christopher Hill, Li Zhaoxing and Wu 
Dawei in Beijing on July 7. The Chinese officials informed Hill about plans to exert 
direct pressure on Pyongyang, though were not specific about how they planned to do 
that.394 The same day, the U.S. opted not to force a vote on Tokyo’s draft resolution, 
yielding to China’s request to seek a bilateral settlement. 395 Three days later, Nicholas 
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Burns, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said that both Russia and China 
“have a responsibility to use their influence with North Korea.”396  
 When the Chinese mission returned without having reached a deal, the PRC and 
Russia introduced a draft resolution tougher than their earlier proposed PRST. It 
“strongly” deplored the tests and called on states to “exercise vigilance” in selling arms to 
North Korea.397 To an extent, this preempted U.S. pressure, with Bolton referring to the 
draft as “a significant step” and “important.”398 However, the U.S. and Japan were 
dissatisfied with elements of this proposal. On July 14, Bolton was asked what he would 
do if China did not move closer to the U.S. position, and responded that,  
...there comes a point where you have to make a decision that putting what is a fair, not 
harsh, not punitive resolution before the Council to decide, and let the world see what 
people vote.”399  
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The threat of a forced vote might have factored into China’s consent on the “special 
responsibility” language, though the PRC maintained its opposition to mandatory 
sanctions or any explicit reference to Chapter VII. 
 Hypothesis 4 is that a shift in Russia’s position towards the West increases the 
likelihood of Chinese cooperation. Russia’s reaction to the missile test was mild. While 
the Foreign Ministry expressed “serious concern,” Moscow’s UN ambassador, Vitaly 
Churkin, cautioned the international community against “whipping up emotions too 
much.”400 Russia supported China’s bid for a 1998-style PRST and then, on July 12, 
joined China in proposing a draft resolution meant to counter Tokyo’s more forceful 
proposition.401 Notably, on the 15th, Japan tried to pry Russia away through an appeal 
from Junichiro Koizumi to Vladimir Putin in advance of the St. Petersburg G8 summit, 
though Putin declined to commit to Japan’s draft.402 In his speech following the passage 
of Resolution 1695, Churkin stated that he and his “Chinese partners” had met the West 
“halfway.”403 There is no evidence that Moscow considered breaking with Beijing, 
leaving the latter isolated. Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed in this case.  
 Hypothesis 5 is that China is more likely to cooperate the greater the support 
among the regional stakeholders for the U.S. position. As noted, Japan advocated a 
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coercive route from the start. On July 5, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said that, 
“We will consider all possible sanctions.”404 In New York, Japan lobbied for a draft 
resolution, framed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would have imposed 
financial measures targeting North Korea’s missile program.405 Tokyo’s draft was laid 
aside while the PRC sought to orchestrate a deal with North Korea bilaterally. Following 
Koizumi’s failed attempt to secure Russian support, Japan decided to abandon its demand 
for sanctions and, along with the U.S., drop its proposal for a Chapter VII reference.406  
South Korea was more cautious. Seoul’s initial reaction was to express “deep 
regret” and call the test an “unwise act.”407 On the 5th, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon 
spoke with his Chinese counterpart, with both sides calling for patience and restraint.408 
On the 8th, Chun Yung-woo, the ROK’s envoy to the 6PT, said that, “It’s time to focus on 
diplomacy rather than coercive measures.”409 Four days later, Ban split with the U.S. and 
Japan and buttressed the PRC position by saying that Chapter VII might have a “negative 
impact” on the situation.410 Once the Wu Dawei mission failed, Seoul agreed to a 
“unified warning,” but reiterated its opposition to sanctions.411 Although South Korea 
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was not a member of the Council, its position likely gave China some political cover to 
oppose the most assertive parts of the U.S.-Japanese approach. In sum, the regional 
stakeholders were divided, with the ROK sympathetic to China, and Japan advocating a 
more forceful response. Given this division, it is difficult to infer an impact on China’s 
political calculus in the direction of cooperation with the U.S.  
### 
   
 Following the vote, North Korea’s UN representative, Pak Gil Yon, called the 
decision “unjustifiable and gangster-like,” warning that the North would take “stronger 
physical actions in other forms should any other country dare to…put pressure on it.”412 
China was willing to risk such a reaction for several reasons. First, both the 6PT and 
bilateral efforts had stalled, rendering Council action a relatively attractive option. 
Second, the U.S. made concessions to mollify the PRC’s main concerns. As a Western 
diplomat pointed out, “Both sides made concessions in the interests of sending a firm, 
united message to Pyongyang.”413 Third, U.S. and Japanese pressure may have factored 
into China’s decision to move past its initial bid for a PRST, and agree to a resolution. 
However, Resolution 1695 was insufficient to prevent an escalation in tensions the next 
fall.   
 
 
Imposing Sanctions: Resolution 1718 
 
 In contrast to the July crisis, China’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear test on 
October 9 was direct and severe. The MFA said that “China expresses resolute opposition 
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to the DPRK flagrantly carrying out a nuclear test in defiance of the international 
community.”414 The use of the term “flagrantly” (hanran) was notable, since it had 
previously been used to denote outrage at incidents including the U.S. bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine.415 Hu and Li almost immediately reiterated the thrust of the MFA 
statement in calls with Bush and Rice, respectively.416 Following an emergency session 
of the Council, Bolton referred to the PRC when he said that he “didn’t see any protectors 
of North Korea in that room this morning.”417  
 On October 11, Wang Guangya conceded that there would have to be “some 
punitive action,” though it ought to be “appropriate” and confined to “nuclear- and 
missile-related areas.”418 Three days later, he cast an affirmative vote for Resolution 1718. 
This document exceeded the “red lines” that Beijing had established during the July 
negotiations insofar as it referred to Chapter VII and authorized a series of sanctions. The 
measures covered arms and luxury goods, and made provisions for restrictions on firms 
and individuals to be specified by the newly formed 1718 Committee. In fact, there is no 
record of China pushing any clear alternative to the U.S.-led proposal as it had, with 
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Russia, three months earlier. Given China’s concerns about the risks of sanctions, and its 
prior position on North Korea, why was it willing to agree to this escalation of pressure?  
 
Narrowing Alternatives  
 
 Between July and October, China had made several unsuccessful efforts to 
encourage North Korea to return to the 6PT. In a joint press conference with Bush on 
July 17, Hu reiterated the need to quickly resume the talks.419 Ten days later, on the 
sidelines of an ASEAN conference in Kuala Lumpur, Li Zhaoxing tried to convince his 
DPRK counterpart, Paek Nam-sun, to attend a meeting of the six nations, but Paek 
declined.420 On September 1, Wu Dawei told a visiting Japanese official that China 
would continue to persuade the DPRK to return to the 6PT.421 Later that month, China 
sent food and fuel to help relieve flood damage in the North, perhaps as an inducement to 
coax Pyongyang back into the diplomatic arena.422 None of these approaches yielded any 
tangible results. 
 Following North Korea’s October 3 announcement of a planned nuclear test, 
China tried to signal its opposition in several ways. In New York, Wang Guangya said 
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that “for bad behavior in this world, no one is going to protect [the DPRK].”423 On the 5th, 
Li Zhaoxing warned Pyongyang’s ambassador in Beijing that a test would lead to 
“serious consequences.” 424 A day later, China agreed to a PRST that stated that a nuclear 
test would “represent a clear threat to international peace and security,” and that the 
Council would “act consistent with its responsibility” under the UN Charter, language 
which indicated a punitive response.425 On the 8th, China and Japan held their first 
summit-level meeting in 18 months in Beijing and expressed “deep concern.” Japan’s 
new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, said that “I think North Korea is closely watching this 
summit,” given the prior rift on the issue between Beijing and Tokyo.426  
 The October 9 test led to pessimism in Beijing about the prospects for the 6PT 
and about China’s bilateral influence. As late as September, analysts contended that 
multilateral dialogue remained viable. Cui Liru, a scholar at the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argued that the talks were the most 
“realistic option” even after the North refused to participate.427 However, after the test, 
analysts came to a different conclusion. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Beijing University, 
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argued that the chances of the 6PT resuming were now “quite slim.”428 Zhang Liangui, a 
professor at the Central Party School, said the test meant that “the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula has been completely broken,”429 and that “promoting dialogue with 
North Korea as the only way was a mistake. That mistake has given North Korea time to 
develop a nuclear weapon.”430  
 Similar attitudes surrounded China’s bilateral leverage vis-à-vis the North. Taking 
note of a long-term trend of divergence between the two countries, Shi Yinhong, a 
professor at People’s University in Beijing, suggested that “relations between North 
Korea and China have continued to worsen and have actually reached a record low.”431 
According to Zhu Feng, a professor at Beijing University, “The test shows that 
Pyongyang has been genuinely indifferent to China’s continuous opposition and warnings 
against the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons” and referred to the North’s intransigence 
as “no less than a slap in China’s face.”432 Hu Jintao himself was reportedly vexed by 
“Kim’s defiance of China’s counsel and interests.”433  
 The narrowing structure of alternatives can help to explain China’s decision to 
endorse sanctions five days after the nuclear test. Publicly, the MFA denied that the test 
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should be “regarded as a failure of the six-party mechanism,”434 and said that the PRC 
would continue to seek “good-neighborly relations” with the DPRK.435 Behind this 
rhetoric, a Foreign Ministry official privately admitted that the international community 
would have to follow a dual-track approach, combining inducements with pressure, 
saying that “the two wheels must work together.” 436 How the punitive track should be 
designed, though, was a matter of debate between China, the U.S. and others.  
 
 Concessions and Risk-Reduction  
 
 After the nuclear test, Bush and Rice consulted with their counterparts from China, 
Russia, Japan and South Korea, and agreed to take up the matter in the Security Council. 
A State Department spokesman said that “there will be a lot of conversations about how 
to approach this diplomatically.”437 In fact, in the ensuing five days there would be 23 
meetings of the P3 and P5 combined.438 On the 11th, Bush reiterated U.S. support for a 
diplomatic agreement, saying that, “We’ll continue working to make sure that we give 
diplomacy a full opportunity to succeed.”439 Meanwhile, trying to ease concerns that the 
U.S. might opt for a military solution, Rice said that, although the use of force is never 
“taken off the table,” “there is no intention to attack or invade [the DPRK].”440 While it 
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pushed for a swift vote, the U.S. was prepared to make a number of concessions to reach 
consensus.  
 In particular, the U.S. relaxed its position in two broad areas. First was on aspects 
of the phrasing connected with a potential escalation of pressure. The U.S. agreed to 
reference Article 41 of Chapter VII, which authorizes “non-military” tools, such as 
sanctions, in order to clarify that the resolution does not warrant the use of force.441 For a 
similar reason, the U.S. removed language mandating a review after 30 days and deleted 
a clause that the Council “shall be prepared to take such further action as may be needed 
at that time.”442 The U.S. also adjusted its position on cargo inspections. Specifically, it 
added a caveat that interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying proscribed items would 
be “in accordance with [states’] national authorities and legislation.”443 This legitimized 
China’s avowal not to conduct inspections on the grounds that doing so might lead to 
unintended hostilities.444 
 Second, the U.S. narrowed the substance of the resolution. In its original draft, the 
U.S. proposed a general arms embargo, but later qualified the text so that only heavy 
weapons, such as tanks and artillery, in addition to nuclear- and missile-related 
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technology, were targeted. China could then carry on its sales of light weapons with the 
DPRK.445 Moreover, Washington initially sought financial measures on illicit activities, 
including money laundering, counterfeiting and narcotics sales. However, it dropped this 
proposal on account of the PRC’s desire to keep the focus squarely on the nuclear 
issue.446 Shen Dingli praises Resolution 1718 as “limited primarily to specifically tailored 
areas without touching civilian and economic dimensions. This carefully crafted 
sanctions strategy serves as effective leverage against Pyongyang.”447 
 
 Political Pressure  
 
 The initial U.S. position was to seek a broad array of sanctions under Chapter VII, 
covering all arms, dual-use items and luxury goods, and calling on states to inspect 
suspicious cargo to and from the DPRK.448 Wang received instructions on the 10th to 
oppose each of these elements. According to Bolton, “For all of our thanks to China for 
years of ‘effort’ in the Six-Party Talks, what China was really prepared to do…was 
precious little.”449 While Bolton said nothing about this divergence in public, he did 
indicate that the U.S. would seek a “strong” and “swift” response.450 The next day, Rice 
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agreed to seek a vote on the 13th, not letting the “shock value” of the test dissipate too 
much.451 On the 12th, Bolton relayed this objective to his counterparts and, later, to the 
press, saying that “we shouldn’t allow more meetings and more meetings to be an excuse 
for inaction.”452  
 The same day, on a previously scheduled trip, China’s State Councilor Tang 
Jiaxuan discussed the North Korean situation in Washington with Bush, Rice, Hill, and 
others. Tang had already backed away from China’s opening position, telling Bush that 
China would agree to sanctions on WMD-related programs. Referring to the meeting, 
U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch said that, “I think it’s a very major 
step and a positive step that we now have all the major players in this arguing, in fact, for 
a strong resolution.”453 By the afternoon of the 12th, Wang had informed Bolton that 
China would not veto the U.S. draft, though held out the possibility that it might 
abstain.454 The firmness of the U.S. position, coupled with the lack of viable alternatives, 
likely resulted in China’s move in the direction of cooperation.  
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 Like China, Russia strongly criticized the nuclear test.455 Both were also wary 
about the possibility of further escalation. However, the two states were not in sync in 
terms of objecting to the U.S. proposal. Whereas China had aired its main concerns early 
in the process, Russia waited until near the end to state its reservations. In particular, on 
the 13th, Churkin raised objections to parts of the language on cargo inspections and the 
specific types of weapons that would be sanctioned. Nevertheless, Bolton refused to 
make concessions on these points and proceeded with the vote, with Russia’s voting 
status in doubt until the end.456 China did not second Russia’s position as it had done 
during the July negotiations. By this point, China’s own concerns had already been 
satisfactorily addressed, and it had little to gain by engaging in last-minute diplomatic 
brinkmanship with Russia.457 
 Along with the U.S., Japan sought to “immediately start deliberations on a 
resolution for stern measures.”458 Japan, which attended meetings of the P5, as well as 
consultations among the P3, desired a range of actions against North Korea that surpassed 
even the opening U.S. position. In addition to arms sanctions and cargo inspections, 
Tokyo also asked for a broad economic embargo, restrictions on port visits by North 
Korean ships, mention of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, and a travel 
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ban on high-level DPRK officials.459 Indeed, during the negotiations, the U.S. added 
Japan’s call for a travel ban to its requests in return for concessions on two issues of 
greater importance to the PRC and Russia: cargo inspections and financial sanctions.460 
However, Japan ultimately dropped the goals not supported by the U.S. and hewed 
closely to Washington’s position.    
 As regards regional dynamics, the main shift was in South Korea’s approach. Roh 
Moo-hyun, who had encouraged dialogue with the DPRK since his election as president 
in 2003, said that Seoul would “increasingly find it difficult to stick to its engagement 
policy towards North Korea.”461 Ban told Rice on the 9th that the ROK would support 
“stern” measures, though would not endorse a military response.462 Two days later, Roh 
called for a mix of “strong sanctions” and “peaceful dialogue,” and said that “we should 
strategically mix the two.”463 Not long after, the PRC agreed to the U.S. push for 
sanctions and said that it would not use its veto. Based on the timing, it is possible that 
Roh’s statements had an impact in China’s decision to back away from its initial 
opposition to sanctions.464  
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 Following the vote, Pak Gil Yon again condemned the body as “gangster-like,” 
and threatened to take “physical countermeasures” if further pressure were applied.465 
Several reasons can help to explain China’s decision to lean to the U.S. side following the 
nuclear test. In terms of the issue itself, the 6PT remained stalled and bilateral pressure 
had failed to prevent the nuclear test, leaving a UNSC response as a preferred alternative. 
In addition, the U.S. was willing to make guarantees that limited the scope of the 
resolution’s authority and adequately addressed China’s main concerns about the scope 
of the resolution. In political terms, the U.S. capitalized on the shock value of the event 
and pushed for a swift vote, which added pressure on the PRC not to obfuscate. In 
contrast to their prior division, Japan and South Korea both supported sanctions, placing 
regional pressure on the PRC to follow suit.  
 
Adjusting Sanctions: The 2009 PRST 
 
 On April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted what it claimed was a “satellite 
launch,” but which observers believed was a disguised test of a long-range ballistic 
missile.466 The latter would have been a violation of Resolution 1718, which banned 
ballistic missile and nuclear tests. China initially expressed no opinion, saying only that it 
had “noted” the launch and “noted” the reaction of “the relevant parties.”467 In New York, 
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China’s ambassador, Zhang Yesui, proposed a press statement, which is considered 
weaker than a PRST or a resolution, and not legally binding.468 On the 7th, the MFA said 
that the UNSC should “react cautiously,” and that the issue concerned the “right of all 
countries to the peaceful use of outer space,” indicating that the PRC did not see the 
launch as a missile test.469 On the 9th, Zhang said that “We still need time to discuss the 
format.”470 
 After a week of consultations among the P5 and Japan, the Council approved a 
PRST that condemned the launch and described it as in “contravention” of Resolution 
1718.471 It also instructed the 1718 Committee to “adjust” the measures adopted in 2006 
through the designation of specific individuals and entities, resulting in the listing of three 
North Korean firms connected with the missile industry.472 Despite its form, this PRST 
had an impact both by setting a precedent that purported satellite launches would be 
treated as missile tests and by starting the process of specifying sanctions on the DPRK. 
In light of its opening position, why was the PRC willing to approve such a statement?  
  
Narrowing Alternatives  
 
 In the two years following the 2006 nuclear test, the Six-Party Talks managed to 
achieve a number of concrete objectives. In February, 2007, the DPRK agreed to close 
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the Yongbyon facility in return for energy assistance and a renewed promise for 
normalized relations with the U.S.473 In July, after the U.S. had released funds from 
Banco Delta Asia that had been frozen in 2005, the North announced that it had shut 
down the Yongbyon reactor. By late October 2008, the DPRK had destroyed the reactor’s 
cooling tower, in return for Pyongyang’s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of 
terrorism. However, in December, the parties failed to reach an accord on the verification 
procedures to be used by the IAEA. The talks had ground to a halt by the end of the Bush 
Administration.474 
 On February 24, 2009, North Korea announced an imminent satellite launch, 
which the U.S. and others viewed as a pretext for a ballistic missile test.475 China’s public 
reaction was to “note” the announcement and encourage the sides to “make concerted 
efforts” to resume the 6PT.476  At the same time, Wu Dawei was dispatched to North 
Korea to deliver a “message of concern” about the planned test.477 This mission evidently 
had no impact, with the DPRK’s deputy UN ambassador stating soon afterwards that, 
“It’s only a matter of time” until the launch would occur.478 On the 28th, the foreign 
ministers of China and Japan met in Beijing and agreed to urge Pyongyang not to follow 
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through, though they did not mention how they would do so.479 Three weeks later, Hu 
met with North Korea’s Prime Minister, Kim Yong-il, encouraging the latter to return to 
the 6PT.480 By the time that the DPRK carried out its test, it was clear that both the 6PT 
and bilateral efforts had failed. This laid the basis for China’s willingness to consider the 
issue in the Council. However, unlike the nuclear test, the PRC was not willing to 
countenance a resolution. The U.S. would have to make concessions in order to guarantee 
China’s endorsement.  
   
Concessions and Risk-Reduction 
 
The Obama Administration continued its predecessor’s mixed strategy towards 
North Korea, combining efforts at multilateral dialogue with pressure.481 After the launch, 
Bosworth reiterated this approach by stressing both U.S. commitment to the 6PT process 
and the need to punish DPRK violations.482 Following an initial session on the 5th, in 
which divergent perspectives were stated, Rice described the need for reconciliation:  
We’re now in the process of going into smaller group consultations with key member 
states to try to forge an agreement on both the form and the substance of the appropriate 
response. So this is a process that will take at a minimum some days. If people think 
                                                 
479
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about an analogy, the Security Council—indeed, the United Nations—is not much 
different than our Congress. It takes time to gain agreement on a piece of legislation—
or in the case of the Security Council, a statement or a resolution.483   
Rice’s comment indicated that, having considered the positions of China and Russia, the 
U.S. had lowered its sights and was not going to insist on a new resolution, but would be 
open to a statement instead.484 
 Indeed, Washington elicited China’s cooperation through concessions on both 
form and substance. By the 9th, the U.S. had largely acquiesced to a draft PRST circulated 
by the PRC. This represented a compromise on form between China’s call for a press 
statement and the U.S.-Japanese pursuit of a resolution.485 One factor that arguably made 
this agreement palatable to the U.S. is the ambiguous international legal status of PRSTs. 
Though sometimes described as “non-binding,” Rice explained that the U.S. does view 
such documents, “broadly speaking” as binding. Rice even asserted that the statement 
was “more than binding,” since it made provisions for a tightening of sanctions through 
the 1718 Committee.486 This remark was likely made to defuse criticism that the 
administration had failed to secure a strong response in one of its first foreign policy 
crises. 
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 Substantively, the U.S. conceded ground on two issues. First was how to 
characterize what the DPRK had actually done. At first, China subscribed to the DPRK’s 
claim that it had launched a satellite, which might have been interpreted as legitimate 
under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.487 However, the U.S. defined it as a “missile launch,” 
which would be a clear violation of Resolution 1718.488 The two reconciled their views 
by agreeing simply to refer to a “launch.”489 Second was how to portray the legality of 
the incident. The U.S. wanted to refer to it as a “violation” of  Resolution 1718, while the 
PRC’s preferred to say that it was “not in conformity with” that resolution. The term 
“contravenes” was settled on.490 As in prior cases, the U.S. eased away from its opening 
gambit in order to guarantee unanimity.  
 
Political Pressure   
 
The U.S. position was that even an authentic satellite launch would violate 
Resolution 1718, as this would necessarily involve the use of banned missile technology. 
On April 5, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the U.S. would seek the “most 
appropriate and strong response we can possibly get,” and would attempt to “toughen 
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existing regimes” and “add to” Resolution 1718.491 Asked by George Stephanopolous if 
the U.S. was “prepared to pressure China” to do that, Rice responded only that “we’re 
working with China,” while conceding that “there have been times when we have 
differed as to the best means of achieving [progress on denuclearization].”492 Following 
this, Rice said little publicly until April 11, when the U.S. introduced a draft PRST that 
was the product of compromise among the P5 and Japan. Unlike Bolton, Rice did not use 
the media to escalate pressure on China or others for a decision. 
However, in private, the U.S. leveraged two major arguments. First was that 
Obama, on April 5, had delivered a major speech on non-proliferation in Prague, in 
which he said that “North Korea broke the rules,” that “rules must be binding,” that 
“words must mean something,” and that “now is the time for a strong international 
response.”493 This pledge, coming as it did in the midst of the crisis, meant that U.S. 
diplomats could argue that, politically, the U.S. could not accept a weak response.494 
Second, the Administration had demonstrated a commitment to the 6PT, recently 
dispatching new special envoy Stephen Bosworth to the region. At the UN, diplomats 
pointed out that engagement was politically risky, and that the failure of the UN to 
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 Formally, the U.S. had narrowed its “win set” according to Putnam’s analysis of international bargaining. 
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produce a strong document might tip the scales against multilateralism, a prospect that 
China would have inferred to mean a more hawkish approach.495 
Beyond direct pressure, the U.S. could have tied China’s cooperativeness on the 
launch to efforts to enhance U.S.-China relations. Specifically, on April 1, on the margins 
of the G20 summit in London, Hu and Obama announced the creation of a Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (SED), which represented a broader initiative to solidify cooperation 
across a range of shared issues. The PRC, then, would likely not have wished to prejudice 
this effort with a major disagreement about North Korea.496 Of course, this also gave the 
U.S. an incentive to demonstrate flexibility. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the 
London meeting, the Prague speech, and the intransigence demonstrated by Pyongyang 
likely meant that the U.S. position in the Council was treated seriously by Beijing.  
For its part, Russia followed China’s cautious approach. Moscow urged 
“restraint” prior to, and just after, the launch.497 On April 5, it joined China in opposing 
efforts by the Council to issue a condemnatory statement.498 On the 8th, Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov said that, while Russia was “concerned,” any “threat of sanctions would be 
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counterproductive.”499 The next day, the Foreign Ministry said that sanctions would 
“isolate and embitter North Korea even more,” and lead to “retaliatory measures.”500 In 
addition, Russia supported China’s initial bid for a press statement, as opposed to a PRST 
or another resolution, and backed the PRC when, on the 11th, it circulated a draft 
PRST.501 While its support offered the PRC some leverage to resist the West’s more 
ambitious plan for a new resolution, there is no evidence that Russia contemplated or did 
switch its position before the PRC did so. Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed.  
As in 2006, Japan preferred a somewhat stronger response than the U.S. A week 
after the DPRK’s announcement, Tokyo said that it would pursue another UNSC 
resolution.502 Bosworth, in talks with Japanese officials on March 6, said only that the 
U.S. would respond “in a common fashion,” without explicitly agreeing to seek a 
resolution.503 After the launch, the U.S. did in fact support Japan’s proposal for a 
resolution, but soon abandoned this effort in the face of Chinese and Russian opposition. 
On April 9, the U.S. circulated a draft PRST, while Japan remained fixed on a 
resolution.504 Japan also reportedly sought to designate 10 DPRK firms as violators of 
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Resolution 1718, which the U.S. thought politically unrealistic.505 It was not until the 10th 
that Japan capitulated and agreed to the U.S. draft.506 As in July 2006, Japan pushed for 
the sternest approach.    
South Korea hewed closely to the U.S. position during the negotiations. This is 
not surprising, given the tougher policy on North Korea taken by President Lee Myung-
bak.507 As with the U.S., the ROK’s position all along was that a satellite launch would 
violate Resolution 1718. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in London, Lee and Obama 
agreed to push for a resolution if the DPRK followed through with the launch.508 On 
April 5, the ROK’s UN ambassador, Park In-kook, called for a “rapid and enormous 
response” from the UNSC.509 On the 7th, attempting to buttress the U.S. position, Lee 
asked a Chinese delegation led by Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun 
to “play a large role” in responding to the launch.510 South Korea was a second regional 
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 A day after the PRST was read, North Korea vowed that it “will never 
participate” in the 6PT, nor would it be “bound to any agreement” of the talks.512 Once 
again, the PRC had made a choice that alienated the DPRK. This can be explained by 
four reasons. First, the 6PT had been deadlocked for four months, and bilateral efforts to 
encourage Pyongyang to return had failed. Second, the U.S. was willing to soften the 
form and substance of the draft in order to reach a consensus. Third, politically, the U.S. 
harnessed Obama’s Prague speech and the upgrading of ties with the PRC to gain China’s 
support for a “strong” response. Fourth, Japan and, importantly, South Korea, were in 
line with the U.S. position, adding additional pressure on Beijing. As with the missile 
tests three years earlier, though, Council unity was insufficient to prevent an escalation of 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the months ahead.  
 
Further Measures: Resolution 1874  
  
 China’s initial response to the second nuclear test, on May 25, was that North 
Korea had “ignored universal opposition” and that the PRC was “resolutely opposed to 
it.”513 An MFA spokesman also referred to China’s “normal state-to-state relations” with 
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the DPRK, softer in tone than the usual references to North Korea as an ally.514 The same 
day, during an emergency session of the Council, China agreed to a statement which 
branded the test a “clear violation” of Resolution 1718, and said that the body would 
“start working immediately” on a new resolution.515 Nevertheless, as of the 29th, Zhang 
Yesui had not received instructions from Beijing as to the nature of the response to which 
it would agree. Despite its rhetoric, China was proceeding cautiously at the outset of 
negotiations.516 
 Resolution 1874 was passed unanimously on June 12, though the P5, with Japan 
and South Korea, had virtually agreed to the text a week earlier.517 The main contribution 
of this resolution was that it outlined a procedure by which cargo inspections would take 
place, yet it did not stipulate the use of force to conduct inspections.518 It also called on 
states to impose financial measures against firms connected with the North’s WMD-
related programs, and, as it had in April, asked the 1718 Committee to designate 
additional entities and individuals that would be subject to restrictions.519 This resulted in 
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five firms and five individuals being added to the sanctions list in July.520 What factors 
can help explain China’s approval of this increase in pressure on the DPRK?  
 
 Narrowing Alternatives    
 
 Following the April PRST, the prospects for a resumption of the 6PT continued to 
deteriorate. On April 18, the North Korean media said that the country would “bolster its 
nuclear deterrent for self-defense” as a “guarantee for the protection of the country’s 
sovereignty.”521 Five days later, Lavrov visited the DPRK and was informed that the 
North “no longer needs” the 6PT.522 Pyongyang added pressure on the 29th by demanding 
that the UNSC apologize for the PRST or risk further nuclear and missile tests523 U.S. 
efforts, including offering the chance for bilateral dialogue within the context of the 
6PT524 and authorizing funds for energy transfers to the North, were similarly rejected.525 
By the beginning of May, Hillary Clinton had told Congress that she believed a 
resumption of the 6PT was “implausible if not impossible.”526 
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 In contrast with prior episodes, China did not make a major public effort to 
dissuade the North. DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun met with Vice Foreign Minister 
Wang Guangya in late April and possibly with Yang Jiechi a month later.527 On May 7, 
Beijing appeared to consider sending a “special envoy” to North Korea, but that trip 
either did not occur or was not reported.528 The absence of a high-level delegation 
provides some evidence that Beijing did not view the bilateral route optimistically, 
preferring not to return, once again, empty handed. Privately, China promoted the use of 
the “lever of economic development” to motivate the 6PT, despite the U.S. having ruled 
out unconditional concessions, and argued that U.S-DPRK dialogue was the “only way to 
make progress,” thus shifting the diplomatic burden to Pyongyang and Washington, and 
away from itself.  
 The May 25 nuclear test drew negative reactions among Chinese commentators. 
Zhang Jingwei, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, asserted that the 
DPRK is a “regime without fundamental rationality,” and that “its flip flops have 
exhausted China’s goodwill and patience. There is no point endorsing such a ‘friend.’”529 
Wang Zaibang and Li Jun, scholars at CICIR, argued later that North Korea had taken 
advantage of China’s tolerance, and “continually raised the asking price” without worry 
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about any “serious consequences” if it did not honor its commitments.530 An editorial in 
the populist newspaper Global Times said that, “North Korea has only itself to blame for 
its plight. Its nuclear fantasy drove the country to behave irrationally and drift further 
from reality.”531 These remarks echoed the harsh tone used by the MFA.  
 However, scholars were divided on the question of further sanctions. A survey of 
20 foreign affairs experts conducted by Global Times found that half were in favor of 
new measures, while half were opposed.532 Liu Jianyong, a Tsinghua University 
professor, argued that, if it joined in a punitive response, China would risk conceding its 
role as a “contact man” between the DPRK and the West.533 Sun Zhe, another Tsinghua 
professor, said that the MFA’s rhetoric was “symbolic,” and denied that the government 
would adopt a much harder approach towards North Korea.534 Zhang Liangui, who had 
supported sanctions after the 2006 test, lamented that “North Korea has no fear of 
economic and political sanctions,” and doubted that the Council would be able to pass a 
resolution strong enough to change Kim Jong-il’s goals.535 Although China was willing 
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162 
to consider a new resolution, debate continued about the usefulness of sanctions vis-à-vis 
diplomacy.   
 
Concessions and Risk-Reduction  
 
 As it had in April, the U.S. initially lowered expectations for quick results by 
stressing the need for patience as differences among the negotiators were resolved. On 
May 26, the day after the nuclear test, Rice said that “our discussions and deliberations 
will indeed take some time. We are thinking through complicated issues that require very 
careful consideration.”536 Notably, the initial draft circulated by the U.S. on May 28 
omitted a paragraph that would have named specific measures, leaving the details to be 
filled in through discussions involving representatives from the P5, Japan and South 
Korea.537 After consultations, Rice said that the process would be “complicated and we 
need to be in touch with our capitals repeatedly. And this is one that we work to get right 
rather than to pop out prematurely.”538  
 The major concession made by the U.S. to guarantee China’s support regarded 
cargo inspections. Although Resolution 1874 outlined a procedure for inspections, it did 
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not require states to conduct them nor did it authorize states to use force. At an experts-
level meeting on May 29, the U.S. broached the possibility of mandatory inspections, 
reportedly proposing that the word “compulsory” be used. However, China quickly made 
clear that it would agree only to language “calling upon” states to interdict suspected 
vessels.539 One participant recalled that there were some “moments of frankness” with the 
PRC about the issue.540 In addition, the U.S. initially wanted the resolution framed 
broadly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but, as with Resolution 1718, the PRC was 
granted a specific reference to Article 41, which was meant to emphasize that the use of 
force was not implied in the text.541   
 Several other features of the U.S. draft also assuaged Chinese concerns. First was 
an exemption for sales of light arms to North Korea, as had also been included in 
Resolution 1718.542 This is notable since the U.S. had originally suggested a general arms 
embargo.543 Second, as in the April PRST, the draft left the designation of targeted 
entities up to the 1718 Committee, which operates by consensus. As a member of that 
Committee, the PRC was reassured that it would be able to keep top-level DPRK officials 
off the list. Third, the proposal called for the establishment of a panel of seven experts 
that would assist the Committee in monitoring enforcement. This arrangement suited the 
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PRC since it would be represented on this panel as well and, as such hold sway over how 
the resolution would be implemented.544   
 
 Political Pressure  
 
 As it had in April, the U.S. refrained from publically pressuring the PRC. In fact, 
there is little evidence of an abrasive U.S. posture during the negotiating process itself. 
After the nuclear test, a U.S. official said he was “pleasantly surprised” with China’s 
cooperativeness, taking note of the vitriolic tone of China’s initial reaction.545 It is 
possible that the PRC simply assumed that not to cooperate would be so damaging to its 
relations with the U.S. that it decided not to pursue an overly assertive position. A 
Western diplomat argues that Resolution 1874 can be attributed to China “valuing 
bilateral relations with the U.S. more than the crazy aunt in the attic (i.e. North 
Korea).”546  For instance, China might have wanted to avoid a downturn in relations just 
as the SED was set to begin in July.547 
 More concretely, the U.S. worked to coordinate its position with South Korea and 
Japan, and thus present a united position to Beijing. On May 25, Obama held 
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conversations with Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, with both 
agreeing to the need to pursue a new UNSC resolution.548 South Korea’s strategy, in 
particular, converged with the U.S. as Seoul decided to join the U.S.-led Proliferation 
Security Initiative, which involved a consortium of states that agreed to interdict vessels 
suspected of carrying banned nuclear-related items.549 On the 30th, a U.S. delegation to a 
regional security conference in Singapore, led by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, held a 
dialogue with counterparts from Japan and the ROK, calling for “genuinely tough 
sanctions” and aligning their positions just as negotiations in New York were 
beginning.550 
 High-level diplomacy between the U.S. and its allies continued in the first week 
of June, as the details of a new resolution were being deliberated at the UN. Deputy 
Secretary of State James Steinberg visited Seoul and Tokyo, discussing the need for a 
unified approach. In Seoul, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said that a “strong 
resolution should come out soon to show the will of the international community to 
address the North’s provocations properly.”551 On the 5th, Clinton met with Yu in 
Washington, discussing U.S.-ROK cooperation on the DPRK issue.552 The same day, 
Steinberg held consultations in Beijing with Yang Jiechi, Dai Bingguo and others, 
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 The same day, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met with his counterpart in Seoul, focused on the 




presenting his case only after internal divisions among the U.S., Japan and South Korea 
had been bridged.553 By targeting “Beijing’s aversion to being diplomatically isolated,” 
the U.S. was able to leverage indirect pressure on the PRC.554       
 Like China, Russia expressed strong misgivings about the nuclear test. Soon after 
the detonation, Churkin said that Moscow was “prepared to support a strong 
resolution.”555 However, through June 5, there is no indication that Russia played a 
significant role in the negotiations. Indeed, the impression of one diplomat was the 
Russia felt “unnerved” and marginalized by the close cooperation between the U.S. and 
China.556 Churkin himself later described the process as such: “There was much 
discussion between the U.S. and Chinese delegations, and some of the issues were 
thrashed out between those delegations before they came to us.”557 Rather, Russia raised 
objections to the language on cargo inspections towards the end of the negotiations, after 
the P5, Japan and South Korea had already submitted a draft to the full Council. 
According to one observer, Churkin “drove everyone nuts.”558 As in October 2006, China 
had nothing to gain by supporting Russia’s last-minute demands.  
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 Politically, the situation was ripe for compromise. The U.S. seized the drama of 
the nuclear test to enhance its cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and then 
presenting a unified case for a resolution to Beijing. Russia’s position was out of sync 




As in the past, the unanimous approval of Resolution 1874 led to a hostile 
response from the DPRK. In this case, the reaction was the launch of a series of ballistic 
missiles on July 4, and additional bellicose rhetoric from Pyongyang.559 China’s approval 
can be attributed to several factors. On the issue itself, the nuclear test diminished 
prospects for a resumption of the 6PT or for effective bilateral diplomacy. In addition, the 
U.S. was willing to carve out concessions on the substance of the resolution that assuaged 
China’s concerns over the use of force, the scope of the resolution and the delegation of 
implementation authority to a body that the PRC could influence. Politically, given the 
salience of the issue to the U.S. and its allies, it would have been difficult for the PRC to 




 This chapter has assessed China’s positions in four UNSC decisions on North 
Korea through the lens of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. To recap, the decisions 
were: Resolution 1695 (2006), which called on states to exercise “vigilance” in their arms 
transactions with the DPRK; Resolution 1718 (2006), which, among other things, 
imposed an arms embargo and called for cargo inspections; the PRST of April, 2009, 
which instructed the 1718 Committee to designate specific entities as subject to 
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restrictions; and Resolution 1874 (2009), which elaborated on the procedures for cargo 
inspections, tightened financial measures, and instructed the Committee to specify 
additional individuals and firms for the embargo list. The PRC voted in favor of all three 
resolutions and consented to the PRST.  
 In a sense, China’s behavior was surprising, since UNSC decisions invariably 
caused an increase of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, four factors can help 
to account for cooperativeness. Hypothesis 1, that cooperation is associated with a 
narrowing of the available alternatives, is borne out in each case. North Korea’s missile 
and nuclear tests all came after the 6PT had stalled; this is not surprising, since those tests 
were likely intended to encourage a resumption of diplomacy on Pyongyang’s terms. In 
the first three cases, Beijing had tried to avert a crisis through high-level contacts with the 
North, but had been rebuffed. By June, 2009, it did not make a significant effort to do so, 
perhaps under the assumption that dissuasion was unlikely to be effective. With 
alternative routes blocked, consideration in the Council became a preferred option.  
Hypothesis 2 is that concessions contribute to China’s cooperativeness by 
lowering the perceived risks. Indeed, the U.S. was willing to make concessions, 
especially in terms of the legal phrasing (e.g. by not directly citing Chapter VII in the 
July 2006 case), the use of force (by not seeking mandatory inspections of cargo ships), 
and the scope of sanctions (such as by exempting light arms). The U.S. preferred 
weakened decisions to the risk of a Chinese or Russian veto, however remote a 
possibility that might have been. In addition, there is an apparent interaction with 
Hypothesis 1. The magnitude of the DPRK’s provocations shuttered alternative options 
not only for China, but also for the U.S. Washington made concessions because, 
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unwilling to fathom a military strike, it put stock in multilateral pressure to coerce 
Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, and was thus prepared to meet its counterparts 
in the middle.   
 In terms of broader political relationships, Hypothesis 3 is that China is more 
likely to cooperate if the U.S. utilizes high-level diplomatic pressure. The shock of the 
missile and nuclear tests created a favorable context for U.S. diplomacy, since China was 
amenable to a punitive response. In addition, the PRC had clear stakes in the bilateral 
relationship and was predisposed to cooperate no matter what level of pressure was 
employed. However, the U.S. did use political leverage to secure the best deal possible. 
This involved overt tactics, such as Bolton’s suggestions that he might ask for a vote 
regardless of China’s position, and less direct ones, such as the argument in 2009 that the 
public would not have accepted a weak resolution. These efforts were buttressed by 
frequent high-level exchanges, driving home the importance the U.S. attached to the 
matter. In addition, the U.S. was able to coordinate a unified response with its major East 
Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. This was especially apparent after the second 
nuclear test.  
 Hypothesis 4 is that cooperation is linked to a change in Russia’s position. In 
general, Russia was not a pivotal actor in these negotiations and gained attention only by 
issuing last-minute demands in October 2006 and June 2009, which were not supported 
by China. Like the other main actors, Russia took North Korea’s provocations seriously, 
and there was never any doubt that it would be receptive to some type of UNSC response. 
Russia was sympathetic to China’s calls for restraint, and supported a softer opening 
position during the July, 2006 and April, 2009 crises. However, there is no evidence that 
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Russia switched its position first, leaving China isolated and therefore politically 
vulnerable. Hence, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed in any of the cases.  
 Hypothesis 5 is that China’s cooperativeness is tied to regional support for the 
U.S. position. The key regional actors in this instance were Japan and South Korea. Japan 
was a non-permanent member of the Council, while Seoul was also an active participant, 
particularly in the 2009 cases. Both of these states broadly supported the U.S. drive for a 
strong Council response, though the ROK was more closely aligned with Beijing after the 
first missile test, while Japan pushed for an even more assertive response than the U.S. in 
the first three cases. Following the 2006 nuclear test, and, especially after the election of 
Lee Myung-bak, Seoul appeared more closely aligned with Washington. There is also an 
interaction with Hypothesis 3, insofar as the U.S. was able to multiply the power of its 
own message through coordination with its allies.  
 In sum, four of the five hypotheses can explain China’s final positions on this 
series of negotiations. Strategically, its options had narrowed such that compromise in the 
UNSC was a preferred option. Moreover, flexibility by the sponsor assuaged concerns 
and, perhaps, made the compromise more acceptable domestically. Politically, the 
combination of support from the U.S. and its allies created an incentive for movement 
toward the Western position. Russia’s role has less explanatory power since it did not 
switch positions before the PRC. These findings are tabulated below.  
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 Measures imposed by the Security Council have not been effective in securing 
nonproliferation, nor have they prevented further acts of provocation by the North. In 
March  2010, the ROK destroyer Cheonan sank, resulting in the loss of 46 sailors. This 
was attributed to a North Korean torpedo attack.560 In November 2010, Pyongyang 
revealed the existence of a large-scale uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, 
surprising observers.561 Soon afterwards, the DPRK launched an artillery barrage on an 
ROK-controlled island in the Yellow Sea, killing four.562 The North’s strategic rationale 
for pursuing nuclear weapons, domestic political reasons for aggression connected with 
the political succession, and ongoing concerns about the enforcement of sanctions 
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resolutions, produced a situation in which UNSC pressure was of limited usefulness.563 
By the end of 2010, analysts remained pessimistic about the prospects for peace on the 
Korean Peninsula.564  
 However, from the perspective of cooperation, the four cases discussed in this 
chapter suggest that harmonization of views is possible under certain conditions: 
narrowing alternatives, concessions aimed at the most skeptical decision-makers, high-
level U.S. pressure, and agreement among the regional stakeholders. Behind all of these 
factors was the drama of the North’s tests, in disregard of regional stability, and in open 
defiance of UNSC decisions. In the absence of a driving external shock, though, 
cooperation becomes more complex. Just as the Council was deliberating the DPRK, it 
was also considering the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. Unlike Pyongyang, Tehran 
claimed that its goal was peaceful energy use, as guaranteed by the NPT. It did not 
conduct nuclear tests or indiscriminately fire missiles over neighbors’ territory. Reaching 
compromise in the UNSC was a much lengthier, more nettlesome process. It is to this 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Tehran Tangle: 




 Similar to North Korea, China’s strategic dilemma on Iran is how to maintain 
regional stability in light of potentially destabilizing Western attempts to impose 
sanctions. On one hand, China values regional stability with regard to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI). The reason is straightforward: the PRC is aware that its growing 
dependence on energy supplies renders any conflict between Iran, the U.S., Israel, or 
other parties, a direct threat to its own strategic and economic wellbeing. In 2009, Iran 
ranked as China’s third-largest source of foreign oil, behind Saudi Arabia and Angola.565 
China also has long-term contracts to purchase Iranian liquefied natural gas, and has been 
a key player in the modernization and development of Iran’s oil and gas industry.566 
Moreover, China’s total trade with Iran climbed from $10.1 Billion in 2005 to $27.8 
Billion in 2008, before tapering off somewhat. China’s trade volume in 2009 ($21.1 
Billion) was still nearly three times as high as the other four members of the P5 combined 
($7.8 Billion).567   
 The issue of Iran’s nuclear program complicates the prospects for stability. 
Beijing is concerned about Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA requests and the prospect 
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that Tehran might eventually produce a nuclear weapon. One Chinese diplomat argues 
that the PRC once thought of nuclear weapons development as a sovereign right, but that 
it “now considers its commitment to regional stability and international nonproliferation 
regimes to be [higher] priorities.”568 Shen Dingli writes that, “Beijing appears to believe 
that the emergence of a regional nuclear power or a nuclear arms race in the region would 
destabilize the Middle East.”569 Yin Gang, a scholar at CASS, argues that, “If Iran had a 
nuclear deterrent, other countries in the region would seek a new balance and seek to 
follow suit.” Yin warns of a “big war in the Middle East” as a possible consequence.570 
 However, China is skeptical of the use of sanctions, both unilaterally and by the 
Security Council, as an effective way of preventing nuclear proliferation. Li Weijian, a 
scholar at SIIS, submits that sanctions may radicalize the Iranian population and increase 
pressure on leaders to resist cooperation with the international community.571 Hua Liming, 
a former PRC envoy to Iran, similarly opines that increasing sanctions would “gradually 
lead to a confrontational situation” in which Tehran would become even more 
intransigent vis-à-vis the IAEA and likely withdraw from the NPT.572 Though it had 
consented to three rounds of sanctions between 2006 and 2008, Beijing’s growing 
economic interests in Iran, coupled with doubts about the efficacy of sanctions, made 
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consensus on a fourth round in June, 2010 especially problematic. This chapter asks why 
China ultimately agreed.   
 The argument is that five factors influenced China’s approval on what became 
Resolution 1929. First is that Iran had adopted an intransigent posture with respect to the 
IAEA and the international contact group seeking to mediate the problem.573 The 
outcome was not an automatic shift in China’s position, but rather a gradual increase in 
political pressure on China to consent to further sanctions. Second, the U.S. made 
concessions that reduced the key risks that China associated with sanctions, especially 
regarding Iran’s energy sector. Third, Washington used sustained diplomacy to clarify 
that the issue affected a “core interest” of the U.S. This worked because China’s ties with 
the U.S. were, in effect, more important than those with Iran. Fourth, Russia moved 
towards the view that sanctions were needed, meaning that the PRC was isolated among 
the P5. Fifth, additional stakeholders, such as France and Germany, as well as Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, supported the U.S. position and, at times, leveled pressure on Beijing.  
The chapter proceeds in four main sections. The first provides a background of 
the Iranian nuclear issue from 2002 to the beginning of the debate on a fourth resolution 
in late 2009, showing that China gradually became a more active participant in 
negotiations as its interests in the IRI broadened. The second section covers the course of 
negotiations with Iran in 2009 and 2010, demonstrating that the primarily negative 
outcome of these processes did not have a direct impact on China’s support for sanctions. 
The third briefly discusses efforts made to assuage Chinese concerns through side 
payments (in particular, allusions that China’s oil supply would be “guaranteed” in the 
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event of a Middle East crisis) and concessions on the text of the resolution. The fourth 
reports the growing support for sanctions by a number of key actors, including the U.S., 
Russia, the EU powers, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and shows how several of these parties 
interceded with China in an attempt to change its political and strategic calculations. The 
conclusion summarizes the argument and specifies the implications for cooperation.  
 
Background: 2002-2009  
  
 The sequence of events leading to Resolution 1929 began in August 2002, when 
the existence of a secret uranium enrichment program in Iran was made public.574 The 
prospect of sanctions as a way to manage the nuclear issue was first raised in November 
2004, after the IAEA was unable to confirm that “there are no undeclared nuclear 
materials or activities in Iran,” and noted a “pattern of concealment.”575 The PRC denied 
requests by the U.S. and Britain to have the issue reported to the Security Council on the 
basis that doing so would complicate the IAEA’s efforts. This position was bolstered by 
an agreement in Paris the same month between the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) 
and Iran, under which the latter would suspend uranium enrichment and agree to IAEA 
verification.576 However, Li Zhaoxing, in a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, declined 
to state unequivocally that the PRC would veto a resolution if the matter were brought 
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before the Council. Rather, Li’s message was that China would oppose the use of 
pressure if Tehran complied with IAEA mandates and thereby assuaged concerns about 
the nature of its nuclear program.577 
 The EU3-Iran diplomatic track made little progress in 2005, as Tehran rejected 
Europe’s prime objective of a permanent cessation of uranium enrichment.578 In January 
2006, Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz was reactivated and cooperation with the IAEA 
was suspended, prompting the EU3 to seek a UNSC referral. On Feburary 4, China voted 
in an IAEA session to transfer the issue to the Council, though Wang Guangya said that 
the PRC “prefers to have the EU3 continue” talks with Iran to “find a long-term solution 
on this issue.”579 The next month, the P5 agreed to a PRST calling on Iran to suspend 
enrichment and directing the IAEA Director General to submit a report on compliance 
within 30 days.580 Due to Chinese and Russian objections, the text had been altered to 
remove a description of the problem as a “threat to international peace and security.” The 
two states feared this might act as a trigger for sanctions, to which both were opposed.581 
Explaining China’s reason for a restrained reaction, Dai Bingguo remarked, “The 
Chinese side feels there has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East. We don’t 
need any more turmoil.”582 
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Table 13: Key Dates in UNSC Negotiations on Iran, 2006-2010 
 
Date Event 
February 4, 2006 Iran withdraws from IAEA’s Additional Protocol on verification; 
IAEA votes to “report” situation to Security Council. 
March 29, 2006 Security Council issues PRST calling for suspension of uranium 
enrichment and directing IAEA to issue report within 30 days. 
July 31, 2006 Council unanimously approves Resolution 1696 threatening further 
measures for continued non-compliance with IAEA requests. 
December 23, 2006 Council passes Resolution 1737 (14-1, Qatar voting no) imposing 
ban on sales of nuclear-related goods and other measures. 
March 24, 2007 Council unanimously approves Resolution 1747, banning Iranian 
arms exports, calling for vigilance on arms sales to Iran, and other 
measures.  
March 3, 2008 Council passes Resolution 1803 (14-0-1, Indonesia abstaining), 
calling for cargo inspections and enacting other measures. 
September 27, 2008 Council unanimously approves Resolution 1835, urging Iran to 
comply with obligations “fully and without delay.”  
April 15, 2010 Substantive negotiations begin in New York on fourth round of 
sanctions, based on U.S. draft resolution initially circulated in 
January. 
May 19, 2010 Agreement on text reached between E3+3 states, draft submitted to 
non-permanent members for consideration.  
June 9, 2010 Council approves Resolution 1929 (12-2-1, Turkey and Brazil 
opposed, Lebanon abstaining), banning arms sales to Iran among 
other measures. 
 
 The IAEA report was delivered to the Council on April 28. The conclusion was 
that the body was “unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the 
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.”583 Five days later, the UK 
and France circulated a draft resolution, framed under Chapter VII, which suggested that 
the UNSC would consider “further measures” if Iran continued to resist IAEA 
requests.584 However, Russia and China saw such action as premature, instead backing a 
new package of incentives that had been issued by the reformed negotiating collective, 
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the “E3+3” (i.e. the Europeans plus China, Russia and the U.S.).585 Among other things, 
this would have exchanged a suspension of UNSC consideration of the problem for 
suspension of enrichment.586 Beijing’s sanguine assessment was that the proposal might 
“serve as a basis for all sides to rapidly restore negotiations and provide conditions for 
resolving differences through negotiations.”587 On June 16, in Beijing, Hu Jintao urged 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to respond to the six-party proposal, and reaffirmed China’s 
commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.588  
 However, by late July, Iran had rejected this initiative.589 Britain and France, with 
the support of the U.S., again formulated a draft resolution on the lines of the text that 
had failed three months before. Requesting amendments to ensure that sanctions would 
not be an automatic next step,590 China and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1696. 
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Like the March PRST, an IAEA report within 30 days was mandated. The resolution 
warned that, if Iran did not comply with IAEA verification requirements, the Council 
would seek to “adopt appropriate measures” under Article 41 of Chapter VII, which 
includes sanctions.591 In his remarks after the vote, Liu Zhenmin urged Iran to “attach 
importance to the extensive appeals and expectations of the international community,” 
and “earnestly implement the requirements of this resolution,” even as he stressed 
China’s preference that the matter be settled through mediation.592  
 The IAEA report requested by the Security Council was released on August 31. In 
it, the Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, found that Iran had not suspended uranium 
enrichment and had continued to resist full cooperation with investigators.593 Over the 
next four months, the E3+3 debated what measures to authorize as punishment for non-
compliance. Progress was stalled by divisions among the actors, with the U.S. advocating 
the toughest approach, Russia and China the most lenient, and the Europeans in 
between.594 John Bolton criticizes, in particular, the Europeans, who he writes had made 
“preemptive concessions” vis-à-vis Russia in the hope that doing so “would speed up the 
process of reaching agreement on a resolution,” a strategy Bolton describes as 
“delusional.”595 Lack of consensus persisted even after the IAEA submitted another 
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critical report to the Council on November 14,596 and Ahmadinejad announced plans to 
expand vastly Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity.597  
 In December, the U.S. and its European partners made a series of concessions to 
secure the support of Russia, which had emerged as the major obstacle to a sanctions 
resolution.598 References to the construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr were 
omitted, due to Russia’s long-standing involvement in that project.599 The Western text 
also allowed that a travel ban on Iranian nuclear officials would be optional, rather than 
mandatory, in order to satisfy a Russian demand.600 Various exemptions to proposed 
financial restrictions on targeted individuals were also approved, over the objections of 
Bolton and others.601 China’s role in these encounters appears to have been mainly to 
second Russia’s position. Bolton confines China’s role in one meeting to “basically” 
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agreeing with the Russian argument, “although, mercifully, [the Chinese diplomat] was 
brief.”602  
 After significant delay, the UNSC approved Resolution 1737 on December 23, 
2006. The resolution placed a ban on the export of nuclear technology to Iran, instituted a 
voluntary travel ban on individuals connected with the nuclear program, authorized 
financial sanctions on firms and individuals in the nuclear and ballistic missile 
industries,603 created a monitoring committee (similar to the 1718 Committee on North 
Korea), and threatened further action if Iran remained in non-compliance of IAEA 
directives after 60 days.604 Wang Guangya bemoaned Iran’s lack of “flexibility,” though 
reiterated the principle that “dialogue and negotiation are the fundamental, indeed the 
only, way out,” and that the IAEA, not the UNSC, was the “principal mechanism for 
dealing with this issue.”605 
 On February 22, 2007, ElBaradei reported that Iran had continued to enrich 
uranium at the Natanz facility and refused to provide details required for verification 
purposes.606 Talks on a second round of sanctions commenced soon after, with 
discussions occurring primarily between high-ranking officials in the capitals of E3+3 
countries. The U.S. and its partners sought a ban on arms sales to Iran and limits on 
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export credits for firms engaged in commercial deals in that country.607 This posed 
particular problems for the PRC, which had existing contracts to supply the IRI with 
various weapons, including anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles.608 China’s exports as a 
whole had increased dramatically, rising from a value of $713 million in 2000 to $7.29 
billion in 2007.609 As a result, on March 9, Wang Guangya said that he did not “see the 
need to expand [the measures] to an arms embargo” and objected to a prohibition on 
export credits.610 
 However, a second round of sanctions was passed unanimously on March 24. The 
contribution of Resolution 1747 was to proscribe Iranian arms exports and to list an 
additional 13 organizations and 15 individuals that would be subject to financial 
restrictions.611 In order to guarantee Russian and Chinese consent, the West agreed 
merely to call for “vigilance” in arms sales to Iran and to omit a ban on export credits.612 
As he had in December, Wang expressed “disappointment” in Iran’s decisions, and 
emphasized the role of the IAEA as the “main framework” through which the issue could 
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be resolved.613 Yet Wang also tellingly added that sanctions should “neither harm the 
Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran 
and other countries.”614 One reading of this is as a signal that China would not endorse an 
endless progression of sanctions on Iran at the expense of its own economic and strategic 
interests.  
 In May, the IAEA again concluded that Iran had not suspended enrichment, nor 
had it provided sufficient data to corroborate the “exclusively peaceful nature” of its 
nuclear program.615 However, momentum for a third round of sanctions was slowed by a 
deal struck in July between the IAEA and Iran under which Tehran would allow 
inspectors to return to the heavy water facility at Arak and provide additional 
documentation regarding the nuclear program.616 In August, the two sides announced a 
timeline under which Iran’s pledges would be carried out.617 This development provided 
China and Russia leverage to argue, at a ministerial conference in September, that 
consideration of additional sanctions should be delayed until the next IAEA report was 
distributed in November. 618 
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 That report, which again noted Iran’s noncompliance, provided a window of 
opportunity for the Western powers.619 Aware of China’s growing economic stakes in 
Iran, Washington focused on persuading Beijing not to stall. On November 16, U.S. 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns argued that,  
We need China to join the effort and agree to have the next meeting. We’re concerned 
that China’s trade has increased significantly with Iran. It’s incongruous for China to 
continue to sell arms to Iran and become Iran’s top trade partner. We’ve advised the 
Chinese to take a much more resolute role.620 
Similarly, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad said that “there has been 
dragging of feet by the Chinese,” a charge which Wang Guangya rejected.621 In mid-
December, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson criticized China’s state petroleum firm 
Sinopec for investing $2 Billion in the development of Iran’s Yadavaran oil field, saying 
that such an activity “flies in the face of the spirit of the UN sanctions that China 
supported.”622  
 By January, 2008, both the U.S. and Iranians were leveling diplomatic pressure on 
the PRC. On the 17th, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, visited Beijing and 
attempted to convince Yang Jiechi that Tehran’s nuclear ambitions were peaceful. 
Meanwhile, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte made contrary arguments to 
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Yang, Dai Bingguo and others during the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue in Guiyang.623 
Perhaps as a further inducement for support, Negroponte condemned Taiwan’s recent 
referendum on UN membership and issued only a mild critique of the trade deficit 
between the U.S. and China.624 The decisiveness of Negroponte’s visit is unclear, but by 
January 22 China had agreed to the general outlines of a third sanctions resolution.625  
 Movement towards further UNSC sanctions was spurred by an Iranian rocket 
launch on February 4 that the U.S. and, notably, Russia were concerned might be a test of 
ballistic missile technology,626 as well as by another critical IAEA report on February 
15.627 On February 26, Condoleezza Rice met with Yang in Beijing, with the latter stating 
that the “dual-track approach” of incentives and pressure should be sustained.628 However, 
growing Chinese commercial interests circumscribed the extent of the sanctions pursued 
by the Western sponsors. On the 28th, the PRC reiterated that measures should not 
“undermine normal trade and economic relations with Iran.” This qualification came just 
as China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation announced a $16 Billion contract to 
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develop Iran’s North Pars gas field.629 Additionally, China’s imports of energy supplies 
from Iran grew from $9.03 Billion in 2006 to $16.8 Billion in 2008.630  
 The final agreement, Resolution 1803, was approved on March 3 by a vote of 14 
in favor and one abstention (Indonesia). The resolution proscribed the sale of certain 
“dual use” items to Iran, imposed a travel ban on five officials associated with the nuclear 
program, and extended financial restrictions to a further 13 individuals.631 However, 
provisions regarding export credits, transactions with two Iranian banks, and cargo 
inspections were all voluntary, and the West had to omit sanctions on the Revolutionary 
Guards Corps.632 No mention was made of the energy sector or other industries not 
directly related to the nuclear program. As he had a year earlier, Wang repeated his 
observation that the sanctions “are not targeted at the Iranian people and will not affect 
normal economic and financial activities between Iran and other countries.”633 
Meanwhile, an MFA spokesman said that “China has not changed its position” on 
sanctions and that diplomacy “remains the best way out.”634 
 Over the next year and a half, calls for additional sanctions receded as the E3+3 
concentrated on the diplomatic track. On June 12, 2008, the EU’s foreign policy chief, 
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Javier Solana, delivered a letter to the Iranian Foreign Minister on behalf of the six 
powers that laid out several “possible areas of cooperation” that might form the basis of a 
long-term compromise with the IRI, such as support for construction of a light-water 
reactor and provision of a reliable nuclear fuel supply.635 Iran responded in August with a 
request for further details, a reply that was viewed in the West as dilatory,636 and which 
led the Council, on September 27, to approve Resolution 1835, reaffirming prior 
resolutions and called on Iran to comply.637 On October 5, Iran rejected the overture by 
stating that it would not cease enrichment regardless of the incentives offered.638 In 
November, the IAEA reported continued noncompliance.639 
 Nevertheless, negotiation remained prioritized at the outset of the Obama 
administration. In February, 2009, Obama remarked that, “If countries like Iran are 
willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.”640 This was soon 
followed by hints that the U.S. would support “direct engagement” with Tehran.641 In 
early March, the U.S. agreed to a mild statement by the E3+3 that requested Iran to 
                                                 
635
 Other areas included cooperation in trade, agriculture, civil aviation, and support for WTO membership. 
The content of the letter was similar to the package of incentives offered in June 2006. The letter was 




 Colum Lynch and Karen DeYoung, “Iran Seeks Details on Nuclear Offer; Western Countries Say That 
Tehran’s Response is Evasive,” Washington Post, August 6, 2008. 
 
637
 The resolution was passed unanimously. SC Document S/RES/1835 (September 27, 2008).  
638
 “Iran to Enrich Uranium Even if Fuel Supply Guaranteed,” AFP, October 5, 2008. 
 
639
 IAEA BG Document GOV/2008/59 (November 19, 2008). This report followed similar conclusions in 
the two preceding documents: GOV/2008/15 (May 26, 2008) and GOV/2008/38 (September 15, 2008). 
 
640
 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “On Iran, Obama Plans Talk and Some Toughness,” New York Times, 
February 3, 2009. 
 
641




adhere to prior UNSC resolutions without threatening penalties if it did not.642 The next 
month, Washington said it would send envoys to six-party discussions with Iran, which it 
had largely avoided during the Bush administration.643 In early July, despite the turmoil 
surrounding Iran’s disputed presidential election the previous month, Obama repeated an 
offer to engage in direct talks.644  
With the U.S. and Europe pursuing dialogue during this period, China’s role was 
mainly to encourage ongoing efforts. For instance, in November, 2008, Tang Guoqiang, 
the PRC delegate to the UN office in Vienna, noted “important opportunities” for 
“solving the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation.645 In April, 2009, the 
MFA stated that, “China encourages Iran to make active contact with [the E3+3] in a bid 
to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution” to the issue.”646 In mid-June, 
just as the electoral crisis in Tehran was erupting, a Chinese diplomat in New York 
argued that there was a “rare opportunity” to restart negotiations, and that “China always 
believes that resolving this issue through diplomatic means is in the interest of peace and 
                                                 
642
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security in the Middle East and is in the common interest of the international 
community.”647  
Patience by the Western powers, however, had dissipated by mid-July. A joint 
statement issued by the G8 countries following a summit in Italy set a deadline for 
September 15 for Iran to engage in negotiations or face the possibility of increased 
sanctions. Obama asserted that the U.S. was “not going to just wait indefinitely” for Iran 
to respond.648 With Western strategy reverting to a punitive approach, the basis of a 
diplomatic confrontation with China was laid. Unlike prior cases, which were resolved 
relatively quickly, it would take nine months for the P5 to secure an agreement on added 




On June 9, 2010, the UNSC approved Resolution 1929 by a vote of 12 in favor, 
two (Turkey and Brazil) opposed, and one (Lebanon) abstaining. Like the three that had 
preceded it since 2006, the aim of this resolution was to pressure the IRI to suspend 
uranium enrichment activities and comply with IAEA inspection guidelines. Among 
other things, it mandated that Iran not acquire interests in uranium mining abroad; 
proscribed sales to Iran of several types of weapons, including tanks, warships, missiles 
and attack helicopters; authorized cargo inspections, with the consent of the flag state; 
and permitted (though did not require) action against Iranian firms and banks, which 
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191 
provided a legal basis for European states to impose unilateral sanctions.649 In addition, 
the resolution specified 40 firms and one individual that would be subject to financial 
restrictions, including those affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 
national shipping company.650  
China’s UN ambassador, Li Baodong, noted that the PRC had been “earnestly and 
constructively engaged in the consultations” leading up to the vote, and had “worked 
vigorously” to promote measures that were “appropriate, incremental, clearly targeted 
and commensurate with the actual practices of Iran in the nuclear field.”651 Chen Qiufa, 
China’s representative to the IAEA, urged Iran to abide by the resolution and take steps 
to “restore the confidence of the international community” in the peaceful nature of its 
nuclear program.652  
This rhetoric incensed Tehran. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic 
Energy Organization, said that China’s support for Resolution 1929 would “affect its 
standing in the Muslim world.”653  On June 12, a key Iranian parliamentarian threatened 
reverse sanctions on both Russia and China.654 Another legislator referred to China as 
“Washington’s errand boy” and suggested that Tehran reduce Beijing’s clout by limiting 
                                                 
649
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imports.655 How can we explain China’s support for sanctions against a state in which it 




 Hypothesis 1 is that multilateral negotiations and bilateral contacts had proven 
ineffective, opening the way to a punitive response. In this instance, we need to assess the 
progress of the E3+3 and associated international efforts, as well as China’s own pressure 
on Iran to comply with IAEA guidelines. In the fall of 2009, there was a reasonable 
prospect that diplomacy might have been a viable way to change Iran’s position. On 
September 1, Jalili said that, in order to “ease common concerns in the international 
arena,” Iran would present a response to the sextet’s June 2008 incentive proposal.656 At 
the same time, Chinese analysts professed optimism that dialogue might yield results. Ni 
Ruchi, deputy director of the MFA’s Iran Division, told a U.S. official that the June 
electoral violence had left the Iranian regime in a “weakened position” and that, as a 
result, it would be more amenable to seeking a compromise with the E3+3. 
 Iran’s overture led to mixed results. On one hand, the five-page document 
submitted by Tehran to the six averred a “readiness to embark on comprehensive, all-
encompassing and constructive negotiations,” but omitted mention of the core problem of 
uranium enrichment.657 This left the U.S. and the Europeans dissatisfied.658 On the other 
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hand, it did lead to direct talks between the various parties. Specifically, Javier Solana 
was able to arrange a meeting between Iran and representatives of the E3+3 countries for 
October 1 in Geneva. Perhaps seeking to lower expectations, though, Dai Bingguo 
advised Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg on September 29 that “one meeting 
would not be able to resolve all problems,” while also suggesting that the PRC would 
“work in its own way” to convince Iran to abandon uranium enrichment and comply with 
the IAEA. 
 The results of the Geneva meeting were initially encouraging. The main 
achievement was that Iran agreed “in principle” (i.e., without a formal commitment) to 
ship most of its uranium supply to Russia for enrichment, and to allow IAEA staff to 
investigate a recently-disclosed enrichment facility in the city of Qom.659 Obama 
expressed cautious optimism at the outcome, referring to it as a “constructive beginning” 
that must be followed by “constructive action by the Iranian government.”660 Cheng 
Jingye, head of the MFA’s Arms Control Department, said that China “appreciates the 
flexibility shown by all sides,” and that the parties should “push forward the process of 
dialogue.”661 To sustain the momentum, Wen Jiabao, on October 15, reportedly urged 
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Iran’s First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, to cooperate with the multilateral 
effort, and stressed PRC opposition to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. 
 On October 22, a follow-up meeting was held in Vienna, during which Iran again 
agreed “in principle” to the nuclear swap arrangement.662 China was guardedly optimistic, 
noting that “some progress has been achieved in [the] Iran nuclear fuel talks” and that 
Beijing welcomed the “gradual implementation of the consensus” that had been 
reached.663 However, the situation began to deteriorate when Iran missed an October 24 
deadline to formally accept the offer. A U.S. official drew a parallel to the DPRK: 
“There’s every possibility that the Iranian strategy here is to follow the North Korean 
playbook. Drag it out. Reach partial agreements. Find reasons not to ship out the fuel.”664 
In early November, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, issued a response, 
saying that “we have some technical and economic considerations” that would best be 
addressed by establishing a “technical commission.”665 At the end of the month, the 
IAEA’s Board of Governors, including China and Russia, passed a resolution, as it had in 
February 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council.666  
 The next months boded poorly for a settlement. After the IAEA resolution was 
approved, Iran responded by claiming, apparently disingenuously given technical 
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constraints, that it would build ten new enrichment facilities.667 Soon eafter, the U.S. 
reminded Iran of a deadline of December 31 that had been set earlier in the Obama 
Administration for Tehran to follow UNSC resolutions or face additional pressure.668 
Iran’s reaction was to issue an “ultimatum” for the U.S. to agree to a counter-proposal by 
January 31 that would involve a much smaller fuel swap than that proposed in Geneva.669 
After suggesting, in early February, that Tehran might be amenable to the original deal, 
Ahmadinejad reversed course and announced on the 11th that the Natanz facility had 
already begun to enrich uranium to a level of 20%, which Western observers noted had 
no “civilian-use justification,” and put Iran “on the cusp” on a capacity to manufacture 
highly-enriched uranium, used in nuclear warheads.670 This was met almost immediately 
with a critical report from the new IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano.671  
A final flurry of diplomatic activity occurred after the P5 and Germany had come 
to a near consensus on the terms of a fourth resolution in late April. On the 19th, Mottaki 
said that Iran would be willing to discuss anew the terms of a nuclear swap deal, and, 
with Ahmadinejad, set about visiting the capitals of UNSC members.672 On May 7, 
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Mottaki invited Council delegates to a dinner at the Iranian Mission in New York and 
reiterated his message that Iran was open to an agreement. The problem was that the 
overture did not reflect a change in Iran’s underlying position regarding enrichment. 
According to one diplomat, “We literally heard nothing new.”673 One week later, Tehran 
announced that it would increase its capacity at Natanz to purify uranium to a level of 
20%, seemingly confirming suspicions.674 Iran did ultimately agree to a swap agreement 
with Brazil and Turkey in May, but this was discounted by the E3+3 on the grounds that 
it permitted Iran to continue to enrich to higher levels and covered only about half of 
Iran’s uranium stockpile.675  
Despite the lack of progress, China continued to advocate diplomacy during the 
first four months of 2010. In January, Zhang Yesui argued that, “This is not the right time 
or right moment for sanctions, because diplomatic efforts are still going on.”676 In 
February, Yang Jiechi opined that discussion of sanctions might “stand in the way of 
finding a diplomatic solution.”677 A month later, China’s deputy UN ambassador, Liu 
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Zhenmin, posited that the “window for contact and dialogue is not closed,” and that 
“there is still room for diplomatic efforts.”678 In early April, Yang again urged “relevant 
parties to step up diplomatic efforts and show flexibility.”679 On April 20, a day after 
Mottaki announced Iran’s latest effort to avoid sanctions, the MFA said that the “door for 
dialogue and trust” remained open.680  Indeed, a dynamic emerged by which Iranian 
allusions to agreement became pretexts for China’s refusal to discuss of sanctions.681 One 
analysis noted that, “on average, Beijing issued a response statement within four days, 
each time strongly calling for stepped-up diplomacy.”682  
There are two reasons why the failure of multilateral dialogue did not lead 
ineluctably to a change in China’s position on sanctions. First was that Iran never clearly 
stepped over a “red line” and produced highly-enriched uranium or, like North Korea, 
actually carried out a nuclear detonation in defiance of the international community. As 
Xu Jin, a scholar at CASS, points out, this weakened the political and legal basis for 
sanctions.683 Second was that China did not appear to treat the risk that Iran might soon 
acquire nuclear weapons seriously. As the International Crisis Group argued in February,  
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Most Chinese analysts are unconvinced that Iran will possess the ability to enhance 
[uranium] to the level sufficient for building nuclear weapons in the near future despite 
its claims to the contrary.684  
Sanctions, then, were not an attractive alternative to further dialogue, however infeasible 
the latter appeared to be.  
However, Beijing did attempt to use its own influence to persuade Tehran to 
adjust its position.685 In early March, China, along with Russia, dispatched envoys to Iran 
with the purpose of convincing the regime to agree to the fuel-swap plan and accept 
IAEA verification requests. According to a Western diplomat, “the Chinese said they got 
a response from the Iranians to wait a little longer and they will come up with something. 
But they didn’t get anything in the end.”686 This may have informed Liu Zhenmin’s 
remarks at the Security Council on March 4 in which he said that China was committed 
to a “dual-track” strategy, including both incentives and pressure, and urged Tehran to 
remove “doubts” by cooperating with the IAEA. This marked a slight easing of China’s 
position vis-à-vis Iran.687 Later, on April 1, Jalili met with Dai Bingguo and Yang Jiechi 
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in Beijing, with no clear outcome.688  It is possible that this encounter weighed on 
China’s decision later in April to engage in sanctions negotiations, though it is unclear 
whether or how Beijing attempted to influence Jalili or other Iranian officials.  
 In sum, the evidence that a narrowing of alternatives affected China’s shift of 
position on sanctions is mixed. In a bilateral sense, China’s efforts are obscure, though 
might have factored into its endorsement of sanctions in the spring of 2010. Multilaterally, 
there is a significant time lag between the breakdown of E3+3 negotiations in October 
2009 and China’s decision to engage in talks on sanctions in April 2010. A missing factor 
was urgency. Even as it rejected international proposals, Iran did not develop or test 
nuclear weapons. Rather, the link appears to be indirect. That is, Iran’s recalcitrance led 
to broad support for a hardened response, including among the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia 
and others, which, in turn, created rising political pressure on the PRC to alter its position.  
 
Concessions and Risk Reduction  
 
 Hypothesis 2 is that China is more likely to consider punitive measures against its 
partners if the U.S. or other takes step to reduce the risks the PRC incurs from doing so, 
through side-payments, substantive concessions or both. Regarding side-payments, a 
component of U.S. strategy was to persuade China that other Middle Eastern oil and 
natural gas producers would fill any gap left by a cutoff of Iranian energy supplies as a 
result of the fallout of another resolution. A benefit of this approach was that it made 
sense for both Saudi Arabia, which was seeking long-term investment in its oil products 
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given a decline in U.S. purchases,689 and China, which had an incentive to lower its 
dependence on Iran given the political risk attached. Senior U.S. officials Jeffrey Bader 
and Dennis Ross floated the idea of a formal energy guarantee in Beijing in November 
2009, though this did not have an immediate impact on China’s position regarding 
sanctions.690 
 During the winter of 2010, representatives of two Gulf States suggested a 
willingness to enhance bilateral cooperation with China as an incentive for Beijing to 
adopt a tougher policy in the Security Council. In January, the Saudi Deputy Foreign 
Minister claimed that, in a meeting with Yang Jiechi, he had noted Chinese concerns 
about access to reliable energy supplies and indicated the possibility that Saudi Arabia 
might help fill the gap, though no “explicit bargain” was discussed. The next month, the 
Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates, which also advocated new sanctions on 
Iran, said that he had made a similar argument in conversations with Chinese officials, 
but recognized that it would be difficult for China to reduce reliance on the IRI given the 
scale of its interest there. Whatever the veracity of these claims, China likely viewed 
deepening ties with Gulf States as a hedge against Iranian unpredictability.691   
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 The U.S. effort to secure China’s consent through energy assurances was most 
directly observable in the spring. As one Chinese analyst put it, U.S. officials had 
repeatedly told their interlocutors in Beijing that, in the event of a crisis, “the oil that has 
been shipped to China from Iran will be replaced by oil from other countries in the 
Middle East.”692 For instance, during his exchange with Hu on April 12, Obama said that 
the U.S. was “sensitive to China’s energy needs” and would collaborate with the PRC to 
ensure Beijing’s oil supply should it be threatened as a result of sanctions.693 In a press 
conference, Obama further stated that, “Iran is an oil-producing state. I think that, you 
know, a lot of countries around the world have trade relationships with Iran. And we’re 
mindful of that.”694 The exact nature of the guarantee, if any, is unclear. However, 
combined with growing political pressure to act it is possible that this gesture did factor 
into Hu’s risk assessment.  
 Concessions during the negotiating process itself also played a role in finalizing 
an agreement on sanctions. The U.S. circulated a draft among its allies at the beginning of 
March. The substance included several stringent elements. In particular, it sought to 
restrict Tehran’s access to capital markets,695 place embargoes on Iran’s shipping and air 
cargo industries, and toughen measures on foreign insurance of oil imports and exports. 
These proposals were all dropped at the request of Britain, France and Germany, which 
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believed that both China and Russia would oppose them.696 In effect, the U.S. had made 
what Bolton had referred to in 2006 as “preemptive concessions” in order to table a draft 
that would have a stronger chance of approval.   
 When it did engage in substantive talks among the E3+3 states in late March, the 
U.S. recognized that it might have to make further amendments to ensure support. As 
Susan Rice said in an interview on the 31st,  
There’s not one meeting where it’s done, poof. It’s a process of consultation and 
negotiation among the P5 [plus Germany] in the first instance and in very close 
consultation as well with the other elected ten members of the Security Council. This is 
a complex issue with countries having very diverse perspectives and diverse interests 
and it will take tough negotiation to get the strongest possible text.697  
Nevertheless, negotiations did proceed. In the first two weeks of April, diplomats focused 
their attention on the arms embargo, financial restrictions, cargo inspections, the energy 
sector, and the Revolutionary Guards Corps.698 Still wary of agreeing to a fourth 
resolution, China adopted a standoffish posture. One diplomat recorded that, “In general, 
the Chinese ambassador did not want to discuss the specifics of the text,” allowing that 
the PRC had indicated its opposition to energy-related sanctions.699 
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 By April 14, delegates from the E3+3 were holding “intense meetings almost 
daily.”700 On the 16th, the U.S. circulated a new draft that removed any mention of limits 
on investment in Iran’s energy industry, which China had opposed.701 Four days later, Li 
Baodong submitted a list of requested amendments to the draft at a six-party meeting held 
at the Chinese Mission. This was followed by a consultation among the P3 and Germany, 
and then by a meeting between Li and Rice on the 20th.702 It is unclear what changes were 
made, but the outcome was promising to the U.S. On the 22nd, Biden announced that, 
“China will agree to sanctions.”703  
At this point, as discussed above, Iran had begun its final diplomatic push to 
prevent sanctions, which allowed the PRC to seek a pause in deliberations. However, this 
proved temporary as Tehran did not address the core issues raised by the E3+3 regarding 
enrichment. On behalf of the sextet, Clinton said on May 18 that a “strong draft” had 
been agreed upon, “with the cooperation of both Russia and China.”704 Following 
consultations with the elected members of the Security Council, the draft was put to a 
vote on June 9.  
 
 
Political Pressure  
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 Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political dimension of negotiations. 
Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to support punitive action against pariah states if 
the U.S. has made high-level efforts to persuade the PRC to do so. Hypothesis 4 is that a 
shift in China’s posture in favor of multilateral pressure can be attributed to a change in 
Russia’s position in the same direction. Hypothesis 5 is that broad regional support for 
Western-led plans to use instruments of coercion in the UNSC will render Beijing more 
likely to lend its support to such efforts. Each of these propositions is considered in turn.  
 
 The U.S.  
 
 The Obama Administration had entered office in January 2009 hoping to make 
progress on the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and incentives, a strategy towards 
which the PRC posed no objections. However, as Suzanne Maloney points out, pressure 
on the White House to toughen its stance had been growing since the crackdown on 
protesters during Iran’s presidential election in June 2009.705 Iran’s noncommittal 
response to the Geneva offer further dampened hopes regarding dialogue, and the 
administration began to change course. On November 15, Obama said that the incentive-
based approach was “running out of time.”706 A month later, even before the expiration of 
Washington’s year-end deadline, Hillary Clinton lamented that “our outreach has 
produced very little in terms of any kind of positive response from the Iranians,” and said 
that “additional pressure” would be necessary.707  
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 During the fall of 2009, U.S. officials stressed the need for cooperation on Iran in 
a series of exchanges with Chinese counterparts. In October, Kurt Campbell, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia, said during a trip to Beijing that, “If we are going to 
make real progress on sending a consolidated message to Iran, we are going to need the 
support of China.”708 A month later, Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader, warned Chinese 
interlocutors that Israel viewed Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential issue,” implying 
that Chinese resistance to pressure could elevate the risks of an Israeli bombardment.709 
On December 9, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns reiterated 
the Israel argument in a meeting with Wang Jiarui, director of the CCP’s International 
Liaison Department, and said that U.S. patience was “nearly exhausted.” 
 The diplomatic offensive continued in early 2010. On January 10, Clinton 
circulated a “diplomatic policy narrative” to State Department officials containing the 
elements of the U.S. argument. The essence was that Iran had resisted IAEA and E3+3 
requests and proposals, had defied prior UNSC resolutions and, by doing so, posed a 
challenge both for regional stability and the credibility of international regimes. On 
January 28, Clinton met with Yang and reportedly conveyed this argument.710 The next 
day, in a press conference, she elaborated on the reasons the PRC ought to support 
sanctions. After praising China’s cooperation on the diplomatic front, she said:   
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Now, as we move away from the engagement track, which has not produced the results 
that some had hoped for, and move towards the pressure and sanctions track, China will 
be under a lot of pressure to recognize the destabilizing impact that a nuclear-armed 
Iran would have in the Gulf, from which they receive a significant percentage of their 
oil supply, that it will produce an arms race; other countries will feel the necessity to 
seek their own nuclear weapons programs; Israel will feel an existential threat to its 
very existence. All of that is incredibly dangerous.711 
In early February, a U.S. official with experience in talks with China said that the main 
U.S. points were twofold: first, the risk of an Israeli strike and, second, negative 
ramifications for the NPT if Iran were permitted to develop nuclear weapons.712 
 Despite these arguments, the U.S. was unable to convince the PRC to revise its 
position during the winter of 2010. One reason appears to be “assertiveness” in Chinese 
foreign policy, driven by a hardening nationalism at the domestic level, which made 
Beijing less amenable to pressure.713 More discretely, though, the state of U.S.-China 
relations was hampered by controversies surrounding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the visit 
of the Dalai Lama to the U.S., and alleged cyberattacks on Google.  
However, a visit to Beijing in early March by Bader and Deputy Secretary of 
State James Steinberg resulted in an improvement in relations. According to one observer, 
the Chinese “recognized that they had overreached in their threats, expectations, 
calculations and demands,” and reaffirmed the primary importance of pacific U.S.-China 
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ties.714 Liu Zhenmin’s Security Council speech promoting the “dual track” strategy 
followed a day later, suggesting that political calculations may have played a role in the 
modification of China’s position.715 
 The U.S. effort reached its apogee in April, when Obama urged Hu on two 
occasions to support a new sanctions resolution. The first came on April 1 during an 
hour-long conversation in which Obama “underscored the importance of working 
together to ensure that Iran lives up to its international obligations.”716 A U.S. deferral on 
a decision on whether to label China as a “currency manipulator” was perhaps meant as 
an additional incentive.717 The second, more decisive, exchange occurred on the sidelines 
of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12. In it, Obama sketched the 
details of a proposed resolution and made assurances to Hu regarding the security of 
China’s oil supply in the event of a crisis in Iran.718 In response, Hu said that, while 
preferring dialogue, China would maintain “coordination” with the U.S. in the Security 
Council.719 The next day, PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai avowed that the 
                                                 
714
 Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip, “U.S.-China Relations: The Honeymoon Ends,” Comparative 
Connections 12 (2010), 23-36. Available online, at: http://csis.org/files/publication/1001q.pdf.  
 
715
 As noted above though, there is evidence that Liu’s speech was also attributable to the failed Sino-
Russian demarche in Tehran regarding the nuclear program.  
 
716
 Readout of President Obama’s Call with President Hu of China,” US Fed News, April 3, 2010.  
 
717
 In particular, on April 3, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner delayed a report on China’s currency 
practices. Andrew Jacobs and Mark Landler, “Hints of a Thaw Between China and U.S.,” International 
Herald Tribune, April 3, 2010.  
 
718
 This communication was part of a larger strategy to minimize China’s perceived risks, and is discussed 
in the following section. David Sanger and Mark Landler, “China Agrees to Work with U.S. on Iran 
Sanctions,” International Herald Tribune, April 14, 2010. Afterwards, Bader told the press that “the two 
presidents agreed that the two delegations should work on a sanctions resolution in New York.” Mary Beth 
Sheridan and Scott Wilson, “Obama Presses for Unity on Iran,” Washington Post, April 13, 2010. 
 
719
 “Hu Says China Hopes to Resolve Iranian Nuclear Issue Through Dialogue, Negotiations,” Xinhua, 




PRC would consider “new ideas,” and, on the 14th, diplomats in New York had begun 
discussion on the substance of a fourth resolution.720   
 It is probable that the U.S. campaign had an effect on China’s assessment of the 
political costs and benefits of supporting further sanctions. The issue was prioritized at 
the highest levels, leaving the PRC with no doubt of the strategic significance of the 
matter to the U.S. Further, Hu would have considered not only the ramifications for Iran, 
but for the tone of the broader U.S.-China relationship. For instance, cooperation 
arguably helped to lay a foundation for a successful second round of the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue, held in Beijing on May 24-5. Some 26 agreements were reached, 
covering nuclear security, counterterrorism, energy and a host of other matters.721 As 
John Garver writes,  
“…cooperating with the United States [on Iran] served China’s interest of maintaining 
comity in its relations with the United States and, even more, of encouraging the United 
States to view China as a strategic partner.”722  




 From the late fall of 2009, Russia had adopted a position on Iran in between the 
West, which sought additional sanctions, and China, which opposed them. Unlike the 
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PRC, Russia was not dependent on Iran for either oil or natural gas supplies.723 Moreover, 
a number of factors complicated Russia’s ties with Iran. These included the territorial 
division of the Caspian Sea, disagreements about Russia’s role in developing in the 
Bushehr reactor, delays in Russian sales of S-300 missile-defense systems, anti-Russian 
public sentiment in Iran, and other matters.724 In a broader sense, cooperation on Iran was 
linked to the “resetting” of Washington’s relations with Moscow that originated in the 
first months of the Obama Administration. Moscow conceivably believed that, by 
agreeing to some form of sanctions, however diluted, it might be better able to seek 
various concessions from the U.S., including WTO admission, elevated U.S. investment 
in Russia, and the ratification of a new strategic arms reduction treaty.725 
However, other factors pushed in the opposite direction. In contrast to North 
Korea, Iran played a central role in Russia’s strategic calculations. Bilateral trade reached 
$3 Billion in 2009, Russia served as a major weapons supplier to the IRI, and Iran has 
been viewed in Moscow as a counterweight to U.S. influence in the region. As one 
analyst concluded, Russia “has too much at stake in its relationship with Iran to…risk a 
tougher approach,” preferring instead that the U.S. “play the role of bad guy.”726 In 
addition, like China, Russia was skeptical of Western assertions that Iran was pursuing 
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nuclear arms and, even if it were, “Moscow does not see Russia as being Iran’s target.”727 
Finally, Russia could not easily ignore China’s position, given the scale of trade, energy, 
and strategic relations between the two actors, symbolized by Vice President Xi Jinping’s 
visit to Russia in late March.728 The result of these opposing factors a middle course 
between the more assertive West and the more cautious China.   
 A schism between Russia and China first appeared in November, 2009, following 
the collapse of E3+3 negotiations. Medvedev stated on November 15 that, in case 
dialogue failed, “the other options [i.e. sanctions] remain on the table, in order to move 
the process in a different direction.”729 For its part, the PRC did not allude to the possible 
necessity of sanctions until early March. In late November, Russia decided to support an 
IAEA resolution on Iran prior to the PRC, prompting one analysis to conclude that China 
supported the decision rather than be isolated among the IAEA Board of Governors.730 
On December 1, following the announcement that Iran planned to build ten new 
enrichment facilities, a Russian diplomat said that “this declaration does not leave us 
optimistic. Even without it, negotiations are difficult with Iran.”731 A Chinese official, 
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though, said that “all parties should step up diplomatic efforts,” without betraying 
pessimism about a settlement.732 
 By early February, the U.S. had concluded that Russia would likely support a 
sanctions resolution. One U.S. diplomat suggested that the Russians “have been pushed 
to this extreme by the behavior of the Iranians,” while observing that “China is going its 
own way.”733 On March 3, just as Steinberg and Bader were concluding their trip to 
Beijing, Russia’s UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, told the press that the most recent 
IAEA report on Iran (issued on February 18) caused Moscow to be “very concerned,” 
and that “this raises worries about the nature of the [Iranian] nuclear program.”734 It is 
plausible that Churkin’s remark was influenced by the same failed mission to Tehran 
which, as mentioned above, apparently led to Liu’s March 4 speech advocating a “dual-
track” strategy. Whether Russia’s tilt away from dialogue had any impact on China’s 
position independent of that mission and the concurrent high-level U.S. visit to Beijing, 
however, remains unclear.  
 A link between Russian and Chinese attitudes is suggested in two additional 
instances. First, on March 19, in a meeting with Clinton, Medvedev remarked that 
sanctions “rarely work, but there may appear a situation when they may end up being 
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inevitable.”735 The next week, the PRC agreed to participate in talks among the E3+3 in 
which an agreement was reached to have additional discussions on the terms of a new 
resolution, which was the farthest China had gone thus far towards consent.736 Second, on 
April 8, Medvedev met with Obama to sign the New START treaty, and made a similar 
comment. Specifically, he said that Russia favored “smart” sanctions, which he explained 
“should be able to motivate certain parties to behave properly.”737 That Russia had 
essentially agreed to sanctions meant that China was now isolated among the P5, and thus 
more vulnerable to U.S. influence when Hu met with Obama four days later. U.S. and 
Russian pressure operated in tandem, even as Russia held reservations on exactly how 
stringent a new resolution should be.  
 
 Regional Stakeholders  
 
 Aside from Russia, it is likely that China took the positions of several other states 
with major interests in the outcome of negotiations into account. As regards the EU 
members of the E3+3, France and Germany merit attention.738 France, despite an 
aggregate trade balance of $3.4 Billion with Iran in 2009, took an assertive position with 
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regard to sanctions.739 On December 11, after the Geneva talks had broken down, 
France’s UN ambassador, Gerard Araud, said that “Iran has never entered into a 
negotiation” and that “there is no longer any reason to wait” for further sanctions.740 A 
month later, France affirmed its commitment to a resolution during its Strategic Dialogue 
with the U.S. in Paris. In late April, as negotiations in New York were underway, 
Sarkozy paid a state visit to Beijing and pressed Hu on China’s support for sanctions. 
Sarkozy’s message was that, “If dialogue does not work, then we can only use 
sanctions.”741 China agreed to a compromise draft less than three weeks later.742  
 From the U.S. perspective, Germany was potentially a more nettlesome actor with 
regard to punitive action towards Iran. The reason was a formidable German business 
lobby with stakes in the Iranian economy; bilateral trade neared $6 Billion in 2009.743 
Nevertheless, like its French and American partners, Germany found itself cornered by 
Iranian intransigence. On January 15, in a meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Merkel stated that, “If Iran’s reactions don’t change, we will help work on 
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comprehensive sanctions.”744 Two months later, she observed that Tehran had rejected 
the sextet’s “constructive offers” and that, “We are about to enter the stage where 
sanctions should be taken against Iran.”745 On April 1, the same day that Obama spoke 
with Hu, Merkel addressed Iran in a conversation with Wen Jiabao,746 while on the 13th 
she said that she was “very hopeful” that ongoing discussions at the Security Council 
would succeed, noting that “China is now part of the process.”747 Hence, unlike during 
the 2002-2003 debate over Iraq, China was faced with a united front among the U.S., 
France and Germany.  
 Within the region itself, two states played a central role: Saudi Arabia and Israel. 
Saudi Arabia was of special importance to the PRC, serving as the latter’s largest oil 
supplier.748 Riyadh entered the political scene in January 2010, as the U.S. was beginning 
to canvass support for a fourth resolution. At the request of the U.S., Saudi Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal reportedly told Yang Jiechi on January 17 that the PRC would 
have to collaborate more closely with other states to prevent Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons, which Saudi Arabia viewed as a major threat. On February 11, U.S. 
diplomats wrote that Saudi King Abdullah “assesses that sanctions could help to weaken 
the [Iranian] government, but only if they are strong and sustained.” On March 12, 
Defense Secretary Gates met with Saudi officials, with a focus “mainly on China.” Asked 
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if Saudi Arabia would be willing to pressure Beijing, Gates responded that, “I have a 
sense that there’s a willingness to do that.”749 Three days later, Saud added, albeit 
obliquely, to his previous remonstrations by saying that China “is perfectly aware of the 
scope of its responsibilities and its obligations.”750 
 Israel’s influence in the debate over Iran sanctions was twofold. First was the 
threat of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in the event that the 
international community could not agree on what Tel Aviv frequently described as 
“crippling” sanctions. For instance, in October 2009, Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S, 
Michael Oren, said that “Israel is supportive of efforts to prepare a package of crippling 
sanctions that may prove more efficacious in bringing about a modification of Iranian 
behavior [than dialogue alone].” Oren further asserted that “all options” remained on the 
table, including the use of force.751  As noted above, part of the U.S. argument to China 
was precisely that not cooperating in the Security Council could prompt Israeli 
aggression. However, PRC analysts were not convinced by this contention, concluding 
instead that the U.S. would likely restrain its ally on the grounds that Washington 
doubted that a military strike would be effective.752  
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 Second was an Israeli effort to alter China’s threat perceptions through 
argumentation and intelligence-sharing. Notably, in late February a delegation led by 
Governor of the Bank of Israel Stanley Fischer and Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe 
Ya’alon visited Beijing and met with senior leaders, including Dai Bingguo.753 According 
to an Israeli report, Fischer attempted to make the case that a nuclear-armed Iran would 
result in a spike in global oil prices, harming the PRC’s economic interests, while 
Ya’alon provided “the full intelligence picture available to Israel,” which was likely 
meant to counter Chinese doubts about Iran’s ability to manufacture a nuclear 
warhead.754 The perception in Tel Aviv was that Beijing was receptive to the argument, 
and that the question was not whether China would veto a resolution, but whether it 
would vote in favor or abstain.755 In late March, Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin 
relayed additional information on Iran’s nuclear programs to counterparts in Beijing.756 
 Though it is possible that Israel had coordinated the timing or substance of these 
visits with the U.S., there were several benefits in having Israeli, rather than U.S., 
officials make the argument. First, the U.S. had accumulated a trust deficit in the wake of 
its erroneous conclusion in 2002 that Iraq possessed WMD capabilities. Second, credible 
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or not, U.S. reports on Iran had been cautious, echoing China’s own skepticism. A 
December, 2007, National Intelligence Estimate found that Iran had abandoned its 
nuclear weapons program in 2003, dampening the U.S. sanctions drive.757 In February, 
2010, the Director of National Intelligence stated that the IRI was “keeping the option 
open,” but that “We do not know…if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear 
weapons.”758 Third, Israel added the view of a regional stakeholder with major 
commercial ties to the PRC, especially in the arms industry.759 This complemented the 




In the absence of an imminent nuclear threat from Iran, the floundering of 
negotiations after Geneva did not lead Beijing to conclude that additional sanctions were 
a prudent next step. What intervened were the conviction of a variety of states, including 
the U.S., the EU powers, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, that another resolution was 
needed, and the willingness of several of these actors to intercede directly with their 
interlocutors in Beijing.  As Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt argued in an editorial in March, 
the best strategy for the U.S. would be to gather the “widest international consensus 
possible” before making a “beeline to Beijing.”760 It appears that patience and 
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coordination were virtues for the U.S. By early April, the political scales for Beijing had 





 Hillary Clinton’s announcement that the P5 and Germany had settled on the text 
of a draft resolution concerning Iran came just one day after Brazil and Turkey 
announced a separate plan to swap uranium for nuclear fuel.761 Iran’s engagement with 
these two countries, even if it fell far short of the demands of the IAEA, the U.S., Russia, 
and others,762 could have provided the PRC yet another opportunity to delay agreement in 
the Security Council under the argument that room for diplomacy still existed. Indeed, 
China could have used its influence to secure “no” votes from Lebanon and Uganda, 
which were elected members of the Council, and used such a coalition to protect its 
erstwhile partner, Iran. Yet it did not. Instead, it chose to collaborate with the U.S. and 
others to pass a resolution that, while weakened from its original form, did result in an 
expanded arms embargo and sanctions on several firms operated by the Revolutionary 
Guard, among other provisions.  
 The explanation for China’s behavior rests on five factors, as sketched in Table 14. 
The breakdown of productive negotiations between Iran and the international community 
in late 2009 did not have an immediate impact on China’s position, in contrast to the way 
in which North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations resulted in a quick adaptation of 
China’s attitude on sanctions in that case. Although others options had narrowed, the use 
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of pressure did not become a preferred alternative. In a sense, Tehran had not crossed a 
“red line” as Pyongyang had, and Beijing was content to hew to a “wait and see” 
approach. The changing structure of alternate options did, however, influence the threat 
perceptions of a number of other actors with whom the PRC sought positive relations. 
The effect of this is covered below. In short, Hypothesis 1 cannot be directly established.   
A second issue-centered explanation concerns risk reduction. In this case, the U.S. 
took steps aimed at reducing the potential risk that China would incur by agreeing to 
sanctions. Alleged “guarantees” by the U.S. or certain Arab states to protect China’s oil 
supply in the event of Iranian retribution are difficult to substantiate, though may have 
played at least a marginal role. More concretely, as it had done in the previous three 
sanctions resolutions, the U.S. was willing to carve out exemptions in order to assuage 
Chinese concerns about the effects on its investments in the oil and gas sector. In the end, 
the resolution did not touch Iran’s energy industry.763   
 
 
Table 14: Summary of Findings 
 
Hypothesis Outcome Explanation 
1 Narrowing of alternatives 
leads punitive action to 
be an attractive option. 
Not 
Directly  
China opposed a fourth resolution for several 
months after E3+3 negotiations had stalled, 
though fewer alternatives meant greater 
political support for sanctions. Role of 
bilateral pressure unclear.   
2 Steps taken to reduce 
risks associated with 
cooperation should 
Yes Role of side payments is obscure, though 
possibly affected risk calculations. Text 
concessions ameliorated concerns about 
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generate consent.  energy sector.  
3 Approval is more likely 
given high-level political 
pressure by the U.S.  
Yes PRC position began to change after Bader-
Ross visit, further changed soon after two 
Hu-Obama encounters.  
4 A shift in Russia’s 
position towards 
approval prompts a shift 
in China’s position. 
Yes Russia’s support for “smart” sanctions in late 
March/early April left China isolated among 
the P5.   
5 China’s consent is more 
likely with consensus by 
regional stakeholders for 
punitive action.  
Yes EU members of the contact group 
coordinated with the U.S. and put occasional 
pressure on China, as did Israel. Saudi Arabia 






 Beyond these factors, China also had an interest in maintaining positive political 
ties with its co-negotiators. Iran’s unwillingness to suspend uranium enrichment, 
cooperate with the IAEA, or agree to a fuel swap agreement developed by Russia and 
France changed the political costs of Chinese resistance to an agreement. This suggests 
an explanatory role for Hypotheses 3 through 5. On several occasions, urged China to 
revise its position. The Obama-Hu meeting in mid-April 2010 was the apogee of this 
initiative and was associated with a relaxation of China’s opposition to additional 
sanctions. Russia had not been as strong an advocate of diplomacy as the PRC, and its 
cooperation with the U.S. meant that China would have been forced to cast a solo veto, 
which it was loathe to do on a case as important to the U.S. and others as this one was. 
Several other important actors not only favored sanctions, but made direct intercessions 
with Beijing. In particular, Israel used argumentation and information in attempt to revise 
China’s views of the risks of not adopting a more assertive approach. These efforts were 
mutually-reinforcing in the sense that they compounded the political costs of delay.  






 At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 14, 2010, just 
after the PRC had joined in substantive negotiations on a new Iran resolution, Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns said that, “I think we and the 
Chinese agree that we need to send a strong message to Iran.” John McCain responded 
that he was skeptical, as the Chinese (and the Russians) had been “playing rope-a-dope 
with us now for over a year.”764 The case of Iran is instructive because it shows that 
international cooperation against a state in which at least one negotiator has vested 
interests is possible even without a major shock on the order of North Korea. However, 
the case suggests that a broad political campaign is necessary and, even then, concessions 
may still have to be made to persuade the potential holdout. Absent a major external 
threat or intensive pressure, cooperation is far more difficult. The next chapter illustrates 
this point with reference to Darfur.  
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Deploying to Darfur: 




On July 31, 2007, the Security Council authorized an African Union/UN Hybrid 
Operation (UNAMID) to deploy to the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan. This force, with 
an eventual troop strength reaching nearly 20,000, was intended to complement ongoing 
peace talks brokered by the UN and the African Union (AU).765 For the previous 11 
months, the U.S., China, delegates of the AU and the UN Secretary-General, among 
others, had sought Sudan’s consent for this mission. Khartoum resisted because of 
concerns that a UN body might act as a “posse” to round up leaders suspected of war 
crimes. As part of the international effort, the U.S. and Britain brandished the threat of a 
sanctions resolution on several occasions. However, no draft was tabled, and no vote took 
place.  
Though it had acquiesced to an arms embargo in 2004, China opposed Western 
calls for additional measures in 2007.766  At face value, this represents Beijing’s 
judgment that sanctions would undermine stability.  He Wenping, director of African 
studies at CASS, writes that sanctions would harm Sudan’s development, and thus only 
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 As noted in Chapter 1 and discussed below, the UN had authorized an arms embargo on Darfur in 2004 
and broadened it in 2005. Moreover, the U.S. did enact unilateral sanctions in May, 2007, though to little 
effect given its minimal economic relationship with Sudan. The present analysis is focused on unrealized 




compound instability.767 Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at SIIS, holds a similar view, 
arguing that the “responsibility of the international community is to alleviate suffering, 
not to add to it.”768 Colin Keating, a former New Zealand diplomat and expert on 
Security Council politics, notes that the PRC has a “genuine fear that sanctions could 
cause a collapse of the country,” preferring quiet dialogue to overt pressure.769  
Indeed, for several reasons, stability in Darfur is in China’s material interest. First 
is the PRC’s reliance on Sudan as a source of oil. Oil exports to China rose from $1.8 
Billion in 2006 to $4.1 Billion in 2007, with Sudan ranking as China’s fifth-largest 
supplier, and second-largest in Africa, after Angola. Second, China is a majority 
shareholder in two of Sudan’s largest oil consortiums, with stakes in fields in Darfur 
among other investments.770 Third, according to the U.S., Sudan accounted for 7% of the 
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PRC’s overseas arms sales between 2003 and 2007, second only to Pakistan.771 Fourth, 
China also holds growing interests in exploring oil reserves in Chad, which sits just to the 
west of Darfur and has been affected by refugee flows from Sudan.772 Finally, the conflict 
in Darfur threatens not only economic interests, but also the safety of Chinese workers in 
the area.773 As one Chinese diplomat has said, Beijing does not “want Sudan to turn into 
Somalia.”774  
 The puzzle is that China faced a similar dilemma on both North Korea and Iran, 
but ultimately supported sanctions. In both of those cases, China’s overriding problem 
was also that coercion might disrupt stability. However, for the reasons suggested in 
chapters 3 and 4, it found common ground with the U.S.  What makes Darfur any 
different? What can explain the absence of an agreement between China and the U.S.?   
 This chapter provides an explanation, based on five reasons. First is that China 
was able to point to two feasible alternatives: Sudan-UN-AU dialogue, and productive 
contacts between the Chinese and Sudanese governments. Though it delayed, Sudan did 
not close the door on either of these processes. Second, the U.S. did not offer China a 
draft that would have allayed its concerns. Rather, the U.S. found it more useful simply to 
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allude to the possibility of sanctions. Third, the U.S. needed Beijing’s help in placing 
bilateral pressure on Khartoum. As a result, it did not emphasize sanctions in its 
interactions with Beijing. Fourth, Russia was opposed to coercion, and would have 
provided a second veto on any vote. Finally, regional stakeholders, including Egypt, 
South Africa, and the AU itself, opposed international pressure. Combined, the political 
risks for Beijing to reject sanctions were minimal.  
 This argument proceeds in five sections. The first provides a background of how 
the UNSC handled the Darfur issue through the end of 2006, emphasizing China’s 
concerns about the use of pressure on Khartoum. The second describes the “non-
outcome” to be explained, which is Beijing’s opposition to sanctions during the spring 
and early summer of 2007. The third presents the argument that multilateral dialogue and 
China’s use of bilateral influence had yielded results, diminishing the necessity of 
sanctions. The fourth explains why the U.S. and its partners chose not to engage in 
substantive, consensus-oriented talks on a resolution. The fifth covers U.S., Russian, and 
regional attitudes towards punitive measures and argues that the PRC faced no substantial 
pressure to revise its position. The conclusion summarizes the argument and states the 




 Authorization of UNAMID, in July 2007, was one milestone in the broader 
international effort to address ethnic conflict in Darfur. A decades-long contest for land, 
water and other scarce resources between black farmers and Arab-identified herdsman 
erupted into large-sale violence in early 2003, pitting rebel groups, such as the Sudan 
Liberation Movement, against Arab militias collectively known as the Janjaweed. The 
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latter were supported by the government in Khartoum, including through arms supply and 
air raids. By 2004, some 200,000 had been killed, another 200,000 had fled to Chad, and 
2.5 million had been internally displaced.775 The U.S., Britain and others were 
preoccupied with negotiating an end to the separate, North-South civil war, and Darfur 
did not gain much external attention until the spring of 2004.776 In April, a ceasefire was 
signed in N’Djamena, Chad, but failed to take hold on the ground.  
 With violence left unabated, the U.S. and its partners sought to draft a resolution 
that would have imposed sanctions on Khartoum if it did not halt its attacks in Darfur and 
disarm the Janjaweed.777 Supported by Pakistan, the Arab League and other 
representatives of the developing world, China opposed a punitive approach and worked 
to dilute the language of a PRST in May,778 as well as a resolution in July that referred 
only to the possibility of “further actions.”779 The latter decision did enact a ban on arms 
sales to “all non-governmental entities and individuals” operating in Darfur, but did not 
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establish any mechanism to monitor or enforce compliance.780  Even then, China only 
abstained, with Wang Guangya arguing to a New York Times reporter that sanctions 
would be counterproductive. As Wang said, “You cannot alienate the Sudan government. 
Without them, the U.N. [mediation] mission will fail.”781 
 
Table 15: Key Security Council Decisions on Darfur, 2004-7 
 
Date Res. # Purpose China’s 
Vote 
July 30, 2004 1556 Imposed an arms embargo against non-
government actors, welcomed AU mission.  
Abstention  
(13-0-2) 
Sept. 18, 2005 1564 Threatened oil sanctions, opened human 




March 24, 2005 1590 Established UNMIS, requested UNSG to 




March 29, 2005 1591 Established sanctions committee, widened 




March 31, 2005 1593 Referred situation in Darfur to the ICC. Abstention  
(11-0-4) 
April 25, 2006 1672 Imposed travel ban and financial restrictions 
on four individuals.  
Abstention  
(12-0-3) 
May 16, 2006 1679 Endorsed AU decision on need for steps to 





1706 Expanded mandate of UNMIS to include 
deployment to Darfur.  
Abstention  
(12-0-3) 
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 Although the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate over the summer of 
2004,782 a small contingent of AU observers had been allowed into the region to monitor 
the ceasefire. In September, the Council passed another resolution, calling for a “rapid 
expansion” of the AU observer force in order to “protect the welfare of the people of 
Darfur.”783 At the insistence of the U.S., the text also warned Khartoum that it would face 
sanctions on its petroleum sector, among other measures, if it did not take steps to disarm 
the militias.784 China again abstained in order to signal its ambivalence, as did Russia, 
Algeria and Pakistan. In his explanation, Wang said that he would not veto the draft on 
account of its positive references to the AU effort, but would not cast an affirmative vote 
either, since threatening language would “send the wrong signal and make negotiations 
more difficult.”785   
 The situation in Darfur continued to worsen in late 2004, with repeated ceasefire 
violations by both the government-backed Janjaweed and the rebel groups.786 However, 
the initial AU mission had grown to a force of some 3,000 peacekeepers with a mandate 
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to protect civilians and, by mid-2005, had evolved into a force of some 7,000. The issue 
was that the AU operation faced impediments on funding, logistical expertise, 
insufficient assets such as helicopters, and other constraints.787 In March, cooperating 
with the UN, the U.S. and the EU, the AU determined that AMIS had achieved some 
success, but that, due to various limitations, it was “not fully effective and needs to give 
greater priority to creating a secure environment.”788 Soon after, the UNSC authorized a 
PKO (the UN Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS) to monitor the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement on the North-South dispute that had been reached in January, and asked that 
this organization “liaise and coordinate at all levels” with the AU effort.789 
 In conjunction with the PKO resolution, the U.S. and Britain tabled a draft that 
would add pressure on Sudan. Specifically, the draft extended the existing arms embargo 
to include the Sudanese government, created a committee and a Panel of Experts to 
monitor compliance, and authorized travel and financial restrictions on individuals 
deemed by the Council to have impeded the peace process.790 However, sanctions on 
Sudan’s oil industry were omitted, reportedly to avert a Chinese veto.791 In a slight 
modification of his earlier remarks regarding sanctions, Wang argued that, in order to 
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 SC Document S/RES/1590 (March 24, 2005). The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to 
report on ways in which UNMIS could provide “appropriate assistance” to AMIS II, “including logistical 
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achieve progress on the political front, “it is necessary to keep appropriate pressure on the 
parties.” Yet he also asserted that China had asked for “major amendments to the text” 
and, since these were not accepted, there was no choice but to abstain.792 Despite Wang’s 
remarks, an MFA spokesman stated that, “We don’t support sanctions or constant 
pressure. It’s no good for a peaceful resolution to the issue.”793    
 Over the next year, the international community pursued a dual-track approach to 
Darfur that combined coercion with dialogue. The first track, promoted by the U.S. and 
its European allies, focused on identifying individual “peace spoilers” that would be 
subjected to sanctions. In January 2006, the Panel of Experts identified 17 potential 
targets, including senior officials of the Sudanese government.794 Washington ultimately 
proposed measures on only four individuals, including one Sudanese Air Force officer, a 
Janjaweed leader, and two rebel commanders, all of whom were charged with violating 
the ceasefire agreement.795 China again abstained, with Wang protesting that the vote had 
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 According to John Bolton, the list was narrowed down at the behest of China, which “was defending its 
oil interests [in Sudan] by protecting Sudan’s government.” Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 352. The 
Sudanese officer was Maj. Gen. Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, the senior air force commander with 
responsibility for Darfur. That an actual resolution was needed to list individuals marked a departure from 
both the North Korean and Iranian cases, in which the relevant sanctions committees themselves were 





occurred “before a number of specific details could be clarified and convincing evidence 
established.”796 
 In justifying his abstention, Wang was also concerned that sanctions might disrupt 
the second track, namely ongoing peace negotiations taking place in Abuja, Nigeria.797 
The result of this effort, which was brokered by the AU, was the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA). Finalized on May 5, 2006, the DPA stipulated that parties would agree to a 
power-sharing arrangement and demobilize forces in Darfur. The problem was that only 
one of several rebel leaders signed this document, and the conflict itself continued to 
escalate.798 Compounding the matter was that the AU had not taken concrete steps 
towards its stated goal of incorporating AMIS into a larger, better-funded mission 
operated by the UN.799 A main reason for the AU’s reluctance was that it was under 
pressure from Khartoum, which opposed a UN force in Darfur due to the belief that such 
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a body might be employed as a “posse” to execute ICC arrest warrants against President 
Omar al-Bashir and others.800  
 However, several other factors militated in the direction of a transition from an 
AU to a UN-backed PKO. First was the growing threat to regional security posed by the 
conflict, which had begun to spread west into Chad.801 Second was the continuing 
violence in Darfur, despite the DPA. Following through on threats to attack rebel groups 
that had not signed the DPA, Khartoum launched a major offensive in August, leading 
one analysis to conclude that “the DPA is all but dead,” and that an effective response 
could come only “through [a] full UN deployment.”802 Third was the persistent limitation 
on the AU to conduct an effective operation, given the constraints described above and 
the deterioration of the conflict. Fourth, AMIS had been subsidized by Western 
governments that supported a transition to a UN operation, which provided leverage to 
encourage the AU to follow suit.803 These considerations set the stage for a push by the 
Council for a deployment in Darfur.  
 On August 31, 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1706, which 
expanded the mandate of UNMIS to include Darfur. The plan envisaged a force of 20,600 
that would assume the mantle from the AU when AMIS’s mandate expired on December 
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31. The new PKO would be charged with monitoring the 2004 ceasefire, among other 
things, and authorized to use force to defend UN personnel and protect civilians, as well 
as to seize items found to be in violation of the arms embargo. Breaking with the norm 
that PKO mandates require host government consent, the text said that the UN “invites” 
(but does not require) Khartoum’s approval.804 China affirmed its support for a transition 
to a UN operation, but abstained on the vote due to concerns about the ambiguous 
consent provision.805 
 By September there was a “consensus” in the Council that Sudan’s approval 
would, in fact, be required prior to deployment.806  On September 11, Kofi Annan said 
that the “tragedy in Darfur has reached a critical moment” and urged Bashir to grant 
consent.807 Initial progress was made in early October, when Sudan agreed to a “light 
support package” (LSP) of about 200 UN advisers to assist AMIS. On November 16, a 
UN-AU-Sudan summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, resulted in a more detailed formula, 
consisting of three phases: first, implementation of the LSP; second, a “heavy support 
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package” (HSP) that would augment AMIS with 2,250 military personnel, 721 police, 
and 1,135 civilian staff; and, third, a “hybrid” PKO of some 20,000 whose leadership 
would be jointly approved by both institutions. The phased deployment was meant to 
assuage Khartoum’s fears about a UN presence in Darfur, and to accomplish the goals set 
out in Resolution 1706.808 
 However, wary of obfuscation by Khartoum, the U.S. began to increase pressure 
on Bashir in late 2006. On November 20, Andrew Natsios, who had been appointed as 
U.S. special envoy for Darfur in September, hinted that the U.S. would not permit endless 
implementation delays. Specifically, he announced that Washington must “see a change” 
by year’s end, or else it would shift to an unspecified, presumably coercive, “Plan B.”809 
The next month, Natsios made similar allusions in meetings with Sudanese officials, in 
which he pressed Khartoum to “accept in writing” the third phase of the deployment.810 
Meanwhile, on December 19, the Security Council approved a PRST that called for the 
Addis Ababa plan to be carried out “without delay.”811  
 Nevertheless, the first quarter of 2007 did not bode well for implementation. In 
January, Ban Ki-moon, the new Secretary-General asked that Bashir confirm acceptance 
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of the HSP. This approval was not granted. By late February, Ban was able to report little 
to the Security Council aside from an agreement on the color of the uniforms to be worn 
by UN personnel.812 On March 6, Bashir did reply, with a list of technical objections on 
the structure of the HSP.813 This letter also raised concerns about whether the UN or the 
AU would have operational control over UN personnel in Darfur.814 Making matters 
worse, on March 9, the UN Human Rights Council received a report from investigators in 
Sudan finding, among other things, that the “killing of civilians remains widespread,” 
disarmament of the Janjaweed had “yet to occur,” and that, “as violations and abuses 
continue unabated, a climate of impunity prevails.”815 Already skeptical of Sudan’s 




 China’s position on the use of coercion to relieve insecurity in Darfur had, to this 
point, been ambivalent. Beijing had abstained on, but not blocked, a series of resolutions 
designed to stem the flow of arms into Darfur and to punish the violators. At the same 
time, the U.S. and its partners had reportedly weakened those resolutions at the behest of 
China. In the coming months, China’s position was less ambivalent. As the focus shifted 
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to the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement, the PRC was clear that it opposed 
the threat or use of additional sanctions. 
 
China’s Opposition to Sanctions 
 
 In response to Sudan’s perceived obstructionism on deployment, the U.S. and 
Britain raised the possibility of sanctions on several occasions in the spring and summer 
of 2007. The PRC resisted each time. The first, as suggested above, occurred as a result 
of Bashir’s March letter objecting to parts of the HSP. On the 13th, a State Department 
spokesman said that there was a “growing impatience” within the international 
community, and that, “we, unfortunately, may be approaching a time when other steps 
will have to be taken.”816 A day later, the U.S. position was that the delay was “an issue 
that needs to come before the Council.”817 China immediately took a contrary view, with 
an official stating that the PRC “never ever believes” that sanctions will be a viable 
solution to the Darfur crisis.818 
 Informal discussions took place among Council diplomats in the third week of 
March on a possible resolution. Among the potential elements were further personal 
sanctions, a widening of the existing arms embargo, and a “no-fly” zone in Darfur. 
Portraying a feeling of urgency, one Western diplomat said that, “We want to move 
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quickly on this.”819 On April 3, the U.S. reiterated that it was “considering what it is that 
we might do,” without indicating whether a new resolution might be tabled.820 At the 
same time, Beijing held to the principle that a “political solution should be found” by way 
of “equal dialogue and discussions.”821 Eight days later, Zhai Jun, China’s Assistant 
Foreign Minister responsible for African affairs, who had recently held discussions with 
Bashir in Khartoum, refuted the Western allusion to sanctions by saying that, “We should 
help Sudan resolve this issue instead of creating further problems or complicating the 
issue. Therefore, we are not in favor of sanctions.”822 For the moment, the U.S. dropped 
references to UNSC action.  
 A second, short-lived push for sanctions occurred on April 18. The trigger was a 
report by the Panel of Experts that described how Sudanese authorities continued to incite 
violence in Darfur (such as by disguising its own planes in UN colors), and concluded 
that “violations of the arms embargo continue unabated.”823 Emyr Jones Parry, Britain’s 
UN Ambassador, said on the 18th that his government, with the U.S. and France, were 
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“working on the content of a resolution, and we’re finalizing a resolution.”824 The same 
day, George W. Bush said that the U.S. would “begin consulting” in the UNSC,825 while 
Tony Blair declared that: 
We have tried diplomacy and negotiation again and again with the Sudanese 
government, but they have to get the message: the international community will not 
allow the scandal that is Darfur to continue.826  
However, China’s position remained that mediation should continue. Liu Zhenmin, the 
PRC’s deputy representative to the UN, said that “it’s better not to move” in the 
“direction” of sanctions, arguing that, “I think in a few weeks or a few months there will 
be some result from the political process.”827 By the 19th, Western advocacy for 
punishment had disappeared from the public discourse.  
 Third, the U.S. again raised the prospect of sanctions at the end of May. 
Frustrated by Sudan’s reluctance to approve the third phase of the Addis Ababa plan, 
Bush announced that the U.S. would execute its “Plan B,” which consisted of unilateral 
sanctions on Sudanese officials and firms. As part of this, Bush said that the U.S. would 
also seek a UNSC resolution that would include restrictions on individuals “found to be 
violating human rights,” broaden the existing arms embargo, ban “offensive military 
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flights” into Darfur, and improve monitoring capabilities.828 In New York, U.S. 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad affirmed, “We will move ahead with a resolution.”829 
 However, China refused to countenance such an approach. Wang Guangya 
labeled the U.S. proposal “quite unfortunate,” and said that sanctions “might make the 
fragile situation a bit more complicated, so I think we are a bit concerned.”830 Liu Guijin, 
a former ambassador to Zimbabwe and South Africa who had recently been named as 
China’s Special Representative for Darfur, likewise submitted that pressure would 
“further complicate the situation.”831 Liu continued:   
In this situation, why can’t the international community give the peaceful resolution of 
Sudan’s Darfur issue a little more time? Why can’t they give the resolution a few more 
opportunities? Why can’t they use a little more patience?832  
Within a day, U.S. officials had ceased making comments suggesting that they would 
pursue another round of sanctions on Sudan.833 Once again, there was no tangible 
progress by U.S., or the Council as a whole, towards a resolution.  
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 A final episode concerned Sudan’s conditional acceptance of a hybrid PKO on 
June 12. At issue was whether the operation would include non-African troops, a 
provision that Khartoum opposed, but others, including the U.S., thought necessary for an 
effective mission. Khalilzad’s position was that “additional sanctions” might be needed to 
“incentivize the government to cooperate” on this point.834 On the 15th, Liu Guijin 
repeated his opposition. Specifically, he said that, “We do not need to rush to put more 
sanctions [on Sudan]. It’s not a proper time now.”835 Two days later, Sudan had dropped 
its objection and the condition for a unanimous vote on the mandate of UNAMID had 
been created.836  
In sum, from the discussions on the HSP in mid-March to the final agreement on 
phase three of the Addis Ababa plan three months later, China had unequivocally 
opposed sanctions or the threat thereof. What can explain this position?  
 
Attractive Alternatives  
 
 The expectation of Hypothesis 1 is that China is unlikely to support U.S. plans for 
multilateral pressure if feasible alternatives are present.  In this case, we need to examine 
the status of two such mechanisms: first, multilateral negotiations with Sudan involving 
the UN Secretary-General and the African Union; and second, Beijing’s own bilateral 
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efforts to encourage Khartoum to accept the transition to a hybrid force. This section 
demonstrates that China did rely on alternative pathways each time the U.S. proposed 
increasing pressure on Sudan during the first half of 2007.  
 
 March 14-April 2: Towards the HSP  
 
 The initial impediment to implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement was 
Sudan’s noncommittal position on the HSP. On January 24, Ban and his AU counterpart, 
Alpha Oumar Konaré, sent a letter to Bashir detailing the terms of the package. Five days 
later, the three met on the margins of an AU summit in Addis Ababa, after which Ban 
said that the discussion had been “encouraging” and that they had “agreed to continue our 
political process.”837 Four days after this, Hu Jintao met with Bashir in Khartoum, 
allegedly pressing the Sudanese leader on consent for the HSP (Table 16 summarizes 
bilateral meetings in the period under review).838 Wang Guangya asserted that, “China 
usually doesn’t send messages, but this time [it] did.”839 However, Hu’s message was 
mixed, as it also included an announcement of new development aid totaling more than 
$100 million, debt forgiveness, and other concessions.840 For his part, Bashir continued to 
delay a response.  
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Table 16: China-Sudan Bilateral Encounters, November 2006-June 2007 
 
Date Who Event 
Nov. 2, 
2006 
Bashir, Hu Bashir meets Hu on sidelines of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation summit in Beijing. Hu says that China 






Assistant FM Zhai prepares for Hu’s Feb. arrival, urges 






Hu conducts state visit, asks Sudan to play “constructive 
role” in Darfur; forgives $80 million debt, announces 
$117.4 million in development aid, reduces tariffs on some 





Presidential adviser Nafi meets Tang Jiaxuan in Beijing; 




Bashir, Zhai   Zhai calls for “flexibility,” visits refugee camps in Darfur, 







Special envoy Liu meets VP Taha, others, encourages 




Bashir, Liu  Liu Guijin welcomes Sudan’s acceptance of hybrid force, 
calls the AU-UN-Sudan dialogue “effective.” 
 
 In early March, China elevated its pressure on Khartoum. On the 2nd, the National 
Development and Reform Commission announced that Sudan had lost its preferential 
trade status with the PRC. This meant that Beijing would not grant financial incentives, 
such as tax breaks and loans, for Chinese firms to invest in Sudan.841 12 days later, Bashir 
submitted his response to the Ban-Konaré letter, which Ban said did include “some 
positive elements,” such as a professed willingness to engage in new talks with rebel 









groups, but which also set conditions on the HSP.842 In the Council, Wang Guangya 
called for an explanation, recalling that, “Last year, in Addis, the understanding is clear 
that we are committed to this [i.e. the deployment plan].” Nevertheless, Wang tempered 
his reaction by attributing Sudan’s position to “some miscommunications and 
misunderstandings of all this.”843   
 Both the bilateral and multilateral tracks continued to function at the end of the 
month. On March 29, Bashir’s adviser, Nafi Ali Nafi, visited Beijing and held talks with 
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan. Tang emphasized that Sudan should show “flexibility” and 
“resolutely improve the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur.”844 The next day, 
in Riyadh, Bashir held talks with Ban, Konaré, Arab League Secretary-General Amr 
Moussa, Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki, and Saudi King Abdullah. The outcome of this 
session was a reaffirmation of the Addis Ababa plan, and an agreement to hold 
consultations on the technical aspects of the HSP at an early date. Ban concluded that, “I 
think we made progress, where there had been an impasse.”845 While Sudan had yet to 
accept the HSP, a deal seemed to be forthcoming.   
 On April 2, Ban expressed optimism that the political process would soon yield a 
result, and urged the U.S. and Britain to suspend their campaign for sanctions. Motivated 
by the Riyadh session, Ban said that, “We have achieved some improvements and results 
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through political dialogue.” He continued, “My position is that, before we talk about 
sanctions, let me have some more political space to deal with this dialogue with [the 
Sudanese].”846 Washington honored the request and said that it would not seek a punitive 
resolution for another two to four weeks. This meant that Beijing would be spared the 
role of opponent, at least temporarily. However, the possibility of further sanctions 
remained on the table. According to a U.S. spokesman, “If [the Sudanese authorities] 
don’t change their behavior, I would not bet against the United States as well as others 
taking additional steps.” 847 
  
 April 7-19: Ban Diverts Pressure  
 
 Since Khartoum had yet to agree to either the HSP or the hybrid operation, 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy continued. Between April 7 and 9, Zhai Jun met with 
Bashir and others in Sudan. As he told reporters in Khartoum, “China appreciates 
Sudan’s efforts in restoring peace in Darfur, but is expecting more flexibility on the 
Annan plan [i.e. the Addis Ababa formula].848 In addition to meeting with national 
leaders, Zhai also visited three refugee camps and held talks with local officials in 
Darfur.849 Following his visit, Zhai asserted that the “current situation in the Darfur 
region is basically stable,” a claim intended, perhaps, to buttress China’s support for 
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gradual dialogue.850 On the 9th, representatives of the UN, AU and Sudan met in Addis 
Ababa and reached an agreement on the HSP, with one exception (on the role of attack 
helicopters).851 This issue was resolved within a week, so that by April 16 Sudan had 
agreed to implement the plan. 852 The non-coercive approach appeared to be effective.  
 However, on the 18th, the disclosure of the Panel of Experts report spurred a new 
call for sanctions. As he had two weeks before, Ban played a pivotal role in dissuading 
Washington. Specifically, he made a “personal and emotional plea” to Condoleezza Rice 
to postpone again “Plan B”.853 Ban’s view was that the recent agreement on the HSP was 
“diplomatically promising and perhaps portended some future action” towards consent on 
phase three. Asked about why the U.S. chose to defer to Ban’s advice, a White House 
spokesman responded that, “We felt it was important to allow the Secretary-General to 
pursue something he thought was important and worthwhile to pursue.”854 This 
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development reinforced China’s perspective that dialogue with Khartoum was still viable, 
and that the time for a punitive approach in the Council had not yet arrived.855       
 
 May 19-June 17: Towards Agreement on the Hybrid Force 
  
 While Khartoum had approved the HSP, it had not yet consented to the hybrid 
operation. China continued its bilateral initiative to encourage Sudan to do so. Between 
May 19 and 23, Liu Guijin travelled to Sudan, meeting with Vice President Osman 
Mohammed Taha and other senior officials. Like Zhai Jun had done in April, Liu visited 
three refugee camps, and talked with local officials in El Fasher and Nyala, capitals of 
North and South Dafur, respectively.856 As Zhai had, Liu encouraged his interlocutors to 
“show more flexibility,” but also stated that the situation in Darfur remained “basically 
stable,” which demonstrated that the government had “made great efforts towards 
resolving the Darfur issue and bringing about peace and development there.” At the same 
time, Liu repeated China’s position against sanctions.857 
 As reported above, the U.S. was dissatisfied with the delays in negotiation and 
opted to impose unilateral sanctions on May 29. It also announced that it would introduce 
a resolution for further UNSC sanctions. However, as he had done twice before, Ban 
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offered no support for such a punitive approach and urged continued dialogue. Asked on 
the 29th if he wanted “some more time, more political space,” Ban replied, “Yes, I need 
some more time.”858 Three days later, Ban said that he had recently consulted with Bashir, 
who was “committed to see early resolution of this issue.”859 In addition, Ban lauded the 
role that China was playing on a bilateral level, saying that Chinese officials had been 
“exerting their utmost efforts.”860 Meanwhile, in Beijing, Liu was asked about sanctions 
and said that, “I don’t think we have come to that stage.”861 Both Ban and Liu, then, 
perceived feasible alternatives to pressure.  
 Consultations between Sudan, the UN and the AU continued in Addis Ababa on 
June 12 and 13. Ban reported to the Council that Sudan had “accepted the joint [AU-UN] 
proposals on the hybrid operation.”862 China took this opportunity to reiterate its view 
that “dialogue and equal negotiation is an effective approach” to the problem.863 However, 
uncertainty regarding the composition of the force remained, with Sudan stating that non-
African troops must be used only as a “last resort.”864 This prompted Khalilzad again to 
brandish the threat of sanctions. On the 17th, the Council dispatched a delegation to 
Khartoum to verify that Bashir did not, in fact, attach any conditions on deployment. The 
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outcome was that Sudan pledged that it would accept the hybrid force “without any 
conditionality.”865 With this issue resolved, the road was clear for a unanimous vote on 




 The June meetings in Addis Ababa took place nearly seven months after the 
transition formula had been designed in the same city. Despite the delays, the PRC clung 
to the position that sanctions would do more harm than good in persuading Khartoum to 
accept both the HSP and the full hybrid mission. Arguably, it was able to resist sanctions 
for two reasons. First, the AU-UN-Sudan mechanism, prodded by Ban, continued to 
function so that incremental progress was made. Second, Sudan responded to China’s 
influence. According to Liu, “in our own way and language,” Beijing encouraged Sudan 
to consent, and that, “I think the Sudan Government probably has listened to the advice 
of China.”866  
 
Absence of Substantive Negotiations  
 
 Hypothesis 2 suggests that China opposed levying multilateral sanctions on Sudan 
because the U.S. did not engage in substantive negotiations and, thus, offered no plan to 
mitigate the risks that China might encounter as a result of sanctions. This section argues 
that the U.S. did not pursue detailed talks with the PRC on how a mutually-satisfactory 
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249 
resolution might be achieved. The reasons were twofold. First is that any draft would 
have been weakened to the point of irrelevance in resolving the problem at hand. Second, 
wielding the threat of sanctions was more useful diplomatically than implementing new 
measures. In this account, China opposed the notion of sanctions because the U.S. had 
not offered, nor did it intend to offer, something that the PRC could accept. 
 Aside from with Britain, there is little evidence that the U.S. engaged in detailed 
talks on the substance of a punitive resolution in 2007. In March, the two Western powers 
had discussed the potential elements of a draft, which were reported to be the 
establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur, travel and financial restrictions against 
Sudanese officials, and an expansion of the arms embargo that been approved in 2005. In 
mid-April, a State Department spokesman said that Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs Kristen Silverberg would discuss a potential resolution 
during meetings in South Africa, though this trip had been scheduled as a routine visit to 
the holder of the Security Council presidency for the month, not as part of an offensive to 
gain South African consent.867 Ban’s request, on April 2 and again on the 18th, that the 
U.S. postpone its pursuit of sanctions in favor of continued negotiation, likely meant that 
broader consultations were put on hold.   
 Even after the U.S. pledged to work on a resolution in May, significant exchanges 
among Council members appear to have been minimal. On the 29th, Rice said that she 
was “open to discussions” on a draft, but, when asked about a timeline, stated only that, 
“I think we want to have some consultations and I can start those today and we’ll have—
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we’ll continue them.”868 The next day, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asia, reported that he had “briefed” his Chinese counterpart on the proposal, but did 
not suggest any optimism that room for agreement existed. Rather, his remarks indicated 
divergence of view: “I wanted to be very clear about what our position is and the Chinese 
were equal to the task of explaining how they see the situation.”869 On June 12, Khalilzad 
stated that a resolution was “still very much under consideration,” but offered no 
details.870 This situation contrasted with North Korea and Iran, in which the U.S. 
provided regular updates on its efforts to seek common ground with its interlocutors on 
the Council.  
 There are two plausible reasons why the U.S. did not expend effort to forge a 
consensus among the P5. First is that there were obstacles to the realization of a tenable 
draft resolution. In a general sense, the U.S. recognized that it would be very difficult to 
gain China’s approval for additional sanctions. For instance, in late April, 2007, 
Negroponte was asked whether he had “an understanding with China that they, too, 
would impose sanctions.” He replied that he could not confirm such an understanding.871 
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In a Congressional hearing in early May, he was asked the same question, and replied 
that, if the U.S. did table a sanctions resolution, then, “I think that we will get some 
pushback from the Chinese.”872 On June 1, after Bush’s announcement that the U.S. 
would implement a “Plan B,” Natsios said flatly that the Chinese “don’t support sanctions. 
They don’t like sanctions.”873  
However, beyond China’s opposition, there were specific problems with each 
element of a prospective draft.874 With respect to a no-fly zone, it was not clear how such 
a restriction would be enforced. Neither the U.S. nor France, the two powers with 
capabilities in the region to enforce a ban, demonstrated any political will to become 
militarily involved.875 In addition, overflight rights from neighbors Libya, Chad and the 
Central African Republic would have been difficult to secure, given regional opposition 
to coercive measures on Khartoum.876 As late as June 8, Rice suggested that the U.S. did 
not have a feasible way to move forward on a no-fly zone. Asked whether such a 
prohibition would be included in a U.S. draft, she responded, “I think it’s important to 
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look at it. And it’s just—you know, it’s not self-evident how you would do it, but I think 
we ought to be examining how it would work.”877 
 Imposing punishments on Sudanese leaders also would have faced barriers. The 
problem was not identifying potential targets. As early as August 2006, a Panel of 
Experts report listed some 51 individuals, including ten “top people in the government,” 
responsible for “serious violations” of international human rights law.878 Rather, the issue 
was whether the PRC would condone sanctions on anyone at a level high enough to cause 
the government to reassess its policy on the UN mission. John Prendergast assessed that 
the U.S. might be able to gain consent for “a few little minor sanctions against midlevel 
officials,” but not against top officials. The reason, he explained, was opposition by the 
Chinese, as well as the Russians.879 Although Prendergast urged the U.S. to use influence 
to encourage China to relent, doing so would have been difficult, and perhaps jeopardized 
what the U.S. was able to achieve in terms of China’s bilateral interventions.880 
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 An attempt to tighten the arms embargo also would have encountered 
constraints.881 Although the value of PRC arms exports to Sudan was marginal in 2007, 
there is evidence that Chinese firms were considering increasing sales of lucrative 
weapons systems, such as fighter jets, to the Sudanese military.882 Similarly, though 
Russian arms exports had declined, Moscow was reported to be in talks with Khartoum 
on a $1 Billion loan for arms purchases, which would have been threatened by country-
wide sanctions.883 Moreover, China and Russia both had an incentive to avoid the 
scrutiny of their arms transactions with Sudan that might have resulted from a tightening 
of reporting requirements.884 Both may have agreed to cosmetic changes to the arms 
embargo, but it is doubtful that they would have consented to considerably stronger 
terms.885 In sum, due to the various constraints, the U.S. likely would have achieved only 
a weak resolution, if any, if it had brought a draft to a vote.   
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 A second explanation for Western aversion to dialogue was that public mention of 
sanctions was intended as a threat, not as a substantive policy goal that would have 
required concessions and deliberations. Natsios, who had visited Khartoum twice in late 
2006, was initially opposed to the idea of threats as part of U.S. strategy. On December 
20, after his second trip, he said that, “It’s not useful to make threats.” Noting that 
coercive language had been used in the past to no effect, he continued, “I think we should 
stop making threats.”886 Though Natsios alluded to a “Plan B” if Khartoum did not agree 
to the Addis Ababa formula, he was intentionally vague on what that might encompass. 
Specifically, when asked what “Plan B” might include, he stated that, “it is open-ended 
and I’m going to leave it at that.” When pressed, he said only that, “Plan B is a different 
approach to this [i.e., mediation].”887  
 Over the course of the spring, the Administration continued to evade questions 
about what the alternative to negotiations might include. Ban’s requests, in March and 
April, that the U.S. postpone unveiling “Plan B” were useful, inasmuch as it allowed the 
U.S. to keep the terms unspecified.888 In May, a half-year after Natsios intimated a 
coercive approach, a State Department spokesman revealed only that, if consent on the 
hybrid operation was not granted, then, “we might look at what else might be done in the 
Security Council.”889 Even after the U.S. announced, on May 29, that it had enacted new 
unilateral sanctions, officials continued to speak about multilateral action only as an 
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instrument that might be used at some later point under unstated conditions. For instance, 
Rice said that Sudan needed to be “responsive” in talks with the AU and the UN, though 
reinforced this request by stating only that she would “start talking” about what kind of 
resolution “we might pursue.”890   
 The U.S. also used sanctions as a threat just prior to the AU-UN-Sudan 
conference in Addis Ababa during which Khartoum accepted the hybrid force plan. On 
June 8, Khalilzad vowed that if the international community did not receive a “positive 
and affirmative response” from Sudan, then the U.S. “would push for multilateral 
sanctions to incentivize—remember, the goal is to incentivize—Khartoum to 
cooperate.”891 Even after the June 13 agreement, Khalilzad hinted once more at negative 
consequences. Responding to allegations that Sudan had qualified its consent, he said that 
any conditions would be “unacceptable.” Those rumors turned out to be inaccurate.892 A 
week later, Emyr Jones Parry reflected on why Sudan had chosen to accept the UN 
deployment: “I would say that the suggestion of sanctions can themselves be just as 
effective as sanctions actually in place.”893 Threats were preferable to a resolution, if an 
agreement could have been reached at all.  
   
Political Dynamics  
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 Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political risks associated with opposing 
sanctions in the Security Council. In this case, we would expect to observe three 
conditions that allowed the PRC to maintain its opposition. First, the U.S. did not employ 
high-level pressure on Beijing to assent to the use of coercion through the UNSC. Second, 
Russia supported China’s position, providing a second veto, if necessary. Third, regional 
stakeholders tended to oppose the Western drive for a resolution, offering added 
incentives to oppose the U.S. This section argues that each of these conditions was 
present.  
 
 U.S. Priorities 
 
From the fall of 2006, the objective of U.S. diplomacy with regard to China was 
not to secure approval for additional sanctions, but rather to encourage Beijing to use its 
influence in Khartoum to persuade the Sudanese leadership to consent to UN 
peacekeepers in Darfur. This was based on the realization that the U.S. itself had limited 
means. As Natsios remarked in November,  
The reason what happened in Darfur happened the way it did, from my perspective, is 
that we don’t have all of the instruments of influence we think we have. And as I study 
many of them carefully, we don’t have as much leverage as we’d like to have.894  
China, with its considerable trade and investment interests in Sudan, was a natural ally. 
From Beijing’s perspective, making an effort to encourage a change in Sudan’s position 
was useful as well. The reason was that a range of international actors, especially in the 
West, had blamed the PRC for failing to act to alleviate the crisis in Darfur. Acting 
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bilaterally served as an opportunity for Beijing to burnish its image as a responsible 
actor.895  
 The mutually complementary pattern that emerged was that the U.S. would 
deflect domestic criticism of the PRC, including in Congress, while the latter would press 
Khartoum for consent on the peacekeeping plan. As early as September, 2006, on the 
margins of the opening of the General Assembly, Rice urged Li Zhaoxing to pressure 
Sudan.896 On November 3, Hu called on Bashir to consent to UN peacekeepers at a 
meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, publicly 
sympathizing with Bashir’s refusal to support a UN mission, but privately pressuring him 
to do just that.897 In January, Natsios visited Beijing for four days of consultations on 
Darfur. During his visit, he said that, “I think [the Chinese] are engaging much more 
aggressively,” pointing to Hu’s exchange with Bashir as evidence.898  
 In early February, the Bush Administration was placed in an awkward position 
after the announcement of an increase in Chinese aid to Sudan during Hu’s recent state 
visit. Natsios acknowledged that China’s “mixed messages…kind of upset all of us here 
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in the United States,” but asserted that, “I still think they can be helpful.”899 To Congress, 
which had been particularly wary of China’s role, Natsios delivered an optimistic report. 
Recounting his consultations in Beijing, he said that, “The Chinese were open with us. 
They were very helpful. We had good conversations.”900 At the same time, he refused to 
answer questions about whether the U.S. was prepared to seek China’s approval for 
further sanctions on Sudan, claiming that the entire subject was related to “Plan B,” 
which he preferred to keep as vague as possible.901  
 However, praising China did not quell domestic criticism of the PRC. In late 
March, for instance, Mia Farrow and her son, Ronan, published an editorial in the Wall 
Street Journal which argued that, “Beijing is uniquely positioned to put a stop to the 
slaughter [in Darfur], yet they have so far been unabashed in their refusal to do so.”902 An 
element of the growing campaign was to urge the U.S. to pressure China to support 
stronger sanctions in the UNSC. On April 11, Susan Rice, then a scholar at the Brookings 
Institution, said that the U.S. should “dare China or any other permanent member of the 
Security Council to accept the blame for vetoing effective action to halt the genocide.”903 
Similarly, the human rights activist John Prendergast told Congress:  
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Quick pop quiz: how many times have the Chinese vetoed a United Nations Security 
Resolution on an African issue since the end of the Cold War? Never. If we press, if we 
push China, they will threaten to veto right up to the moment that the vote occurs, and 
then they will abstain. If we have the political will to press forward with a real plan B 
multilaterally to change the Government of Sudan's calculations, the Chinese will step 
aside.904 
The Bush Administration might, then, have gained political points for publicly pressing 
China to support a resolution.  
 Instead, officials refrained from doing so. In a Senate hearing on April 11, Natsios 
noted that China had “put very heavy pressure” on Sudan, and had been a “critical factor” 
in the latter’s decision to accept the HSP. With regard to the “China-bashing” occurring 
in the U.S., he said that, “I’m not sure…right now it’s very helpful.”905 In early April, 
Negroponte met with Zhai Jun and reiterated that China should exert pressure on 
Khartoum. Negroponte later said that “the Chinese have helped us and the international 
community generally” through their contacts with Sudan.906 On June 1, Natsios credited 
Beijing with doing “a number of things in the last few months that go far beyond what 
they’re typically disposed to do on a diplomatic issue of this sort.” He went on to argue 
that the Chinese “have been much more helpful than may be apparent publicly.”907 In 
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sum, recognizing the usefulness of China’s bilateral diplomacy, the U.S. opted not to 




 In contrast to the PRC, Russia’s commercial interests in Sudan were marginal. 
Bilateral trade stood at about $50 million in 2006, ranking it behind the four other 
members of the P5.908 Russian arms transfers to Sudan were valued at about $434 million 
in 2004, due to a large order of MiG-29 aircraft, but had declined to $42 million in 
2006.909 Due to its own desire to keep attention away from Chechnya, Russia also had a 
stake in preventing a precedent on UN intervention without host country consent. 
However, this concern was likely mitigated by the tendency of the P5 not to meddle in 
each others’ internal affairs.910 As with talks on North Korea, Russia’s role was primarily 
to buttress the PRC.  
 Prior to 2007, Moscow and Beijing had adopted largely similar positions in the 
Council. Whereas China had abstained on all four sanctions resolution that had been 
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adopted between 2004 and 2006, Russia abstained on three.911 Russia also joined the 
PRC in abstaining on Resolution 1706, which called for a transition to a UN PKO in 
Darfur without an explicit host government consent requirement. Echoing Wang, Russian 
Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said that it was of “fundamental importance that the 
resolution clearly states the overriding need for the consent” of the Sudanese 
government.912 The only notable difference in the two states’ attitudes concerned 
Resolution 1593, referring Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC. Beijing, in an unusual 
alignment with Washington, abstained on sovereignty grounds, while Moscow countered 
that the measure would help to remedy “gross violations of human rights.”913  
 During the first half of 2007, Russia exhibited no willingness to condone a 
coercive approach towards Sudan. On March 12, Moscow issued a mild reaction to 
Bashir’s equivocal letter regarding the HSP. Churkin said that the letter was “probably 
less than the radically positive answer the Secretary-General was hoping for, but I don’t 
think it’s necessarily going back.”914 Two days later, as the U.S. and Britain were 
suggesting that a resolution may be necessary to cope with the implementation delays, 
Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister said that any decision on Darfur should be based on 
“constructive dialogue and cooperation.” His government’s ICC vote notwithstanding, he 
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argued that human rights should not be used as a “pretext for interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states.”915 There was no indication that Russia would back a drive for 
sanctions. 
 In mid-April, as the Western powers renewed their calls for a resolution, Russia 
joined China in opposition. Noting Khartoum’s recent acceptance of the HSP, Churkin, 
said that, “After a long while…we have this positive development in the dialogue 
between the UN and Khartoum, and all of a sudden to come back with some sanctions 
would not be good.”916 At the end of May, after the U.S. had said that it would put “Plan 
B” into effect, Churkin restated Russia’s opposition to a resolution. His argument was 
that this would be a “departure” from the Council’s “common strategy,” which was to 
support Ban’s mediation efforts.917 This position indicates that Moscow was a second 
permanent member skeptical of sanctions, and probably would have joined China in 
using its veto if a vote were taken.    
 
  Regional Stakeholders: Egypt, South Africa and the AU 
 
 As regards regional attitudes, there was no vocal support for sanctions among 
Egypt, South Africa and the AU as a whole. First, as the most powerful neighbor of 
Sudan, it is likely that Cairo’s position was considered in Beijing. Egypt’s core interest 
regarding Sudan was in preventing state collapse, which would have destabilized the 
regional security environment, brought a radical Islamic faction to power in Khartoum, or 
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both. Moreover, Egypt had an interest in preserving access to the lower reaches of the 
Nile.918 Given its interest in maintaining positive ties with the Sudanese regime, Egypt 
had opposed sanctions all along. For instance, following the passage of Resolution 1591 
in 2005, Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit said that the situation might “slip out of 
control” if pressure was further increased.919 
Cairo continued to oppose sanctions in the spring and summer of 2007. On March 
17, Gheit warned against the “dangers of brandishing the threat to impose sanctions 
against Sudan.”920 On the 27th, Assistant Secretary Silverberg told Congress that Ban had 
raised the issue of sanctions with Egypt and had received a “very bad response.” She 
went on to say that, “We were very disappointed by Egypt’s failure to step up to the plate 
in helping to pressure Sudan to take action.”921 Egypt again urged caution after the U.S. 
and Britain threatened sanctions on April 18. Referring to Khartoum’s decision to 
approve the HSP, Gheit argued that:  
It would be more logical for the international community to welcome Sudan’s response 
to the UN proposal and encourage it instead of threatening it, exerting pressure and 
raising suspicions about its seriousness to cooperate.922 
Gheit also told reporters that he had encouraged the P5 not to “make haste in making new 
decisions that would complicate the situation.”923 
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On May 7, Egypt announced that it might reconsider a commitment of some 750 
troops and 130 other personnel for Darfur if the Western initiative for pressure continued. 
In addition, the Egyptian presidential spokesman reported that Hosni Mubarak had 
spoken with Bush about the matter, and relayed that, “Mubarak emphasized that Egypt 
sees no use of some international powers’ inclination for increasing pressure on 
Sudan.”924 On the 29th, Gheit repeated his position against sanctions, saying that, “There 
is still an opportunity to reach an agreement.”925 On June 13, after the Addis session that 
resulted in Sudan’s apparent consent for the hybrid force, Gheit said that the outcome 
made “talk of sanctions futile.”926 Egypt’s refusal to endorse the U.S. position provided 
political cover for the PRC to oppose additional sanctions themselves.    
 Though not a contiguous neighbor of Sudan, South Africa was another influential 
actor on UN negotiations regarding Darfur. This was due to its status as a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council in 2007, contributor to AMIS, and major actor both in 
the AU and in sub-Saharan African politics generally.927 For China, South Africa was an 
important destination for exports (and the PRC’s largest trading partner in Africa); site of 
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 One analyst argued that, in this circumstance, Cairo held leverage vis-à-vis Washington. According to 
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investment; and source of vital resources, such as gold and platinum.928 Though Pretoria 
had not articulated a position on sanctions prior to 2007, it brought to the Council an 
attitude of skepticism towards coercion. As one scholar notes, South Africa viewed 
“sanctions and doctrines of the ‘right to protect’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’” as a 
“heavy club in the hands of major powers and have eroded the sovereignty of weaker 
states in what is increasingly becoming a hegemonic world.”929 Hence, South Africa was 
predisposed to treat U.S. suggestions on sanctions with caution.  
 However, unlike Egypt, South Africa did not explicitly reject the notion of 
imposing sanctions when it was raised in March, 2007.930 Yet on April 18, South Africa’s 
UN Ambassador labeled the call for sanctions “very surprising,” in light of Khartoum’s 
decision to agree to the HSP. Dumisani Kumalo continued, “This is what we’ve said we 
want, and now we’re talking about sanctions. What is this about?”931 In a separate 
comment, he said, “Bringing up sanctions now is very counterproductive. What’s the 
point?”932 Kumano made a similar remark after the U.S. announced its “Plan B” in late 
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May: “It’s not clear to us what are the sanctions supposed to achieve, what’s really the 
aim?”933 In addition, South Africa, along with Council members Congo and Ghana, 
opposed the insertion of a sanctions threat in the text of the mandate for UNAMID in July. 
Opposition from all three African states insulated China’s own rejection of such 
language.934 
 Finally, the AU itself was a stakeholder, both in terms of its role as the 
coordinator of AMIS, and as a member of the Sudan-UN-AU negotiating mechanism. 
The AU’s top decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council, did not issue a 
position on the appropriateness of sanctions as a means of gaining Khartoum’s consent 
on a hybrid PKO.935 However, AU Chairman Konaré rejected allusions to new sanctions 
on Sudan twice in 2007. On May 21, in a meeting with Mubarak, Konaré asserted, “What 
is strange is that some sides start talking about sanctions at a time when an agreement is 
reached with the Sudanese government.”936 He repeated this position on June 9. During a 
meeting with Moussa, who himself argued against sanctions, Konaré stated that new 
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measures would be an “unjustifiable act.”937 To the extent that the Konaré’s remarks 
reflected the views of member states, China’s position mirrored that of the AU.  
 As a caveat, like the U.S., particular AU members did encourage China to use 
influence bilaterally with Khartoum. For example, during the FOCAC summit in 
November, 2006, several African leaders reportedly alerted Hu and others to the gravity 
of the situation in Darfur.938 By January, 2007, the deteriorating conditions in which 
AMIS was operating spurred a number of African governments to indicate that Beijing 
should play a more active role in gaining Sudan’s consent for a UN-backed mission.939 In 
March, Ghana’s UN ambassador called on states with “close ties” to Sudan to use it, 
while, in April, the foreign minister of Chad visited Beijing and delivered the same 
message.940 These pleas by African sates may have influenced China’s decision to 
intercede with Khartoum, but did not cause a change in the political costs vis-à-vis 




 In sum, there did not appear to be significant political risks for China in rejecting 
the Anglo-American push for UNSC measures on Sudan. The U.S. was preoccupied with 
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Beijing using its leverage bilaterally, despite the pleas of some activists for multilateral 
action. Russia, though not a key actor in the debate, adopted a position similar to China’s. 
Regional powers Egypt and South Africa were vocally opposed to sanctions, while the 
AU lent no support to the Western cause. Individual African governments did place 
pressure on Beijing, but their goal mirrored that of the U.S.—bilateral intervention with 





 The goal of this chapter has been to assess the reasons why China opposed 
sanctions as a remedy for Sudan’s intransigence on the deployment of UN troops in 
Darfur, when it had been willing to lend its support for sanctions on North Korea and Iran. 
Why did Beijing agree to U.S. initiatives to punish Pyongyang and Tehran, but resist 
efforts to pressure Khartoum in the spring and early summer of 2007?  
 The analysis supported all five hypotheses. These are summarized in Table 17. 
First, in contrast to North Korea, there were credible alternative methods available to 
persuade Sudan to change its position. The first was the UN-AU-Sudan dialogue, which 
had resulted in the Addis plan in November, 2006. Integral to the viability of this 
mechanism was the role of Ban Ki-moon, who had called on the U.S. to postpone its 
pursuit of sanctions in favor of continued diplomacy. The second mechanism was 
China’s own bilateral efforts, starting with Hu Jintao’s conversation with Bashir in 
November 2006, and culminating in the appointment of a special envoy for Darfur, Liu 
Guijin, the following June. U.S. officials themselves concluded that China’s efforts had 
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produced positive changes in Sudan’s position. The combination of these alternate 
pathways reduced the necessity of UN sanctions.  
 
Table 17: Summary of Findings 
 
Hypothesis Outcome Explanation  
1 Availability of alternative 
options diminishes the 
attractiveness of punitive 
measures. 
Yes The UN-AU-Sudan negotiating mechanism 
continued to operate, with Ban Ki-moon a 
driving force. China appeared satisfied with 
the results of its bilateral interventions.  
2 Lack of concessions by 
the proposer means that a 
compromise draft is not 
available.  
Yes There is no evidence of substantive talks. 
The U.S. and Britain seemed to prefer 
brandishing the threat of sanctions to 
engaging in difficult negotiations on an 
actual text.  
3 Absence of high-level 
U.S. pressure removes a 
political constraint on 
opposition. 
Yes The U.S. put no obvious pressure on China 
or any other state to support sanctions. U.S. 
strategy with respect to China focused on 
encouragement of bilateral pressure.  
4 Russian alignment offers 
a second veto, if 
necessary, removing 
isolation.  
Yes Russia expressed opposition to sanctions 
and likely would have seconded a Chinese 
veto had a vote been taken.  
5 Regional stakeholders are 
united against sanctions or 
divided on support, 
reducing political 
pressure. 
Yes Egypt and South Africa were strongly 
opposed to sanctions, as was the AU 
Chairman. No African state publicly 
advocated a coercive approach.  
 
 
Second, the U.S. did not engage in talks with an eye to actually achieving a 
consensus resolution. Though Washington might have been able to offer a draft on which 
China and Russia would have at least abstained, it would have had to carve out large 
concessions in order to do so.941 The alternative was that the U.S. and Britain decided to 
hold deliberations on sanctions in abeyance pending the result of other processes, notably 
the tripartite dialogue and China’s direct efforts. Given the positive results of those other 
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processes (which, in turn, reduced political support for coercion among Russia and the 
regional stakeholders), the U.S. did not need or intend to pursue a resolution actively. The 
consequence of this decision was that China did not receive a proposal that mitigated its 
risks, as it had on North Korea, Iran, and in earlier measures on Sudan.  
 Third, the U.S. did not exert high-level diplomatic pressure on China in a bid to 
win support for a punitive resolution. Instead, just as it had encouraged Beijing to 
intercede with North Korea during the 2006 missile crisis, the U.S. focused on ways in 
which China could use its unique influence in Khartoum to the advantage of the 
international community. The cost of this was that U.S. officials regularly defended 
China from domestic outrage at Chinese collusion with the Sudanese regime and a 
growing campaign to boycott the 2008 Olympics. Unlike North Korea, though the U.S. 
did not switch to a strongly pro-sanctions posture. The basic reason was Bashir’s gradual 
acceptance of the advice of his Chinese interlocutors, in addition to the role played by 
Ban and others. In this sense, there was a causal relationship between the viability of 
alternative options (Hypothesis 1) and the absence of a strong U.S. diplomatic offensive 
for sanctions (Hypothesis 3).942  
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non-interference.” See: Victor Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” The Washington Quarterly 31 
(2008), pp. 115-7; J. Stephen Morrison, “Will Darfur Steal the Olympic Spotlight,” The Washington 
Quarterly 31 (2008), 188; Erica Downs, “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations,” China 
Security 3 (2007), 60; Paula Roque and Chris Alden, “China and the UN Security Council: From Observer 




 Fourth, Russia was sympathetic to Chinese opposition to sanctions and likely 
would have offered Beijing a second veto, if the issue had come to a vote.943 Similarly, 
fifth, there was no political appetite among the regional stakeholders for a coercive 
approach towards Sudan. In particular, Egypt was vocally opposed to the U.S. 
proposition that sanctions might be necessary, as was South Africa. The Chairman of the 
AU, along with his Arab League counterpart, also raised questions about the efficacy of 
sanctions. Council members Congo and Ghana, for their part, did not rally to the Anglo-
American cause. Computing its broader political interests in the case, China would have 
discerned few benefits, and several costs, in shifting its support to the West.  
  
### 
   
 The problem of deploying peacekeepers to Darfur did not end with the passage of 
Resolution 1769. In late 2007 and early 2008, Khartoum once again threatened to derail 
the operation by delaying a status of forces agreement with the UN, and hindered the 
issuance of visas for PKO personnel. As it had in the spring, China used bilateral pressure 
to guarantee that the mission would go ahead. This included signaling the possibility that 
it might agree to additional sanctions if Sudan did not expedite the deployment 
process.944 Since China’s own interventions proved successful, the need for further 
sanctions was reduced. Despite lingering problems related to deployment, the mission did 
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reach—and surpass—its mandated strength, with over 22,000 personnel deployed by 
early 2011. This represented a major improvement over the AMIS operation.945   
This case suggests that U.S. influence in the Council is constrained under several 
conditions. First is when there is at least one feasible alternative that a veto-holding state 
prefers to U.S.-backed plans for coercion. This may include other multilateral processes, 
bilateral intervention, or both. Second is when the U.S. itself isn’t firmly committed to a 
particular proposal. China’s willingness to use bilateral leverage, combined with 
problems associated with effective sanctions on Sudan, meant that the U.S. refrained 
from placing a high degree of pressure on the PRC for a new resolution. Third is when 
there is broad opposition to the U.S. Russia offered a potential second veto and, perhaps 
more importantly, the main regional stakeholders lent no support for the U.S. The result 
of these conditions was a non-outcome; that is, a proposal that was raised but dropped 
before the voting stage. There is another type of negative case, as well: a vetoed draft. 
The next chapter seeks to explain why China exercised its veto on Burma and Zimbabwe.    
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China Says “No”:  




 In January 2007, and again in July 2008, China departed from its normal pattern 
of avoiding the use of the veto in Security Council votes.946 In the first case, Beijing, 
along with Moscow, voted against a motion sponsored by the U.S. and Britain that would 
have urged the military junta in Burma to engage in a “substantive political dialogue” 
with the opposition National League of Democracy (NLD) and release the leader of that 
movement, Aung San Suu Kyi.947 In the second, China, again with Russia, vetoed a 
proposal that would have condemned Zimbabwean authorities for perpetrating violence 
against opposition candidates and supporters in the wake of the March 2008 presidential 
election in that country. This resolution would have imposed an arms embargo and 
leveled financial and travel restrictions on several top leaders, including the president, 
Robert Mugabe.948 
 As with Sudan, Iran and North Korea, China held significant material interests in 
these states. Myanmar was an important as a source of natural gas (with proven reserves 
about equal to those of China itself), as well as the site for an overland oil pipeline that 
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would allow oil shipped from the Middle East to bypass the relatively vulnerable Straits 
of Malacca.949 Moreover, Burma served as a buffer between China’s southwest and areas 
controlled or influenced by the two other major powers in the region: India and the 
U.S.950 Bilateral trade surpassed $2 billion in 2007.951 Interests in Zimbabwe were 
comparatively modest, though still notable. In particular, Zimbabwe held the world’s 
second-largest reserves of platinum, a rare metal used in the manufacturing of products 
ranging from electronics to fuel cells.952 In 2007, China’s investments reportedly stood at 
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Kunming, in Yunnan province. Its expected completion date is in 2013. Li and Lye, “China’s Policies 
Towards Myanmar,” 257-62; Li and Zheng, “Re-Interpreting China’s Non-intervention Policy Towards 
Myanmar,”627-30; Canning, “Pursuit of the Pariah,” 54-6.  
 
950
 As Wang Jienan, a professor at the Nanjing University of International Relations, points out, Myanmar 
is an excellent “barrier” against U.S. encroachment in the region, as represented by its naval presence in 
Guam, Singapore and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Wang Jienan, “Miandian jushi yu Zhongguo nanbu 
zhanlüe anquan,” (The Situation in Myanmar and China’s Southern Security Strategy), Dongnanya zhi 
Chuang (Window on Southeast Asia) 3 (2009), 21-3. See also: Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s 
Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007), 147-158. Another scholar, 
though, discounts Chinese suspicions of India’s motives vis-à-vis Myanmar. See: Renaud Egreteau, “India 
and China Vying for Influence in Burma—A New Assessment,” India Review 7 (2008), 57-9.  
 
951
 Meanwhile, China’s top exports to Myanmar included manufactured products such as boilers, 
appliances and diesel engines. In addition, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, the value of 
Chinese arms exports to Myanmar reached about $115 million in 2005 (or $76 million in 1990 dollars, 
adjusted for inflation). However, the database reports only a value of $3.1 million in 2006 and $0 in 2007.  
 
952
 Michael Wines, “Zimbabwe’s Future: Made in China,” New York Times, July 25, 2005.  For further 
information on the uses and significance of platinum, see the UN Conference on Trade and Development 




$1.6 billion, with plans underway to expand stakes in Zimbabwean commodities.953 
Additionally, Harare was a major buyer of Chinese arms through at least 2004.954 
 China’s strategic dilemma was that its interests were jeopardized by the policies 
of both regimes, but it feared that Western plans for coercion might be counterproductive. 
On Burma, China was concerned about the “erratic and isolationist” behavior of the 
junta,955 and the negative consequences of protracted violence between the authorities 
and their political opponents.956 Economic misrule and political strife also had a negative 
impact on China’s interests in Zimbabwe. For instance, one analyst argues that instability 
placed constraints on the prospects for expanded investment in Zimbabwean mines.957 
However, as in other cases, Beijing held a skeptical attitude towards pressure. Ni Xiayun, 
a scholar at CICIR, argues that the use of pressure might weaken the regime to the point 
where the tense situation between the government and minority groups situated along the 
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Burma-China border devolves into civil war.958 Two Chinese Africa analysts argue that 
U.S. and European sanctions on Zimbabwe since 2000 had made “an already bad 
situation much worse.”959 
 The difference between these cases and Sudan, Iran and North Korea lies in the 
use of the veto. No compromise was brokered, and the U.S. was unwilling to defer a vote 
so that alternative conflict resolution efforts might proceed uninterrupted. China’s 
decision is surprising for two reasons. First is that both cases occurred in the 18 months 
leading up to the Summer Olympics in Beijing, with the Zimbabwe veto having been cast 
less than one month before the opening ceremonies. It is curious that China would risk 
tarnishing its national image by appearing to shield these two pariah states in addition to 
Sudan (i.e. Beijing’s close association with Khartoum had motivated a movement to 
boycott the 2008 Olympics).960 Second, unlike Darfur, China had not made a public effort 
to intervene with the authorities in either Burma or Zimbabwe. For instance, it did not 
appoint a special envoy to divert attention from its opposition in the UNSC, as it had with 
respect to Darfur in the spring of 2007. This chapter asks why Beijing deviated from its 
practice of avoiding public disputes with the West by exercising its veto power.  
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 The explanation consists of five parts. First, China, which sought gradual reform 
but not immediate political transformation, was satisfied with the willingness of both 
states to participate in international mediation. This provided a basis on which to oppose 
coercion.  Second, Washington’s objective in both instances was to make a symbolic 
statement, rather than to make the concessions necessary to achieve a consensus. This 
meant that no efforts at reducing Beijing’s risk were undertaken. Third, preoccupied with 
other issues in its relationship with the PRC, the U.S. did not exert high-level diplomatic 
pressure on the latter to cooperate. Fourth, Russia sympathized with Beijing’s position, 
though its role differed in the two cases. On Burma, Russia simply provided a second 
veto, while, on Zimbabwe, Moscow’s last-minute decision to object to sanctions likely 
caused a similar shift by Beijing. Fifth, the regional stakeholders, including ASEAN 
members on Myanmar and South Africa on Zimbabwe, showed no affinity for Council 
interference, which provided the PRC with additional political insulation.   
 This argument proceeds in the following four sections. The first describes the 
background of the political situations in Myanmar and Zimbabwe, and the Western and 
Chinese positions vis-à-vis a UNSC response. The second argues that the U.S. was 
interested in making a statement rather than reaching a consensus, though concedes that it 
is unlikely that any concessions on Burma would have been sufficient to secure Chinese 
support. The third discusses the alternative conflict resolution pathways, and suggests 
that China was satisfied with the willingness of both regimes to participate, even if no 
immediate solution was found. The fourth assesses the political risks of exercising the 
veto, suggesting that Beijing did not face high costs, given U.S. priorities, Russia’s 
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position, and the opinions of the regional stakeholders. The conclusion summarizes the 
findings and states the implications for cooperation.  
 
Political Violence in Myanmar and Zimbabwe   
 
 China’s vetoes of Western-sponsored measures on Myanmar and Zimbabwe 
occurred against the backdrop of a deteriorating humanitarian situation in both states. The 
U.S. and its Western partners were especially perturbed about the escalation of political 
repression, which generated calls for redress through the UNSC. China advocated a non-




A raft of political and economic challenges lay behind the state-sponsored 
violence which led states, especially the U.S. and its partners, to seek UNSC involvement 
in the mid-2000s. In Myanmar, the internal situation had deteriorated under the watch of 
the junta, which had assumed power in 1988 and refused to cede authority to the 
opposition NLD after the latter won a large parliamentary majority during elections held 
in 1990.961 To maintain control, the junta (known since 1997 as the State Peace and 
Development Council, or SPDC) diverted public funds from the agricultural sector, as 
well as services such as education and health care, to the military.962  By 2007, the per-
capita GDP was about $237, less than half of its value in 1989. Inflation had risen more 
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than five-fold between 2000 and 2007.963 In addition, the HIV/AIDS rates had risen to 
1.3% of the population in 2005, and malnutrition affected about 20% of children.964 
Violent conflicts between ethnic groups, especially in the border areas near Thailand, 
continued unabated.965 External effects included the presence of about 450,000 Burmese 
refugees in Thailand in 2005, a rise in the illicit drug trade, and contributions to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases in the region.966 
  Restrictions on economic and political reform instituted by the SPDC intensified 
these problems. In the early 2000s, the junta had experimented with dialogue with Aung 
San Suu Kyi, who had been placed under house arrest periodically since 1989, but this 
effort ended in mid-2003, when Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders were taken back into 
custody.967 In 2004, General Khin Nyunt, the third-ranking member of the SPDC, who 
was known to support economic reform and a gradual opening of the political system, 
was deposed. This left the hardline generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye in control of the 
state apparatus.968 An effect of this was increasing isolation from the international 
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community, symbolized by the relocation of the capital from Yangon to the remote, 
inland city of Naypyitaw in 2006, and the increasingly tense relations between the junta 
and international humanitarian organizations. Groups such as Doctors Without Borders 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross ceased operations in 2005.969   
 For its part, Zimbabwe experienced a similar decline. Through the late 1990s, 
Zimbabwe was a middle-ranked developing country (with a GDP ahead of Honduras and 
behind Latvia),970 possessed the population with the highest education level per capita in 
Africa, and boasted strong agricultural and tourism sectors.971 The problem was that, 
since 1980, power had been concentrated in the hands of Robert Mugabe and his 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, which grew 
increasingly corrupt and hostile towards actors ranging from trade unionists to the white 
minority farmers who held most of the arable land in the country. These forces, led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai, coalesced as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which 
began to take part in previously uncontested elections for parliamentary seats and the 
presidency. Mugabe responded by electoral intimidation, intermittent arrests of 
Tsvangirari and his supporters, and a policy of land annexation from the white farmers.972 
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 Political strife resulted in severe humanitarian conditions in Zimbabwe, which 
worsened during the 2000s. By 2006, the country faced 1000% inflation, an 
unemployment rate of 85%, a poverty rate higher than 90%, one of the world’s highest 
infant mortality rates, and an HIV/AIDS rate of about one-fifth of the adult population.973 
Life expectancy in Zimbabwe had fallen from 61 in 1980 to 43 in 2006.974 In May 2005, 
in an effort to “clean up” the slums that had developed near urban centers, and possibly 
as a means of retribution against a support base for the MDC,975 Mugabe launched 
Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order), which rendered some 700,000 people 
homeless and damaged the informal economy on which poor residents had subsisted.976 
A result of these factors was a large flow of refugees from Zimbabwe to neighboring 
South Africa. Of a population of 11.8 million, it was estimated that about 3 million were 
residing as refugees in South Africa in 2007.977 
 In 2005, the UNSC waded tentatively into both issues. In December, the Council 
unanimously requested a briefing on the situation in Myanmar. On the 16th, Under-
Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari delivered a report describing the 
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“lack of political reform” and an “ongoing humanitarian emergency,” but said that the 
situation did not “pose an immediate threat to international peace and security.”978 
Regarding Zimbabwe, in July 2005, the U.S., Britain and France asked for a briefing on 
Operation Murambatsvina from Kofi Annan’s special envoy, Anna Tibaijuka. Tibaijuka’s 
assessment was delivered in closed session,979 but presumably based on a report she had 
written that termed Operation Murambatsvina a “man-made disaster” carried out “with 
disquieting indifference to human suffering.”980 Despite these updates, Council members 
did not yet seek further intervention.   
 
Calls for Condemnation  
 
U.S. and European calls for an elevated role for the Security Council were 
triggered by acts of repression towards opposition leaders, and their supporters, in both 
states. The rationale, though, depended not only on domestic political violence, but also 
on the threats posed by these states to the international community. On Myanmar, the U.S. 
chose to seek a resolution on May 31, 2006, four days after Burmese authorities 
announced that they would extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest by one year. In his 
letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting that the issue of Myanmar be 
placed on the agenda, John Bolton argued that problems including the detention of 
political prisoners, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, refugee flows, and drug trafficking all 
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contributed to a “deteriorating situation” that “threatens to have a destabilizing impact on 
the region.”981 During a Council debate on September 15, Bolton cited Resolution 688, 
which dealt with the exodus of Kurdish civilians from Iraq after the Gulf War, as a 
precedent for considering the Burmese problem as a threat to international peace.982 
 
Table 18: Key Dates in China’s Vetoes on Burma and Zimbabwe 
 
Date Event China’s Position  
September 15, 
2006 
Council decides to place issue of 
Myanmar on agenda. 
Opposes this decision, citing 




Council rejects U.S.-sponsored 
draft resolution urging Myanmar to 
reform.  
Vetoes, arguing issue is not 
germane, supporting SG’s “good 
offices” mission. 
April 30, 2008 Council decides not to place issue 
of Zimbabwe on agenda.  
Opposes placing issue on 
agenda, but does not justify 
decision. 
June 23, 2008 Council approves PRST 
condemning electoral violence, 
urging restraint. 
Supports, but urges continuation 
of mediation efforts. 
July 11, 2008 Council rejects U.S./British draft 
imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. 
Vetoes, arguing that sanctions 
are ineffective and would violate 
norm of sovereignty. 
 
On November 27, Bolton announced that the U.S. would seek a resolution to 
press the junta on reform. This decision followed a visit by Gambari to Myanmar, in 
which the authorities declined to release Suu Kyi or take other “concrete steps” on 
matters such as democratization or unhindered access to the country by humanitarian 
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agencies.983 Bolton again linked the internal situation to regional concerns, citing refugee 
flows, illicit drugs, and the spread of infectious diseases. As he concluded, “There are 
consequences external to Burma that make it appropriate for the Council to act.”984 The 
text of the draft called for a “substantive political dialogue,” which would lead to a 
“genuine democratic transition,” implored the regime to release Suu Kyi and “all political 
prisoners,” and allow humanitarian organizations to “operate without restrictions.”985 
Speaking after the vote, Bolton’s successor, Alejandro Wolff, characterized the problem 
as one that “first and foremost” affected the Burmese people, but which also posed a risk 
to “peace and security beyond its borders.”986 
 The movement to condemn Zimbabwe in the UNSC was also precipitated by a 
domestic political development, but justified on the grounds that the issue affected 
regional stability. The trigger was violence associated with a runoff election for the 
presidency between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai had won a general election on 
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 In particular, Wolff (who had replaced Bolton as acting ambassador after the latter’s recess appointment 
expired in December 2006) lamented that the draft would have been a  
…strong and urgently needed statement by the Security Council about the need for change in 
Burma, whose military regime arbitrarily arrests, tortures, rapes and executes its own people, 
wages war on minorities within its own borders and builds itself new cities, while looking the 
other way as refugee flows increase, narcotics and human trafficking grow and communicable 
diseases remain untreated.  




March 29, 2008, though, according to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission, did not 
win sufficient votes to avoid a runoff.987 The campaign of intimidation attributed to the 
ZANU-PF included arrests of MDC officials; arrests and beatings of journalists, union 
leaders, political activists and others; incidents of violence against women and children; 
and the murder of an unknown number of MDC supporters.988 The situation had grown 
increasingly turbulent as the June 27 runoff date approached.989 On June 23, Tsvangirai, 
who himself had been detained, withdrew from the race, saying that conditions for a free 
and fair election were not present. 
Though the Council had discussed the situation in Zimbabwe in April, it was not 
until June that the U.S. and its partners sought a decision.990 The West achieved 
consensus for a PRST on June 23 that condemned the ongoing political violence and 
called on the regime to “cease political intimidation,” and “release the political leaders 
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who have been detained.”991 In support of this action, Khalilzad pointed out that the 
“political crisis” not only threatened the “people of Zimbabwe,” but also “regional peace 
and stability.”992 The June 27 election, in which Mugabe ran unopposed, drew a visceral 
response from the West. 993 To prod Mugabe into quelling attacks on opponents and 
negotiating a power-sharing arrangement with the MDC, the U.S. and Britain then 
drafted a sanctions resolution, including an arms embargo and measures against top 
leaders. Following the vote, Khalilzad maintained that, “There should be no doubt that 
what is happening in Zimbabwe affects peace and security in the region.”994  
 
China Says “No”  
 
 As it had on Darfur, China opposed the use of pressure against Burma and 
Zimbabwe. On September 15, 2006, during a deliberation on whether the Myanmar issue 
should be placed on the Council’s agenda, Wang Guangya made two points. First, he 
argued that it was “preposterous” to consider problems such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
drug trafficking, and refugee issues as threats, since doing so “not only exceeds the 
mandate given by the Charter to the Council, but will also undermine the Council’s 
authority and legitimacy.” Wang also noted that most neighboring countries held similar 
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views.995 Second, he contended that the role of the international community was to 
“encourage Myanmar” and “create a favorable environment in the country,” which he 
posited could best be accomplished through the “good offices” visits of Ibrahim 
Gambari.996 In the ballot that followed, China, Russia, Congo and Qatar voted against the 
proposal, while Tanzania abstained.997 
 Chinese officials made similar arguments after the U.S. circulated a draft 
resolution on January 10. That day, Liu Zhenmin argued that the Council “should focus 
on more important issues which are really threats to international peace and security.”998 
A day later, an MFA spokesman rejected intervention on the grounds that, “We believe 
these are purely Myanmar’s internal affairs.”999 On the 12th, Wang defended his veto use 
on a similar basis. Specifically, he argued that, despite Burma’s shortcomings, “similar 
problems exist in many other countries.” If the Council took up this issue, then “the 
situations in all other 191 United Nations Member States may also need to be considered” 
by the UNSC. Instead, Wang said, the UN should play a role in facilitating political 
reconciliation through “a process of dialogue and engagement, which needs time and 
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patience.”1000 Russia also voted against the draft, as did South Africa, while Qatar, 
Indonesia and Congo abstained.  
 With regard to Zimbabwe, China had opposed the inclusion of the issue in the 
Council’s agenda on April 29, but did not release a public justification.1001 While it 
consented to the June PRST, it voted against the imposition of sanctions the following 
month.1002 As with Myanmar, Wang’s rationale for exercising veto power to block the 
draft resolution was based on the view that the problem did not constitute a threat, and 
therefore fell outside of the Council’s jurisdiction.1003 Wang also observed that mediation 
efforts sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were 
continuing, and said that the Council should “respect the position of African countries” in 
favor of further talks and against the use of outside pressure. In addition, he criticized 
sanctions as counterproductive, asserting that, “Lightly using or threatening to use 
sanctions is not conducive to solving problems.”1004 Along with China, Russia, Libya, 
South Africa and Vietnam cast negative votes, while Indonesia abstained. 
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 Wang’s remarks on both cases echoed long-standing themes in China’s political 
rhetoric. As described in Chapter 1, Chinese statements on cases such as Iraq, Bosnia and 
Kosovo stressed issues of sovereignty and the disutility of coercion. However, not 
wishing to alienate itself from the U.S. or tarnish its reputation, Beijing usually abstained 
rather than use its veto power. Given the possible political costs of disrupting Western 
proposals, and the fact that both votes occurred in the period prior to the Olympics, why 
was the PRC willing to vote negatively?   
 
Attractive Alternatives  
 
 One possible explanation, as captured by Hypothesis 1, is that more efficacious 
options to resolve the dilemmas posed by Burma and Zimbabwe existed. Rather than 
consenting to punitive measures, which may have led to a further deterioration and thus 
placed China’s interests in even greater jeopardy, Beijing opted to support conflict 
resolution mechanisms that would both help to alleviate the extant problems, and do so in 
a way conducive to stability.  
 
 Burma: Alternatives on Three Levels   
 
 With regard to Myanmar, we need to evaluate alternate options at three levels: 
China’s bilateral efforts, ASEAN mediation, and the “good offices” missions of the UN 
Secretary General. In its bilateral interactions, China acted as a “low-level interventionist 
power.”1005 Beijing was unwilling to countenance a neighbor that was unpredictable, 
xenophobic and completely self-isolated, but was also unwilling to attempt to dictate the 
state’s policies by fiat. Since China’s priority was stability, it did not seek a sudden 
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regime change in the country, or attempt to win particular human rights concessions, such 
as the release of political prisoners. Rather, China confined its involvement to pressing 
issues, such as the illegal drug trade and the security of the 2,000 kilometer-long border. 
China may have advocated an opening to the international community, but one that was 
gradual and conducive to regional stability.1006 
These priorities are exemplified in the nature of China’s high-level diplomacy in 
the two years leading up to the Western push for Council intervention. While the top two 
generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, rarely visited the PRC and seemed to prefer to 
develop ties with Russia and India, other officials did maintain regular contacts with 
China.1007 Wen Jiabao met with Prime Minister Soe Win on the margins of an ASEAN 
conference in December 2005, with the two agreeing to strengthen cooperation on 
combating drug trafficking.1008 Later that month, Maung Aye hosted a delegation of 
Chinese military leaders to discuss border control issues.1009 In February 2006, Soe Win 
met with Wen and Hu in Beijing, discussing the drug trade and Burma’s treatment of its 
ethnic Chinese population.1010 In October, Soe Win again conversed with Wen on drug 
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trafficking and “other cross-border crimes.”1011 At least publicly, Beijing did not address 
the issue of democracy, limiting its agenda to matters of common security.  
At the regional level, ASEAN made only a modest attempt to intervene in 
Burma’s internal political situation. In December 2005, ASEAN appointed Malaysian 
Foreign Minister Syed Hamid as a special envoy for Myanmar. Due to Burmese 
intransigence, Hamid was not issued a visa until March 2006. During his first and only 
trip in this capacity, he was unable to meet with either Than Shwe or Suu Kyi, though 
was able to speak with Soe Win and others.1012 Afterwards, when asked about national 
reconciliation in the country, Hamid responded that, “It is very slow moving.” 1013 With 
little progress having been made, Hamid wrote an editorial in July in which he expressed 
frustration:  
In the past, I have impressed upon the Myanmar leadership the importance of 
cooperating with ASEAN. I have stressed that we are their best hope before 
international impatience leads to punitive actions. Unfortunately, Myanmar appears to 
be deliberate in its disregard for our goodwill and concern.1014 
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 In particular, from March 23-4, Albar met with Soe Win and Foreign Minister Nyan Win, and other 
government ministers. He did not meet with Than Shwe or Maung Aye, nor did he meet with NLD 
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 Hamid’s editorial appeared in the Wall Street Journal Asia. “ASEAN Gives Up on Myanmar Issue, 




At a summit in late July, ASEAN foreign ministers claimed no success and called for 
“tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the near 
future.”1015 This was not a basis on which China could cite a credible alternative to 
pressure.  
 In August, under growing pressure for engagement by ASEAN, the junta slightly 
relaxed its posture. Alberto Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, was permitted 
to make a three-day visit to Myanmar in his capacity as rotating chair of ASEAN.1016 
During this trip, Romulo was permitted to meet with Than Shwe and Maung Aye, and 
encouraged the generals to follow through on their professed “road map” for 
democratization.1017 He was not able to meet with Suu Kyi, though did convey ASEAN’s 
wishes that she and other detainees be released. Based on his visit, Romulo told the 
media that, “There is some light at the end of the tunnel [for] reconciliation in 
Myanmar.”1018 Although it did not produce tangible results,1019 this event provided China 
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with an argument that the Myanmar issue did not belong in the Council. As Wang said in 
September, Romulo’s trip “served to boost ASEAN’s confidence in finding a successful 
solution to the question of Myanmar on its own.”1020  
 At the level of the UN, dialogue with the junta was mainly carried out by the 
Secretary-General’s special envoys. In April 2000, in an attempt to facilitate 
democratization, Kofi Annan appointed the Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail as his 
representative to Burma. Razali was able to forge a working relationship with Khin 
Nyunt, but was refused entry to the country after the latter was deposed in 2004.1021 In 
January 2006, Razali resigned in frustration, stating that, “It is clear that they (i.e. the 
junta) do not want me back.”1022 Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Right’s Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, had been unable to visit 
the country since 2003.1023  
 However, in 2006, the junta agreed to two visits by Ibrahim Gambari, who served 
as Kofi Annan’s representative. First, in May, Gambari met with Than Shwe and Maung 
Aye, and was permitted to visit Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders. Gambari addressed the 
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humanitarian situation; democratization; violence against ethnic minorities, especially 
those in Karen State on the Thai border; and the detainment of political prisoners. 
Reporting the outcome of Gambari’s visit to the General Assembly, Annan wrote that, 
while “more tangible progress is needed,” the UN’s “effort to begin constructive dialogue 
was generally well-received.”1024 Gambari made a second trip in November. As before, 
he was able to meet with Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Topics included the release of Suu 
Kyi, who he met again; cooperation with international humanitarian groups; cessation of 
violence in border regions; and the need for an “inclusive, participatory and transparent” 
political process. 1025  Afterwards, Gambari told the press that it was now “up to the 
authorities to have some concrete results from that visit.”1026 On November 27, he told 
the Council that the junta had taken some “small steps,” including the release of a small 
number of political prisoners, though he was waiting for the “government to take further 
steps to respond to the concerns of the international community.”1027  
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As with Romulo’s mission in August, the willingness of the junta to host Gambari 
was cited by China as a reason to support the continuation of dialogue. In September, 
Wang argued that Gambari’s trip “indicated that Myanmar was ready and willing to 
collaborate with the United Nations and turn over a new leaf,” and “had successful 
results.”1028 In December, after the U.S. had announced its intention of seeking a 
resolution, a Chinese diplomat pointed to Gambari’s second trip as a reason to reject 
punitive measures.1029 On January 11, in defending his veto, Wang said that Gambari had 
made “certain progress” and that UNSC action would “hinder discussions” and “bring no 
benefit” to the Secretary-General’s mission.1030 For China, signs that the junta was 
prepared to engage in a minimal level of consultation with the outside world were 
sufficient to oppose calls for a more invasive response.   
 
Zimbabwe and the Role of South Africa  
 
In contrast to Myanmar, there was only one active external route available with 
respect to Zimbabwe: the mediation role of South African President Thabo Mbeki. 
Bilaterally, China’s role was minimal. It did not attempt to act as a broker, as it had on 
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Darfur.1031 At the level of the UN, Ban Ki-moon had tasked an Assistant Secretary-
General, Haile Menkerios, with assessing the situation in Zimbabwe after electoral 
violence erupted in the spring of 2008. Menkerios was able to meet with Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai, but reported to Ban that “conditions did not exist for free and fair elections” 
and that “no outcome of an election run under these circumstances could be considered 
credible.”1032 On July 8, G8 members meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, advocated the 
appointment of a high-level envoy for Zimbabwe who would “support regional efforts to 
take forward mediation between political parties.”1033 However, this did not occur and the 
locus of the international effort remained at the regional level. 
Mbkei was appointed mediator in March 2007, during an SADC meeting in 
Tanzania on the issue of the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe.1034 When violence 
broke out after the general election a year later, the SADC reaffirmed Mbeki’s role and 
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mandated that he facilitate talks between the rival parties.1035 An initial problem that 
emerged was that, to the MDC, Mbkei appeared to downplay the gravity of the political 
violence. On April 17, Tsvangirai called on Mbkei to step down after the latter had said 
that there was “no crisis” in Zimbabwe.1036 In June, Mbkei unsuccessfully attempted to 
persuade Mugabe to meet with Tsvangirai and cancel the runoff in favor of talks aimed at 
the formation of a unity government.1037  On July 3, Tsvangirai repeated his concerns 
about Mbkei’s role, asked that additional regional facilitators be included, and pledged 
that, “If this does not happen, then the MDC will not be part of the mediation 
process.”1038 In short, the Mbeki-led pathway appeared to have stalled in the week before 
the U.S. and Britain submitted their draft resolution to the Council.  
Nevertheless, a window of opportunity for inter-party reconciliation opened just 
prior to the UNSC vote. On July 8, Mugabe signaled the possibility of resuming talks 
with the MDC.1039 The next day, Liu Zhenmin affirmed that China would “support the 
mediation efforts.”1040 On the 10th, Tsvangirai sent representatives to Pretoria to discuss 
the preconditions for a settlement with ZANU-PF delegates. The MDC leader stated that 
his goal was to find a “peaceful, negotiated solution to the Zimbabwe crisis,” which 
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would require that Mugabe cease attacks on MDC supporters.1041 By the 11th, the two 
sides were still engaged in “talks about talks,” with no formula regarding a power-sharing 
agreement having been reached.1042 Washington cited the lack of progress as a reason to 
call for a vote.1043 However, for Beijing, Mugabe’s willingness to enter into negotiations 
with his rival provided a sufficient basis on which to reject sanctions. As Wang Guangya 
argued, imposing sanctions would mean “interfering with the negotiation process. That 




 This discussion suggests that China maintained a relatively low threshold in 
evaluating the feasibility of alternative dispute resolution pathways. Though no 
“concrete” results affecting the political situation in either country issued from external 
mediation efforts, the willingness of the Burmese and Zimbawean authorities to 
participate was itself evidence of progress. The U.S., on the other hand, viewed these 
processes as ineffective and sought to use the UNSC to underscore its commitment to 
democracy.   
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Symbolic Resolutions and the Veto  
 
 Hypothesis 2 is that China is more likely to agree to Council measures when the 
U.S. has attempted to reduce risks by making side-payments or concessions. Conversely, 
it is less likely that a consensus can be reached when the U.S. has not demonstrated 
flexibility. This section shows that Washington’s goal on both Burma and Zimbabwe was 
to make a political statement, not to reach consensus. Yet, at least on the first case, it is 
doubtful that compromise would have been possible even if the U.S. had continued to 
modify its draft.      
 
 Burma  
 
 U.S. advocacy of human rights in Burma through the Security Council originated 
in October 2005 when, as part of a series of White House meetings with dissidents, Bush 
met with Charm Tong, a prominent Burmese refugee, who described the internal political 
situation in detail.1045 Violation of religious rights, especially against Christian minorities, 
seemed to register in particular.1046 This encounter coincided with the emphasis on 
democracy promotion shared by both Bush and Condoleezza Rice, who in her 
confirmation hearing as Secretary of State branded Myanmar as an “outpost of tyranny” 
and pledged that the U.S. would “spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe.” 
As such, Burma became a “test case” for U.S. commitment to democratic activists in 
                                                 
1045
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Southeast Asia, and an element of the broader “Freedom Agenda” that the Bush 
Administration pursued during its tenure.1047  
 For the U.S., bringing the matter to the UNSC served two purposes. One was 
voicing solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi, whose detention had been extended by one 
year in May 2006, and others. In September, a spokesman for Laura Bush, who had 
become involved in the U.S. advocacy effort, said that, even if a vote was ultimately 
unsuccessful, placing the matter on the agenda “would be a success in itself.”1048 On 
September 30, after the Council had decided, in a split vote, to take up the issue of Burma, 
Bolton said that,  
We are hearing that the fact that the Security Council cares about Burma has gotten 
through to the Burmese people in spite of all the regime’s efforts to block it, and has 
given them new hope.1049  
In November, after announcing that the U.S. would seek a resolution despite Chinese 
objections, Nicholas Burns made the point that, “We’ve made Burma into a real object of 
concern.”1050  
 Officials made similar remarks in January, before and just after the vote. On the 
10th, declining to answer a question about the strength of support for the U.S. draft, 
Alejandro Wolff remarked that, “The people of Burma are watching and require our help 
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and support.”1051 Two days later, a State Department spokesman dodged a question about 
whether China might use its veto power, but said, “We think that this resolution sends a 
very clear signal of concern on the part of the Security Council about the situation in 
Burma.”1052 After the vote, explaining why the U.S. had called for a ballot it knew would 
fail, Burns stated, “We forced this onto the agenda for one reason. The Security Council 
is the only place that can deal with human rights.” 1053 Wolff observed that the draft had 
gained the support of the majority of Council members, and said the effort was intended 
to “send a clear signal” to the Burmese people “that we have not forgotten you and we 
won’t forget you.”1054 
 The second purpose in raising the matter was requiring other Council members to 
make a public choice between “democracy” and support for authoritarian leaders. On 
September 1, prior to the issue having been placed on the agenda, Bolton argued that,   
…there are times when you have to vote, there are times when people have to go on the 
record and say what their position is. We think that the time has come to do that with 
Burma, and we’re prepared to put it to a vote.1055 
In another instance, hinting at the choice that China and Russia would have to make, 
Bolton argued that “governments, permanent or otherwise, will have to consider how 
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they’re going to approach [the vote].”1056 More explicitly, Warren Hoge, who covered the 
UN debate for the New York Times, recalled that the U.S. “wanted to embarrass 
China.”1057 Though the U.S. lost the vote, it was able to place its opponents on the 
defensive.1058 
 Given its symbolic goals, the U.S. did not engage in a cycle of concession-
making.1059 However, it is doubtful that any flexibility regarding the text would have 
affected China’s position. The reason is that Beijing was not opposed to the substance of 
the draft. Instead, it was opposed to the issue being considered by the Council at all. As 
Colin Keating argues, using the UNSC as a platform for democratic advocacy towards 
Burma was seen as a “bridge too far” for states, including China and Russia, that had 
been frustrated by the hubris in U.S. foreign policy under Bush.1060 The PRC was 
especially concerned that signals of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and others was 
designed to create chaos around China’s borders and containing China itself.1061 Such 
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fears were likely exacerbated by the “color revolutions” in the Caucasus in 2004-5, which 
were linked to aggressive U.S. democratic promotion.1062 Arguably, even if Washington 
had softened the draft beyond its already mild form, China still would have voted 
negatively.1063   
 
 Zimbabwe  
 
 Like Burma, Zimbabwe fit into the Bush Administration’s “Freedom Agenda” 
and had been counted by Rice as an “outpost of tyranny” in her January 2005 
confirmation hearing. In the wake of Operation Murambatsvina in the spring of 2005, the 
U.S. expanded its unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwean officials and institutions, and 
Bush, in June, said that the “world needs to speak very clearly about the decisions 
[Mugabe] has made, and the consequences” for those decisions.1064 Though the U.S. had 
placed the burden of managing the situation in Zimbabwe on regional actors, including 
South Africa, it gradually became inclined to view the Council as a means of pressuring 
Mugabe as well.1065 U.S. concern was piqued after the March 2008 presidential election, 
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with the American ambassador in Harare describing the campaign of violence against 
opposition figures as “absolute brutality.”1066  
 Though the U.S. had been able to secure a PRST on June 23 calling for a 
cessation of violence, attacks on MDC supporters continued. At this point, Washington’s 
objective was not merely to make a political statement, but to use sanctions to stem the 
violence. On the 26th, after Tsvangirai had withdrawn, Rice said that the runoff results 
would not be “legitimate” with the “forces of President Mugabe doing the things that 
they’re doing and claiming…an election victory.”1067 Two days later, she optimistically 
predicted that, “it’s hard to imagine that anybody could fail to act given what we’re all 
watching on the ground in Zimbabwe.”1068 On the 30th, she met with Yang Jiechi and 
urged him to instruct the PRC ambassador in New York to agree to consultations on a 
Zimbabwe draft.1069 The same day, Khalilzad confirmed that the U.S. would seek 
sanctions with the intention of responding to Mugabe’s defiant continuation of repression 
after the PRST demanded that it stop.1070 
 Substantive talks on the contents of a sanctions resolution took place in the first 
week of July. On the 2nd, Khalilzad noted that the U.S. was “working on a resolution,” 
had discussed the contents with “like-minded countries” and would broaden the 
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consultations to include others that day.1071 The next day an experts-level meeting was 
held on the terms of the draft, with no sign of an impending Sino-Russian veto.1072 On the 
8th, at the request of Russia, the U.S. postponed a vote on the draft. According to Churkin, 
Moscow was seeking a “strong and clear” signal from the Council and argued that a 
delay was necessary so that “we can be as united as we can.”1073 At the same time, 
Khalilzad indicated that discussions continued, and that he did not “believe that [the 
Russians] have decided to vote against the resolution.”1074 On the 9th, two days before the 
vote, Khalilzad reiterated that the U.S. goal was to secure support for sanctions. His 
assessment was that a “majority” of Council members were “persuaded that by the 
argument that we have to act” in a way that “gets us out of the current crisis.”1075 
 As mentioned above, Russia’s position rapidly switched to opposition to sanctions 
after the G8 Declaration was issued. For the U.S., the choice was to either scuttle plans 
for an arms embargo or concede to another “request” on Harare, or to proceed with a vote 
that would fail, but make a symbolic gesture.1076 Reportedly at the insistence of 
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 Speaking after the vote on the 11th, Khalilzad explained that what Russia had asked for was “yet 
another request, a resolution that we only, I’m assuming, would have only made request of the regime, 
without incentivizing it to take what we are saying seriously because [the Zimbabwean authorities] did 
thumb their noses at what we asked of them before (i.e. via the June 23 PRST).” “Media Stakeout with 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,” Federal News Service, July 11, 2008. It is also worth noting that South 
Africa did propose, but then withdrew, a potential compromise that would have established a 30-day 
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Britain,1077 the U.S. choice was that a vote, which would force China and Russia to 
“publicly take a stand in support of Mr. Mugabe and the violence promulgated by his 
supporters to steal the election,” was preferable to a weak resolution.1078 A Western 
diplomat involved in the case recalled that the U.S. “knew that [the effort] was going 
down in flames,” but was still able to make a political statement.1079 After the vote, 
Khalilzad noted that nine Council states had “stood with the people of Zimbabwe,” even 




 The preceding discussion found mixed support for Hypothesis 2. On Burma, the 
U.S. goal was to show support for democratic activists, not to achieve a compromise text. 
However, it is improbable that China would have agreed to any formulation, given its 
objection to any external involvement in the matter. Regarding Zimbabwe, Washington 
pursued a substantive decision, but would not concede to Russian demands for a weaker 
outcome. Rather, the U.S. forced a vote to make a political statement.  
 
 
Political Dynamics  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
deadline for Mugabe to comply with unspecified demands before sanctions would take effect. Ibid. and 
“SA Shifts on Zim Sanctions,” The Star (South Africa), July 11, 2008.  
 
1077
 Interview with Colin Keating, Security Council Report, January 2010. Keating argues that pushing the 
resolution was a “bit of hubris” on the part of the British, and that sanctions would have effectively 
destroyed the chance of mediations leading to a unity government.   
 
1078
 Neil MacFarquhar, “2 Vetoes Quash UN Sanctions on Zimbabwe,” New York Times, July 12, 2008.  
 
1079
 Interview, Western diplomat, New York, January 2010.  
 
1080
 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5933 (July 11, 2008), 14.  
  
307 
 Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political stakes of opposing the U.S. and its 
partners. In this context, Hypothesis 3 would predict that Washington did not use high 
level diplomacy to press Beijing to support punitive measures. Hypothesis 4 would 
expect that Russia did not move towards the Western position, thereby providing China a 
potential second veto. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 would predict that regional stakeholders were 
generally opposed the use of pressure.  
 
 U.S. Priorities   
 
 There is little evidence that U.S. policymakers exerted diplomatic pressure on 
their Chinese counterparts to support UNSC action on Myanmar or Zimbabwe. 
Regarding Burma, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns noted in 
November 2006 that he had held “long conversations” on the topic during a visit to 
Beijing and that the U.S. had “made this front and center in our relationship.”1081 
However, this claim was belied by an admission by the State Department that Rice had 
had no contact with Yang Jiechi in the days leading up to the vote in January 2007.1082 
On Zimbabwe, Rice did raise the issue with Yang in a June 30, 2008, meeting, though the 
latter responded by reiterating China’s support for continued dialogue.1083 More 
importantly, Bush apparently did not discuss Zimbabwe in his session with Hu on the 
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sidelines of the G8 summit in Hokkaido. Instead, the two leaders covered matters 
including trade, Darfur, Taiwan and the North Korean nuclear issue.1084 
 From the perspective that the Bush Administration had advocated democracy 
promotion, the lack of pressure on China to support the U.S. on political repression in 
Burma and Zimbabwe is surprising.1085 However, the explanation is straightforward: the 
U.S. needed China’s cooperation on a series of strategically more important issues. As 
regards Myanmar, a month after the U.S. had fought to place the matter on the Council’s 
agenda, North Korea carried out a nuclear test. As recounted in Chapter 3, this required 
U.S. officials to persuade Beijing to consent to a round of sanctions on the DPRK.1086 
Moreover, in mid-December 2006, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson travelled to 
Beijing for the inaugural session of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), seeking to 
foster communications on a range of central economic issues, from intellectual property 
rights concerns, to currency reform, to the trade balance.1087 Given these interests, the 
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U.S. did not push hard on a matter “in the backwaters of U.S. foreign policy 
priorities.”1088 
 Overriding concerns vis-à-vis China also lowered the priority of Zimbabwe. First, 
in economic terms, the two sides had completed the fourth session of the SED in June 
2008, with the U.S. seeking Chinese approval of a framework on energy and 
environmental issues, in addition to pursuing a bilateral investment treaty, which would 
expand Chinese markets for U.S. exporters. Second was the resumption of the U.S.-China 
Security Dialogue, which had last been held in 2004 and reflected the desire by the U.S. 
for enhanced coordination on nuclear non-proliferation and related issues.1089 Third, as 
evidenced by Bush’s discussion with Hu in July, the U.S. placed the regional problems of 
Taiwan and North Korea high on the bilateral agenda. As with Burma, the U.S. was 
unprepared to prioritize an issue in which it held no major stakes at a time when it needed 




 While Russia concurred with China’s view that neither Myanmar nor Zimbabwe 
should be discussed by the Council, its role in the two cases differed. Regarding Burma, 
Russia echoed China’s position, but did not lead the opposition. In September 2006, 
Vitaly Churkin voted against including the item on the Council’s agenda, though did not 
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provide an explanation.1090 On January 10, 2007, he declined to confirm that Russia 
would use its veto, but said that, “We think it’s not a proper issue to discuss in the 
Security Council.”1091 The next day, after voting against the draft resolution, Churkin 
made only brief remarks, stating that other UN bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, 
were more appropriate venues in which to discuss the situation. As with China, his 
argument was that, “We deem unacceptable any attempt to use the Security Council to 
discuss issues outside its purview.”1092 Although Russia provided the PRC with a second 
veto, it was not particularly outspoken in its opposition.1093  
 With respect to Zimbabwe, Russia’s position quickly shifted from apparent 
support for the U.S.-British draft to resistance. On July 8, in Hokkaido, Russian President 
Medvedev consented to the text of a joint communiqué of G8 leaders that questioned the 
“legitimacy” of the election results, called for the appointment of a UN special envoy, 
and warned that, “We will take further steps, inter alia introducing financial and other 
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measures against those individuals responsible for violence.”1094 However, Russia’s 
commitment to this pledge softened soon afterwards, as Medvedev pointed out that the 
communiqué did not necessarily imply UN sanctions.1095 In New York, Churkin said that 
some part of the draft were “quite excessive and clearly in conflict with the notion of 
sovereignty of a state member of the United Nations.”1096 In discussions between U.S. 
and British diplomats on the 9th, Mark Malloch Brown, Britain’s senior official on 
African affairs, suggested that, while China was unlikely to use its veto, due to the desire 
to protect its image ahead of the Olympics, Russia was now “more problematic.”  
 Given Russia’s support for the G8 declaration, its veto on July 11 drew 
considerable ire from the U.S. and its partners.1097 Conversely, China, which had 
refrained from making any statements on the issue, received little criticism. Khalilzad 
termed Russia’s vote “particularly surprising and disturbing,” and opined that Russia’s 
vote raised doubts about its “reliability as a G8 partner.” 1098 He made no specific 
mention of China’s veto. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband echoed this theme, 
arguing that,  
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It’ll appear incomprehensible to the people of Zimbabwe that Russia, which committed 
itself at the G8 to take further steps including financial and other sanctions, should 
stand in the way of Security Council action. 
Less emphatically, he added: “Nor will they understand the Chinese vote.”1099 It is 
possible that the PRC exercised its veto only because Russia had absorbed the brunt of 
the political fallout. As Britain’s UN ambassador, John Sawers, remarked, the Western 
“assessment” was that China would not have vetoed “on its own,” and that “the key thing 
is that the Russians decided to vote against [the draft].”1100 
 
Regional Associations   
 
 The political costs associated with China’s decision to use its veto power were 
reduced by the tendency of two regional associations, ASEAN and the SADC, to oppose 
interference on Burma and Zimbabwe, respectively. First, ASEAN preferred the 
continuation of regional and UN mediation efforts. Since 1991, ASEAN had espoused a 
notion of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar, in which the gradual inculcation of 
commercial and diplomatic ties would help bring about political liberalization and 
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economic reform.1101 However, ASEAN had occasionally exercised pressure on Burma, 
which had joined the organization in 1997. For instance, after Suu Kyi was detained in 
May 2003, ASEAN issued a statement calling for her release.1102 Particular states had 
also deviated from the “ASEAN way.”1103 In December 2005, the Philippines had 
supported Western calls for a UNSC briefing on the subject.1104 The following August, 
Indonesia warned that ASEAN would not defend Myanmar in the Council if it did not 
demonstrate a willingness to open to the outside world.1105 
 Nevertheless, after the junta permitted the visits of Romulo and Gambari, ASEAN 
adopted a wary attitude towards external condemnation. On January 6, 2007, the foreign 
minister of Indonesia, which was the sole ASEAN member on the Council, stated that he 
believed that Burma’s problems, including the exodus of refugees to Thailand, were 
“domestic and not yet a threat to security in the region, let alone the world.”1106 On the 
11th, prior to the vote on the U.S. draft, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Cebu, 
Philippines, voiced objections to the Western effort. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed 
Hamid, who had previously denounced Burmese intransigence, said that, “We still 
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believe that Myanmar is not a security threat issue.”1107 In the Council, Indonesia 
abstained on the vote. Its representative, Rezlan Jenie, expressed support for the Gambari 
mission, but contended that the situation in Myanmar did not constitute a “clear and 
present danger for the rest of the world.”1108  
 By using its veto power, China aligned itself with the ASEAN preference for 
dialogue. In defending his vote, Wang observed that “all ASEAN members and most 
Asia-Pacific countries believe that the current situation does not post a threat to regional 
peace and security.”1109 He also stated that, “China will, as always, support ASEAN in 
playing a leading role in addressing the issue of Myanmar.”1110 This argument not only 
provided evidence that China’s own position was shared by other neighbors of Burma, 
but also may have offered reassurance to Southeast Asian states that the PRC would not 
collude with external powers to interfere in ASEAN’s “intramural” affairs.1111 One 
reason that Burma was admitted to ASEAN was a desire to counter rising Chinese 
                                                 
1107
 “ASEAN Ministers Call for WTO Talks Restart, Say Myanmar No Threat,” Japan Economic Newswire, 
January 11, 2007.  
 
1108
 Security Council Document S/PV.5619 (January 11, 2007), pg. 4. On the sidelines of the ministerial 
session in Cebu, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong did not directly address the pending Security 
Council vote. This may have reflected some disagreement among member states about the merits of the 
proposal. Instead, Ong said that the “general view of ASEAN foreign ministers is that the [junta’s seven-
point] roadmap we heard about should be adhered to. But there should be the early release of Aung San 
Suu Kyi.” “ASEAN Presses Burma to Reform, Admits Power Limited,” Hong Kong AFP, January 11, 
2007. WNC reference: 200701111477.1_cd40005c23938983.  
 
1109
 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5619 (January 11, 2007), 3.  
 
1110
 Ibid. Following the vote, an MFA spokesman likewise explained that China “firmly opposed” UNSC 
interference and pointed out that ASEAN held an “identical view on the question.” “Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Liu Jianchao’s Regular Press Conference on 11 January 2007,” Available on the MFA’s 
website, at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t288589.htm. 
 
1111
 Indeed, reassurance and the reduction of mutual suspicions was a priority in China-ASEAN relations 
since the PRC began its rapid economic and military development in the early 1990s. Lai Foon Wong, 
“China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN Relations During the Post-Cold War Era,” Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 1 (2007), 377-82. Indeed, Li and Zheng argued that the case of Myanmar had become 
a “testing ground of China’s compliance to [ASEAN’s] non-intervention policy.” Li and Zheng, “Re-




influence in the region, and Beijing’s position that ASEAN, rather than the UNSC, 
should be the main locus of arbitration implicitly acknowledged this concern.1112  
 Regarding Zimbabwe, the SADC encompassed the concerned regional actors, 
such as Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia.1113 Within the association, South Africa was 
perhaps the main stakeholder. This was due to its proximity, position as non-permanent 
member on the Council in 2008, destination of Zimbabwean refugees, and Mbeki’s role 
as mediator.1114 Like ASEAN, South Africa was generally disinclined towards external 
intervention in regional affairs.1115 In addition, Pretoria preferred “quiet diplomacy” to 
coercion because it believed that this was the most effective route to maintaining stability. 
According to Mbeki, “We engage them because we don’t want Zimbabwe collapsing 
next door. South Africa would inherit all the consequences of Zimbabwe’s collapse.”1116 
Hence, is unsurprising that South Africa voted against the imposition of sanctions by the 
Security Council. 
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 In addition, there was a sizable trade relationship between the two countries. According to the CIA 
World Factbook, South Africa provided 43% of Zimbabwe’s imports in 2006, and received 33.3% of its 
exports. South Africa ranked as Zimbabwe’s #1 trading partner, though Zimbabwe did not rank among 
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 South Africa’s negative vote provided Beijing with additional political insulation 
for its veto. Although Moscow was the primary recipient of Western antagonism, Pretoria 
also absorbed a measure of criticism. Speaking after the vote, Khalilzad remarked that 
South Africa’s vote was troubling, given the role that UNSC sanctions had played in 
dismantling Apartheid in that country. Khalilzad continued,  
For its representative to be protecting the horrible regime in Zimbabwe, a regime that’s 
responsible for not only a political crisis but a humanitarian crisis in the country…is 
particularly disturbing.1117  
Given this criticism of South Africa, China was able to avoid being labeled as an enabler 
of violence in Zimbabwe.1118 
 In addition, other SADC members evinced no support for sanctions. In June, 
SADC countries had diverged on the extent of their condemnation towards Zimbabwe. 
Unlike South Africa, the governments of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia had all 
publicly criticized Mugabe and questioned the efficacy of Mbeki’s mediation effort.1119 
Meeting with Condoleezza Rice in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania’s foreign minister said that 
the international community must “do something urgently so that we can save 
Zimbabwe,” though did not directly advocate the use of sanctions.1120 However, by July, 
                                                 
1117
 “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,” Federal News Service, July 11, 2008. In 
addition, a Western diplomat described the role of South Africa as “shameful.” Interview, Western 
diplomat, New York, February 2010.  
 
1118
 Indeed, the Mbeki government had come under significant domestic criticism for its preference for 
‘quiet diplomacy’ with Zimbabwe. Trade unions and human rights activists, including Desmond Tutu, were 
particularly concerned that South Africa appeared to be colluding with Mugabe. Lipton, “Understanding 
South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” 340.   
 
1119
 Neil MacFarquhar and Celia Dugger, “Security Council Urges Zimbabwe to Halt Violence,” New York 
Times, June 24, 2008.  
 
1120
 Neil MacFarquhar and Celia Dugger, “South Africa Snubs U.S. Effort to Condemn Mugabe,” New 
York Times, June 20, 2008.  
  
317 
it was clear that the U.S. did not have an ally within the SADC. On the 8th, a delegation 
of African leaders met with Bush in Hokkaido and refused to endorse the U.S. position. 
Tanzania’s president, Jakaya Kikwete, who was the current chair of the AU, said that 
Africa and the West were both concerned about Zimbabwe, but that “the only area we 
may differ is on the way forward.”1121  
 As with ASEAN, China found political value in the consonance between its 
position and that of the SADC. In his remarks, Wang said that China had “repeatedly 
called upon the Council to respect the position of African countries,” including allowing 
“more time” for the SADC mediation effort. He also averred that “China deeply regrets” 
that the “reasonable proposals” of African countries were not “taken on board” by the 
sponsors.1122 Pointing to the common ground between the PRC and African states not 
only provided a rhetorical basis for the veto, but also served to highlight China’s respect 
for regional views. This was of particular relevance with regard to the SADC, which had 
raised concerns about China’s arms shipments to Zimbabwe and suspected its intentions 
in southern Africa.1123 The extent to which China’s position on the matter assuaged 
regional concerns, though, is questionable.1124 
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 In sum, the political dynamics in both cases militated in favor of Chinese 
opposition to Western proposals. Requiring Beijing’s support on other priorities, the U.S. 
did not exert significant pressure on China on either Myanmar or Zimbabwe. Russia’s 
position was aligned with the PRC, insulating the latter from political costs, especially in 
the case of Zimbabwe. The major regional stakeholders, grouped respectively within 
ASEAN and the SADC, offered no support for the U.S. effort, further buttressing China’s 
opposition. Moreover, China used the opportunity to highlight its affinity with the 






 This chapter has addressed the reasons for China’s vetoes on the cases of 
Myanmar, in January 2007, and Zimbabwe, in July 2008. Beijing’s decision to vote 
negatively is an historical anomaly, having occurred only six times since 1971. It is 
particularly surprising in two senses. First is China’s desire to maintain a positive 
national image in advance of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Second is that, in contrast to 
Darfur, China had no public bilateral initiative which would have diverted attention from 
its opposition in the UNSC.  
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 The analysis found evidence corroborating five explanations. These are presented 
in Table 18. First, in both cases, China appeared to be content with the progress of 
alternative efforts. On Burma, it had conducted frequent exchanges with the junta on 
problems such as drug trafficking, and envoys from ASEAN and the UN had been 
allowed to enter the country and meet with opposition leaders. Given that China’s goal 
was stability, rather than immediate political change, this demonstration of openness was 
a sufficient basis on which to oppose condemnation in the Council. The same situation 
was found in Zimbabwe. China supported the Mbeki mission, which had achieved no 
results, but which both the ZANU-PF and the MDC had been willing to attend. This 
suggests that when Beijing’s objective is modest and long-term in nature, it is likely to 
prefer even ineffective dialogue to pressure.1125  
Second, there is mixed evidence that the lack of Western flexibility on the 
contents of the drafts influenced China’s positions. In both cases, the U.S. sought to make 
a political statement, registering support for democratization while drawing out Russia, 
China and others who refused to condemn authoritarian regimes. On Zimbabwe, this 
explanation is plausible, since Russia, and China in turn, likely would have supported a 
weakened draft had the U.S. opted to submit one. However, on Burma, China was clearly 
opposed to the matter being discussed in any form in the Council. Even if the U.S. draft 
could have been softened, it is unlikely that the PRC would have acquiesced. Hence, a 
caveat to Hypothesis 2 is that no level of concessions is sufficient for cooperation if 
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Beijing is fundamentally opposed to UNSC involvement. However, Myanmar was as an 
outlier in this respect.1126 
 
Table 19: Summary of Findings 
 
Hypothesis Burma Zimbabwe  
1 Alternative pathways, such 
as mediation, were 
available.  
Yes. Three routes were 
available: bilateral, regional 
and at the UN-level.  
Yes. The Mbeki mediation 
effort was underway at the 
time of the vote.  
2 The U.S. was unwilling to 
make concessions.  
No. The U.S. priority was 
symbolic, but flexibility 
would not have made a 
difference.   
Yes. The U.S. did not make 
concessions, and opted to 
seek a symbolic vote.  
3 The U.S. did not place 
high-level pressure on the 
PRC.  
Yes. Burma was not a core 
issue; the U.S. needed 
China’s cooperation on other 
matter.  
Yes. The U.S. did not make 
Zimbabwe a major bilateral 
issue, e.g. at the G8 
summit. 
4 Russia was aligned with 
China, and against the U.S. 
Yes. Russia opposed 
sanctions, backing up the 
PRC position. 
Yes. China followed 
Russia’s shift to opposition 
towards sanctions.  
5 Regional stakeholders 
opposed UNSC pressure.  
Yes. ASEAN refused to 
endorse the USNC effort.  
Yes. The SADC and South 
Africa in particular, 
opposed sanctions.  
 
 Politically, China faced only minimal costs for opposing the Western initiatives. 
The U.S. required China’s cooperation on a range of strategically important issues, and 
did not exert high-level pressure on Beijing to support its position on Burma or 
Zimbabwe. Russia’s position was consistent with China’s, but its role differed in the two 
instances. On Burma, it kept a low profile, but provided China with a second veto. 
Regarding Zimbabwe, China seems to have returned the favor after Russia turned against 
the U.S. As one Western diplomat observes, Beijing and Moscow “hide behind each 
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other and do it very effectively.”1127 Two regional associations, ASEAN and the SADC, 
declined to support the U.S. on Burma and Zimbabwe, respectively. Moreover, South 
Africa, the primary local stakeholder on Zimbabwe, had been particularly resistant to 




 In the months following its vetoes, China distanced itself from both the SPDC and 
Mugabe. In October 2007, following a violent crackdown in Rangoon, China endorsed a 
condemnatory PRST that contained many of the same points as the January draft.1128 In 
August 2008, Beijing sent a message to Harare that it should “behave” during the 
Olympics, and banned Mugabe from attending the opening ceremonies.1129 However, 
given its interests, the PRC did not lean too heavily on either state. In May 2008, Beijing 
blocked Western efforts to condemn the junta’s intransigence in accepting foreign 
assistance in responding to the disaster of Cyclone Nargis. In November 2010, China 
congratulated the junta on a “smooth” election, one in which the conditions for fairness 
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were lacking to the point that the NLD refused to participate.1130 On Zimbabwe, China 
endorsed a fragile power-sharing agreement between the two main parties reached in 
September 2008 which privileged Mugabe and the ZANU-PF in spite of the March 
election results.1131  
 More broadly, China’s vetoes suggest that cooperation in the Security Council is 
likely to be inhibited under several conditions. First is when the basic goals of the P5 
states differ. Unlike the U.S., China was interested in stability rather than democracy 
promotion. This meant that the PRC was more amenable to allowing mediation to 
continue, even as it advocated gradual reform in both states. Second is when there is 
significant regional opposition to UNSC action. The U.S. was able to amass nine votes in 
the Council, but China was attuned more to the actors which held major stakes in the 
outcomes: ASEAN and the SADC. Third is when one negotiator suddenly shifts its 
position for obscure reasons, as Russia did after the G8 summit. Fourth is when any P5 
state is essentially opposed to Council interference on a given issue, as China was with 
regard to Myanmar. The confluence of these factors raises the chance that a public 
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The preceding chapters assessed the reasons for China’s positions in a series of 
negotiations on pariah states that occurred in the early 21st century. The driving question 
was how we can account for the PRC’s mixed record of cooperativeness with the U.S. 
and its allies, given a basic skepticism towards the application of multilateral pressure 
and growing material interests in these regimes. What can help to explain the variance in 
China’s cooperativeness with respect to the U.S.? What is the broader relevance of the 
findings? What does the answer suggest about the constraints on, and avenues for, U.S. 
power in the UNSC? What are the larger implications for the relationship between rising 
powers and the future of the international order?      
 
Strategic and Political Interests  
 
 In the context of labor negotiations, Roger Fisher and William Ury observed that, 
“every negotiator has two kinds of interests: in the substance and in the relationship.”1132 
China’s primary substantive interest in the pariah states is stability, and we would expect 
that it would endorse proposals in the UNSC that it believed would not, at a minimum, 
undermine stability. Hypotheses 1 and 2 evaluate this proposition. Hypothesis 1 is that 
China should be more amenable to multilateral pressure if it does not perceive a more 
efficacious alternative, such as mediation or bilateral pressure. Hypothesis 2 is that China 
is more likely to endorse motions when the U.S. has made side-payments or concessions 
aimed at limiting the risk to China’s interests.  The converse is that China should 
maintain opposition when it believes that other options are more conducive to stability, 
and when the U.S. is unwilling to make amendments that limit the risks of instability  
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 There is support for both hypotheses in the eight cases examined. The results of 
the analysis are presented in Table 20, below. North Korea’s withdrawal from the 6PT, 
combined with Pyongyang’ dismissal of PRC pleas for restraint, led Beijing to favor U.S. 
calls for a Council response. However, a condition was that Washington modified its 
requests, such as removing mandatory cargo inspections from what became Resolution 
1874, in order to decrease the chance for unintended conflict. With respect to Iran, the 
evidence was mixed. Hypothesis 1 could not be confirmed, since the E3+3 dialogue had 
stalled several months before Beijing finally lent its support for a fourth round of 
sanctions. A possible explanation is that, in contrast to North Korea, Beijing did not treat 
developments in Iran with a sense of urgency. This suggests that closing alternatives are 
most likely to affect receptiveness to pressure when combined with a clear act of 
provocation. Hypothesis 2 is on firmer ground, as plans to target Iran’s energy sector 
were left out of the text and others, including Saudi Arabia, apparently attempted to 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These two hypotheses also generally work on the three negative cases. Regarding 
Darfur, a combination of bilateral interventions and the results of the AU-UN-Sudan 
dialogue reduced the necessity for potentially destabilizing sanctions. Moreover, wielding 
sanctions as a threat, the U.S. did not engage in substantive talks aimed at securing 
China’s consent. Similarly, a mixture of bilateral contacts, and regional and UN-led 
mediation, diminished the necessity of multilateral pressure on Myanmar, while Robert 
Mugabe’s willingness to engage in talks sponsored by South Africa dampened the need 
for sanctions in that instance. Hypothesis 2 could not be convincingly corroborated on 
Burma, because it was doubtful that any U.S. concessions would have sufficiently 
lowered the risk of Council action perceived by China. However, the refusal of the U.S. 
to weaken the draft on Zimbabwe likely contributed to Chinese opposition.  
 In addition to the substance of particular cases, UNSC negotiations also involve 
political risks and rewards for participants. Hypotheses 3 through 5 are meant to examine 
the notion that the PRC responds to the varying political stakes of cooperation. 
Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to agree with the U.S. if Washington has 
prioritized the issue in the bilateral relationship, as evidenced by high-level diplomatic 
pressure. Hypothesis 4 is that China should move towards the U.S. position if Russia has 
already done the same. The reason is that the insulation of a Russian veto would be lost, 
leaving China in a vulnerable position. Hypothesis 5 is that China is more likely to 
cooperate the stronger the regional support for the U.S. The rationale is that China desires 
not to jeopardize its relations with the local stakeholders.  
 With respect to North Korea and Iran, the political stakes militated in favor of 
Chinese cooperation. Washington pressed its case at a high level, dispatching envoys to 
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Beijing and prioritizing a Council response to North Korean provocation and Iranian 
intransigence vis-à-vis the IAEA. Hypothesis 4 could not be substantiated on North 
Korea, since the PRC came to support the U.S. before Russia. However, Russia did move 
towards sanctions on Iran prior to the PRC, leaving the latter isolated. Japan and South 
Korea tended to follow the U.S. position on the DPRK in 2006 and 2009, although, after 
the July 2006 missile launch, Seoul appeared to echo China’s hesitance for a resolution. 
Thus, there is only partial evidence for Hypothesis 5 on that case. Regarding Iran, there 
was significant support for sanctions among the EU and Israel, both of which 
independently exerted pressure on China, in addition to the approval of Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf states. Arguably, China would have encountered major resistance if it had 
used its veto to shield Pyongyang or Tehran.  
 By contrast, Chinese opposition on Darfur, Burma and Zimbabwe was relatively 
safe politically. The U.S. had an ideological stake in these cases, but was constrained in 
the extent to which it could effectively push its agenda in its bilateral relationship with 
China. On Sudan, the U.S. opted not to push Beijing because it sought instead to 
encourage China’s use of bilateral influence on Bashir. On Burma and Zimbabwe, 
Washington likely did not press hard because it needed China’s cooperation on higher-
priority issues, including North Korea and Iran. Russia sympathized with China’s 
concerns about intervention, playing a notable role in opposing the U.S. on Zimbabwe. 
Hypothesis 5 can also be confirmed in all three cases. The U.S. was unable to secure a 
visible African advocate for sanctions on either Zimbabwe or Sudan, with South Africa 
particularly opposed on the former and Egypt on the latter. Similarly, Washington had 
not gained any supporters among Southeast Asian nations on the Burma case. Regional 
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bodies, especially the AU, SADC, and ASEAN, did not adopt the U.S. position. By 
opposing the U.S., China was able to develop goodwill in Africa and Southeast Asia, and 
likely would have suffered costs had it acted otherwise.   
 A number of interactions among the variables were also observed. First, the 
closing of alternatives may provide the U.S. with a strong position from which to employ 
political pressure. For instance, North Korea’s rejection of Chinese entreaties not to 
proceed with a nuclear test in October 2006 enhanced U.S. efforts to push for a swift 
resolution. Second, narrowing alternatives may change the perceptions of China’s 
erstwhile supporters, thereby affecting the political stakes. The growing frustration of 
Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others with Iran in the spring of 2010 resulted in more 
robust pressure on China to follow suit. Third, regional stakeholders may actively work 
to keep alternatives open, affecting the strategic landscape. The AU, in concert with Ban 
Ki-moon, played a role in leading Bashir to accept UNAMID, which diminished the 
necessity for sanctions. Fourth, U.S. rigidity may affect not only China, but also others. 
U.S. “hubris” on Zimbabwe seems to have irked Russia, in particular, whose opposition 
in turn influenced China.  
 These findings hold three notable implications for the broader literature on UN 
politics. First concerns the concept of “outside options.” Voeten notes that the ability of 
the U.S. to credibly threaten interventions without UN approval provides Washington 
with greater leverage within the institution.1133 Under a similar logic, China is in a 
stronger position to resist particular U.S. demands for enforcement action under Chapter 
VII when it can point to ongoing mediation efforts, or to its own bilateral initiatives. This 
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was observed with respect to both Burma and Sudan. Likewise, the PRC has found itself 
in a weaker position in instances in which outside options do not exist, especially 
regarding the crisis diplomacy on North Korea in 2006 and 2009.  
 Second, inspired by Inis Claude, scholars have addressed problems of legitimacy 
with respect to the UN. Hurd, in particular, posits that the decisions reached by the 
Security Council carry “symbolic power” and are thus treated with greater weight by the 
majority of states.1134 The present analysis demonstrates that legitimacy of decisions to 
prosecute offenders, including pariah states, is sometimes contested within the Council. 
Although China itself behaves in a pragmatic, calculating manner, beliefs about the 
appropriateness of intervention do impact the political tradeoffs that the PRC considers in 
its own decision-making process. In particular, China is more likely to agree to sanctions 
on states when there is a broad consensus that doing so is legitimate, as on Iran and North 
Korea. It is much less likely to do so when there is a division in this respect, as on Burma 
and Zimbabwe.  
 These two points lead to a third, which is that Council bargaining may be 
understood in terms of both the structure of alternatives and the distribution of beliefs 
about the legitimacy of particular decisions. China’s veto power travels the farthest when 
outside options exist, and when those options have gained the support of at least some of 
the other stakeholders. The reason is that it can base its opposition on both pragmatic and 
principled grounds. Conversely, China’s leverage is weakest when there are few credible 
alternatives and when there is a shared belief that punishment is legitimate. Further 
research should explore the causal linkages between the structure of alternatives and the 
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breadth of support for particular decisions as legitimate. Doing so would help to bridge 
the gap between these two approaches to UN politics.  
 
Broader Relevance   
Applied to two more recent cases, the argument appears to be of mixed usefulness 
in explaining China’s positions. On one hand, China’s position with respect to Council 
decisions on Libya in February and March 2011 is more compatible with the explanation 
offered in this study. The crisis caused by the February uprising jeopardized China’s 
stakes in access to energy supplies, especially oil. Given the unavailability of clear 
alternative options, such as external mediation, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing 
viewed multilateral coercion as a preferred method of restoring order. In addition, the 
measures drafted by the U.S. and its allies did not cover Libya’s oil industry, perhaps 
assuaging China’s primary risk. Politically, the importance of the U.S. in China’s 
calculations is unclear, given Washington’s own concerns about intervention. However, a 
critical factor in China’s support for sanctions, as well as its acquiescence on a no-fly 
zone, appears to have been the endorsement of the Arab League for such measures.1135 
The confluence of strategic and political incentives to cooperate can help to account for 
China’s positions even if the problem was, like Burma and Zimbabwe, mainly of an 
internal character.  
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Second, in December 2010 the PRC rejected U.S. attempts in the UNSC to secure 
a condemnation of North Korea’s artillery bombardment of ROK-controlled Yeonpyeong 
Island. This decision is puzzling both from a strategic point of view (i.e. given the failure 
of the 6PT and bilateral intervention, it is unclear what other route to stability the PRC 
preferred), and from a political perspective (i.e. the U.S., Japan and South Korea had all 
lobbied Beijing for a UNSC response). Explaining this instance of opposition may 
depend on domestic-level factors, especially a surge in nationalistic sentiment. 
Opposition to a Council response may have been a signal of “assertiveness” in China’s 
relations with the U.S.1136 
 The problem of “assertiveness” points to a constraint on the broader validity of 
the findings. Although China has been described as a pragmatic actor that modulates its 
positions on changes in the external strategic and political environment, it is not obvious 
that the PRC will always do so, as suggested by the 2010 North Korean example. 
Analysts have observed that strains in civil-military relations within the PRC, especially 
prior to leadership transitions, are especially ripe for uncertainty in China’s external 
relations. A major economic disaster in the PRC may have a similar result.1137 Another 
source of change would be a fundamental shift in China’s basic skepticism on the use of 
sanctions. New interests groups within the PRC, such as companies facing political risk 
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in areas such as Libya, may help gradually to push Beijing towards a higher tolerance 
level with regard to Chapter VII measures.1138   
 Beyond China, the relevance of the findings would depend on two factors. First is 
the extent to which the state in question follows a pragmatic foreign policy, as opposed to 
one dictated by domestic political calculations or nationalism. Russia’s behavior in the 
case of Zimbabwe suggests that Moscow may not be as sensitive to the political costs of 
opposition to the U.S. as the PRC, although more research on Russia’s positions in the 
Council would be required to verify this claim. Second is a latent opposition to the use of 
multilateral pressure a way of managing the problems created by the pariah states. In this 
respect, the analysis would be less useful to the U.S. and its allies than to China, Russia, 
and others, such as India and Brazil, which have expressed misgivings about the role of 
coercion in the Council’s repertoire. Given a realpolitik orientation, the framework used 
in this study may be profitably used to explain the positions of a cast of other skeptics of 
the Western approach to collective security.  
 
China and the Limits of U.S. Power 
 
 Despite its continuing status as the world’s foremost military and economic power, 
U.S. leverage in the UNSC is variable. In general, China prefers not to oppose the U.S. 
unless major political or economic interests are threatened. Although the PRC has 
occasionally used rhetoric and abstentions to distance itself from Washington’s position, 
it has avoided blocking resolutions based on ideological differences alone. In addition, 
China has not been “assertive” for reasons that cannot be explained by reference to its 
strategic and political interests. Rather, the challenge is that, as its interests in pariah 
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states, as well as in neighboring countries that may desire to shield those regimes from 
interference, have expanded, Beijing has concrete reasons to object to Western plans to 
use the machinery of the Council to punish these states. Combined with its veto power, 
China may have both the capabilities and the will to push back against U.S. objectives.  
Based on the analysis, relative power in contentious negotiations turns on 
strategic and political variables. The U.S. is likely to be in a weak position under several 
conditions:  (1) external options remain open, such that U.S.-backed measures do not 
appear to be the only feasible way to address the problem at hand; (2) U.S. stakes are 
limited, insofar as Washington would elect not to prioritize the issue in its bilateral 
relationship with Beijing; (3) Moscow has seconded China’s objections, providing a 
reliable second veto; (4) regional powers have either failed to endorse, or have explicitly 
opposed, the U.S. position; and (5) the U.S. has not actively sought a resolution, but has 
rather brandished the possibility of coercion for ideological reasons, or as a threat. 
Conversely, the U.S. should be more likely to effectively disarm opposition when few, or 
none, of these conditions are present.  
The U.S. may be able to improve its relative power by manipulating both sets of 
factors. Strategically, the goal would be to convince the PRC that its interests are best 
served by means preferred by the U.S. This might include providing new information 
about the severity of the problem, so that Chinese policymakers better understand the 
risks of continued opposition. It might also center on a discussion of the relative merits of 
alternative conflict resolution methods, with the goal of convincing Beijing that 
mediation or bilateral strategies are not likely to address the risks to Chinese interests 
present in the case. Given suspicions about the impartiality and reliability of its data and 
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analysis, the U.S. might draw on third-party information, such as IAEA reports. It might 
also encourage its regional partners, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia in the case of Iran, to 
take the leading role in persuasion.  
Politically, there are two basic strategies. First is to deprive the PRC of diplomatic 
support, raising the costs of intransigence. It might be possible to convince Russia, or 
pivotal regional actors, to move closer to the U.S. position based on persuasion or 
selective concessions. Russia typically has fewer material interests in pariah states than 
China, although the two do rely on each other for reciprocal votes. The support of 
regional security organizations, such as the AU or ASEAN, would be highly valuable, 
though for political or other reasons, these bodies may not desire or be able to provide an 
endorsement. Though difficult, such a strategy is not impossible. Hillary Clinton’s 
effectiveness in working with pro-U.S. regional states, such as the UAE, and ultimately 
gaining the approval of the Arab League for a resolution authorizing a no-fly zone on 
Libya, shows that the local diplomatic balance can tip in the U.S.’s favor.1139 
The second political strategy is to make the issue a priority in the U.S.-China 
bilateral relationship. In general, positive relations with the U.S. are still far more 
important to Beijing than relations with any given pariah state. However, China may 
conclude that the political costs are acceptable if U.S. resolve is low. To counter this 
impression, the U.S. would need to make a convincing case that it is unwilling to accept a 
non-outcome (as on Sudan) or a veto (as on Burma and Zimbabwe), which it in turn 
might do by stressing U.S. material interests, including its economic stakes in the region 
and the security of its regional allies; placing the issue high on the agenda at bilateral 
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meetings, including those that occur at the summit level; dispatching high-ranking envoys 
to Beijing, thus generating domestic political expectations of a compromise; or, in rare 
cases, suggesting that the U.S. might be willing to act without a mandate.1140 In addition, 
the two strategies may be integrated, insofar as the U.S. first seeks to win as broad 
support as possible, and then approaches China from a position of comparative 
diplomatic strength.  
Nevertheless, even with nimble diplomacy, the U.S. might not be able to convince 
the PRC to agree to a decision without substantial concessions. In some instances, China 
might not accept any resolution, no matter how weak.  Washington would then have to 
consider the merits of expending political capital on an effort unlikely to yield 
substantive results and which might send a signal to the state in question that the 
international community is divided, and unprepared to act. Unless driven by the 
normative desire to make a statement, and thus risk a fracturing of the façade of 
unanimity among the P5, as the Bush administration did with respect to Burma and 
Zimbabwe, the U.S. might be better advised not to raise the matter in the first place. In 
short, the U.S. cannot simply dictate outcomes within the UNSC, but nor is its ability to 
achieve goals therein fundamentally endangered by China’s rise. Exceptional skill will 
have to be utilized to identify the relative power balance in specific cases, and to decide 
whether, and how, to exercise influence with respect to other major powers.   
 
Rising Powers and the International Order   
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 Though it can be expected to use power to protect its growing material interests, 
China’s role in the Security Council does not suggest an inclination to undermine the 
rules, norms and power relations that form the basis of the present international order.1141 
As one of five countries guaranteed veto power by the UN Charter, China has an 
incentive to retain the current structure of authority. Though it has rhetorically advocated 
greater representation on the Council for developing countries, China has also not taken 
the lead in pushing for an expansion of number of permanent members.1142 Instead, 
pressure for changes in the Council’s composition has come from others, such as India, 
Brazil and Japan, whose power has grown since the bargain that resulted in the UN 
Charter was struck in 1945.  
 There is also no evidence to suggest that China will seek to promote radically 
different norms than other permanent members. China’s position on sovereignty has 
evolved to the point that Beijing supports intervention under the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ doctrine, which permits Chapter VII action to respond to offenses such as 
genocide and war crimes. In February 2011, China voted in favor of Resolution 1970, 
imposing sweeping sanctions on Libya due to threats posed to civilians during the civil 
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war.1143 Despite its objections on Zimbabwe and Burma, China has condoned the 
Council’s interference in the electoral politics of states, as witnessed by its support for a 
resolution in December 2010 that described electoral violence in Côte D’Ivoire as an 
international threat and renewed a PKO there over the objections of the country’s 
president.1144 The PRC does not appear to be at the helm of an emerging “sovereignty 
bloc.”1145 
 Further, China’s behavior in the Council does not denote an attempt to displace 
the U.S. as a predominant power. Though it has occasionally used bilateral influence and 
lent its support to multilateral dialogue, it has not challenged U.S. leadership by offering 
a coherent vision for how problems such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma or 
Zimbabwe should be addressed. Indeed, the real problem is not that China will become 
too “assertive,” but that it will retreat and fail to offer any leadership on problems where 
it has the capabilities to do so. As Thomas Christensen argues, “China has become far too 
big to stand on the sidelines—let alone to stand in the way—while others attempt to 
resolve these issues.”1146 For the U.S., a PRC that is willing to co-manage security and 
humanitarian problems is valuable; one that absconds with the benefits of cooperation 
while placing the burden on Washington’s shoulders is not.  
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 To be sure, China’s behavior in the UNSC is just one vantage point from which to 
observe its attitudes towards the international order. A status-quo orientation within that 
body does not necessarily imply the absence of revisionism, however defined, in others. 
For instance, along with states such as India, Mexico and Brazil, the PRC has 
successfully lobbied for a greater share of voting authority in the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.1147 It has occasionally promoted norms that conflict with 
those of existing institutions, such as offering ‘no-strings-attached’ aid to developing 
countries, in contrast to the conditional aid offered by the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee.1148 It has also generated new structures, such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, that have unclear implications for the balance of power 
between the PRC, Russia and the West.1149 Thus, China’s participation in the 
international system may be either status-quo or revisionist depending on the 
circumstances.  
 In a broader sense, China is just one actor in the relationship between the “rising 
powers” and the distribution of global power and responsibility. But even here there is no 
clear, single axis of contention. In the Council, China’s interests align with the U.S. in 
preventing a diffusion of authority, while India’s run to the contrary. In the G20, and on 
subjects such as climate change and currency, China has aligned with India, Russia, 
Brazil and others. As Bruce Jones argues, the U.S. is unlikely to face a single peer 
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competitor in the mid-21st century, but rather, “complex, shifting coalitions of 
interest.”1150 A the largest “minority shareholder” in global politics, the U.S. will have to 
develop a sense for when it should lead, when it should encourage others to do so, and 
when to participate as a co-manager of shared problems. Developing prudent strategies in 
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